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Abstract 
Libyan-Tunisian bilateral relations take place in a context shaped by particular historical 
factors in the Maghreb over the past two centuries. Various elements and factors continue to 
define the limitations and opportunities present for regimes and governments to pursue 
hostile or negative policies concerning their immediate neighbours. The period between 1969 
and 2010 provides a rich area for the exploration of inter-state relations between Libya and 
Tunisia during the 20th century and in the first decade of the 21st century. Ideologies such as 
Arabism, socialism, Third Worldism, liberalism and nationalism, dominated the Cold War 
era, which saw two opposing camps: the capitalist West versus the communist East. Arab 
states were caught in the middle, and many identified with one side over the other. generating 
ideological rivalries in the Middle East and North Africa. The anti-imperialist sentiments 
dominating Arab regimes and their citizens led many statesmen and politicians to wage 
ideological struggles against their former colonial masters and even neighbouring states. 
 
Post-independence Tunisia and Libya were involved in the rivalry that was clearly present 
during the 20th century between 'radical' and 'conservative' Arab regimes. A polarised 
ideological climate existed between Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia's first President, and 
Muammar Gaddafi, the young military officer who would later become the ruler of Libya, 
which created a hostile climate. The regimes of Bourguiba and Gaddafi adopted differing 
positions on their relations with other Arab states, Pan-Arabism and a narrowly defined 
Tunisian nationalism, and they clashed on many occasions. Ideology was a major factor 
contributing to the state of relations between Bourguiba and Gaddafi in the period between 
1969 and 1987. Post-1987, Tunisia made a remarkable reversal under Zine El Abidine Ben 
Ali, who had ousted Bourguiba from power, in the area of Libyan-Tunisian bilateral relations. 
The years between 1987 and 2010 witnessed joint co-operation and policies between the 
regimes of Tunisia and Libya, principally in the area of the economy. Gaddafi and Ben Ali 
appear to have focused more on shared economic interests than on implementing a radical 
pan-Arabism or a conservative notion of Tunisian nationalism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The post-colonial Maghreb is home to countries sharing many similarities but also 
differences. Populism in various forms has left its mark on the self-identity of the regimes in 
the region. Further, the relationship between ideology and inter-state relations has been 
particularly strong since the first years of independence. Libya, Tunisia and Algeria adopted 
the various ideologies which have informed their ties with their neighbours. The research I 
propose to undertake in this thesis occurs in a context characterised by many factors which 
influence, to varying degrees, the direction and nature of relations among states in the 
Maghreb. I am interested in examining Libyan-Tunisian inter-state relations between the 
years 1969 and 2010. The hypothesis that I propose to explore in this thesis directly relates 
the impact of ideology on these relations in that period. A decline in ideology after 1987 
caused an improvement in the economic and political ties of Tunisia and Libya, with 
pragmatic and shared interests leading to joint policies. Religion, ideology, politics, 
economics, history and society are part of the broader context which is needed to explore and 
understand the ties between Tunisia and Libya during the Cold War and the rise of the USA 
as the sole superpower in the world.  
Colonialism in the Maghreb was a violent experience, with resistance launched by Arab 
tribesmen and other social groups in both Tunisia and Libya. France and Italy challenged the 
hegemony of the Ottoman Empire and annexed its key provinces, thereby eroding its North 
African territories. French troops occupied Tunisia in 1881 and Italy began its conquest of 
Libya in 1911. While Tunisia was a relatively coherent political entity, Libya was divided 
according to the three provinces:  Fezzan, Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. Informal links between 
tribesmen in these two colonies demonstrated the rejection of the legitimacy of borders which 
did not previously exist. Anti-colonial campaigns were born in Tunisia and Libya, led by the 
Constitutionalist Party and the Senoussiyya Sufi brotherhood, respectively.  
The long struggle against colonialism finally witnessed the independence of Tunisia and 
Libya and the withdrawal of the colonial authorities. In Tunisia, Bourguiba and the Neo-
Constitutionalist Party had negotiated the terms of independence with the French. 
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Muhammad Idris ibn Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Senoussi became King Idris I following years 
spent in exile in Egypt after agitating against Italian colonialism. The new regimes in Tunisia 
and Libya were generally conservative in their foreign policy. Further, Bourguiba and Idris 
had fostered friendly relations with the USA. The latter even invited the British and 
Americans to have military bases in his country. Post-1969, Libya would witness a 
transformation of this geopolitical alignment with the capitalist West, and a movement 
towards the socialist camp, led by the USSR on the world stage, and Nasserist Egypt in the 
Arab world.  
The party-state emerged in the post-colonial era with no tolerance for opposition movements 
or parties. Although populism in the Arab world recognised the self-determination of the 
Arab masses, it did not trust them to run their own affairs. Democracy was rejected as a route 
for the empowerment of people. Instead, many authoritarian regimes adopted an agenda of 
nationalisation in countries such as Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Although 
the 'conservative regimes' of the Arab Gulf escaped the pull of socialism, their rule was based 
on kinship ties or religion, with direct control of their economies. Tunisia had experimented 
with socialism briefly, and the state remained in control over major sectors of the economy, 
from banking to agriculture.  
The role of Islam in Arab politics continues to be misunderstood by many. In the Cold War, 
Islam was employed by various regimes for radical and conservative objectives. Libya, under 
Gaddafi, transformed the Islamic ideology of the regime into a revolutionary appeal to rise 
against imperialism. This was in direct contrast to the conservatism of the Senoussiyya 
monarchy. In Egypt, Abdul Nasser had managed to bring the major religious institutions of 
the country, such as al-Azhar under the control of the state. Islam was effectively nationalised 
for social and political purposes. Bourguiba's Tunisia had also nationalised religion, but it 
was motivated by different objectives. A strict separation between religion and politics was 
forcefully implemented by Bourguiba, like his act of drinking water during the day during 
Ramadan.  
The economies of former colonies in the Maghreb were dependent on Europe and other 
regions for their sources of revenue. Primary sector exports, such as oil and agricultural 
produce, were the primary areas of economic activity for Libya and Tunisia respectively, 
after independence. I mentioned, above, the socialist policies adopted in Tunisia and Libya in 
this period and how they reinforced the authoritarian character of these two regimes. The 
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collapse of the USSR speeded up the process of change from socialism to a regime-led neo-
liberal agenda. Foreign direct investment became the dominant mechanism in the attempt to 
stimulate economic growth. From 2000, Libya witnessed Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi's project of 
'Tomorrow's Libya', based on the rhetoric of political and economic reform. In both Ben Ali's 
Tunisia and Gaddafi's Libya, economic liberalisation was selective and according to the 
desires and benefits of the authoritarian regime in charge. 
 
Importance of the Subject 
The importance of the subject of Libyan-Tunisian relations is located in the effort to build 
bridges after decades of mutual antagonism. Between 1969 and 1987, Tunis and Tripoli were 
involved in a hostile rivalry that was influenced by ideological, personal and political factors. 
Arab unity was a major issue in disagreement in the Maghreb region, and Bourguiba fell out 
with Gaddafi over the integration of all Arab states into a single political union. Interestingly, 
Bourguiba and Gaddafi signed an agreement in 1974 to unite under one government, but that 
was quickly dissolved. The lowest point in Libyan-Tunisian relations came in the events 
following the Gafsa crisis, with Libya threatening to attack the country after a Libyan-backed 
uprising failed. Efforts to integrate states in the Maghreb were complicated by the hostile 
attitudes of the regimes towards each other. Morocco and Algeria had a longstanding dispute 
which spilled onto the thorny subject of the Western Sahara. Ideological disagreements 
divided Arab regimes into 'radical' and 'conservative' camps during the Cold War period. The 
significance of the research in this thesis is based on the factor of ideology that appears to 
have exerted a strong influence on Arab politics. Interestingly, the very ideology of unity that 
was adopted by Gaddafi seems to have contributed to a deterioration in unity with other Arab 
states. Tunisian nationalism, for Bourguiba, narrowed down the prospects of political and 
economic integration. From 1987, there was a move from political union based on the 
ideology of Arabism, to economic integration based on pragmatic interests, a shared neo-
liberal agenda. A historical perspective looking at the colonial and post-colonial periods will 
be very useful to identify the context of the exploration of the bilateral relations between 
Libya and Tunisia. Further, the factors which pulled apart or pushed together these two 
countries can help shed light on other case studies involving Arab states that are cooperating 
in various areas. 
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Justification and Aims of the Research 
There is an urgent need to fill a gap in the existing literature on the Maghreb in general, and 
on Libyan-Tunisian relations in particular. Topics such as European Union-Maghreb ties, 
Arab integration projects in the form of the Gulf Co-operation Council and the Arab Maghreb 
Union, and the lack of an initiative towards Arab unity, have been tackled in detail. The 
failure of pan-Arabism to unite the Arabs has been debated by Western scholars and Arab 
intellectuals. However, no attention has been paid to political and economic relations between 
Tunisia and Libya in the independence era. Although the Bourguiba and Gaddafi regimes 
were located in a context where Arabism was the dominant ideology, no in-depth studies 
exist on Libyan-Tunisian ties. I aim to fill the gap in the scholarship on the projects of 
integration among states in the Maghreb through the research I plan to undertake for my 
thesis. Further, the existing theories on integration and co-operation are unable to provide 
adequate explanations of Arab efforts to unite, their failures and successes, and the 
transformation of previously negative ties between Tunisia and Libya after 1987, when Zine 
El Abidine Ben Ali ousted Bourguiba after 31 years in power. Neo-functionalism, 
institutionalism and inter-governmentalism and the lack sensitivity to the particular historical, 
political, economic, social and cultural dimensions of the Maghreb in a post-colonial context. 
I thus propose to use a grounded theory approach to generate a theory that is capable of 
exploring Libyan-Tunisian relations. Additionally, the formulation of categories of analysis 
and interpretation will help to identify the key aspects of the subject under investigation. The 
primary sources collected will inspire and inform these categories, and I aim to explore the 
hypothesis and answer the research questions in a dynamic process of research collection and 
analysis. My research will be characterised by two interdependent stages: data collection and 
subsequent analysis. I will collect primary sources in the form of interview answers and 
official government documents. Analysis of these sources will take place through a critical 
examination of language. A recurring pattern of words and phrases, as well the presence of 
similar or different terms, will be identified.  
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Outline of Chapters 
Chapter One 
Chapter 1 of this thesis begins with a statement of the object of enquiry, providing some 
details on the scope of the research proposed in this thesis concerning the regimes which 
ruled Libya and Tunisia between 1969 and 2010. I will elaborate on the significance of this 
study in a regional context that lacks supra-national organisations which could foster Arab 
integration. I will outline the hypothesis and research questions at the heart of this thesis. The 
theoretical framework and methodology based on grounded theory, complemented by 
discourse analysis, is discussed and stated in clear terms in the final parts of the chapter.  
Chapter Two 
In Chapter 2 I review the relevant secondary sources on Libyan-Tunisian relations and on the 
Maghreb in general. Political scientists, anthropologists, economists and social scientists have 
studied the various aspects of this region of the Arab world. The prospect of engagement co-
operation with the European Union is an area of academic interest among many other areas. 
Secondary sources have been divided into three categories in my review. The first part 
examines the literature on the Mediterranean and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Part 
two examines studies on Arab regional blocs and organisations. The third part looks at the 
scholarship on Arab states and their level of economic co-operation.  
Chapter Three 
Chapter 3 will examine how colonialism began in the Maghreb, with a particular focus on 
Libya and Tunisia and the era just after their independence in the 1950s. Five parts make up 
this chapter as I highlight the different stages of the largely informal relations binding the 
colonial subjects of French Tunisia and Italian Libya. Group solidarity appears to have united 
tribesmen from both these colonies. Resistance fighters, such as Khalifah Ben Asker and 
Mohammad Daghbaji, waged campaigns against the colonial occupation of their lands from 
both sides of the colonial Libyan-Tunisian border. The formulation of the idea of the 
Republic of North Africa by Young Tunisians expressed the sentiments of political union and 
self-determination. In the period of early independence, a republic had emerged in Tunisia 
under the leadership of Bourguiba, after he had abolished the monarchy, and Libya saw the 
adoption of the Senoussiyya monarchy.  
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Chapter Four 
Chapter 4 highlights the political contexts of Libya and Tunisia in the period after 
independence, with emphasis on the factors of domestic politics, their economies and 
religion. Knowledge of these three areas will help to understand foreign policy behaviour. 
The emergence of authoritarianism had eliminated opposition to the regimes of Bourguiba, 
Ben Ali and Gaddafi in an effort to maintain their rule and to implement their political 
visions. Two dissimilar economic systems characterise these two countries, with Libya being 
dependent on oil, and the Tunisian economy being based on agriculture and tourism. Islam 
was used by Bourguiba, Ben Ali, King Idris I and Gaddafi in various ways to uphold 
secularisation, the -option of religion, conservatism and revolution, respectively.  
Chapter Five 
In Chapter 5 I will analyse the primary sources, mainly the interviews collected, motivated by 
the aim of finding out to what extent ideology dominated Libyan-Tunisian relations between 
1969 and 1987. The Francophile Bourguiba, who sided with the capitalist West, was in direct 
opposition to the Arabism of Gaddafi, who backed the radical regimes of the Arab world. I 
will examine the sources of division which emerged, such as Bourguiba's controversial 
speech at Jericho in Palestine, the coup d'êtat against him in 1963, the Gafsa crisis, and I end 
with a discussion on the turning point in Libyan-Tunisian relations, with the new Ben Ali 
regime in control of Tunisia.  
Chapter Six 
Chapter 6 will examine the changed behaviour of the regimes in charge of Tunis and Tripoli 
after 1987. A new regime in Tunisia created a new opportunity for Gaddafi to foster closer 
relations with his neighbour. My discussion is divided into eight parts, with each part 
highlighting a specific aspect of Libyan-Tunisian relations. Differences in the economies and 
the past policies adopted in Tunisia and Libya will be examined. The other parts of the 
chapter focus on the stage of unorganised Libyan-Tunisian economic relations that led to the 
rise of a vibrant black market, known as 'the Tunisian Souk'; the implementation of the 
National Treatment Principle, seeking to harmonise the rules on Tunisian and Libyan goods; 
the Tunisian-Libyan Economic Chamber's activities in the promotion of cross-border 
commercial opportunities; efforts to build a common and appropriate infrastructure for 
bilateral projects and the formation of mega projects; the existence of the private sector, the 
international embargo on Libya and its impact on the development of Libyan-Tunisian 
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economic links, and the lack of harmonisation in the banking and tourist sectors, 
accompanied by a climate of unpredictability.  
Chapter Seven 
Chapter 7 will examine Libyan-Tunisian relations through the formation of regional 
organisations, such as the Arab Maghreb Union and the African Union. Increasing levels of 
cross-border trade between the two countries also took place. I will analyse official 
documents collected from state archives in order to identify the motivations underlying the 
improvement in Libyan-Tunisian relations from 1987 to 2010. I will also seek to explore how 
the decline in the ideology created a context that was favourable for the abandonment of old 
hostilities. There are five parts which make up this chapter, beginning with the Libyan-
Tunisian effort to co-ordinate their relations through the Arab Maghreb Union and the 
African Union, followed by an examination of joint commercial policies that were aimed at 
imposing tax exemptions on Tunisian and Libyan goods. The third part continued this 
examination, looking at the rise in the commercial exchange of these good crossing the 
border. Part four focuses on the unsuccessful attempt at the bilateral construction of the Ras 
Ajdir customs post on the Libyan-Tunisian border. The fifth chapter examines the economic 
co-operation in the form of joint investments, whereby a number of actors co-ordinated their 
activities for this purpose.  
Chapter Eight 
Chapter 8 will continue the examination of Libyan-Tunisian bilateral relations, focusing on 
specific projects. I will analyse official documents and agreements from state archives which 
were collected during my research. Joint committees were formed only for the purpose of 
driving bilateral relations. Three parts of this chapter examine the various dimensions of 
Libyan-Tunisian ties. I have divided these parts according to the primary, secondary and 
tertiary sectors of the economy, and they are subdivided further into subsections. While Libya 
lacked an industrial sector, Bourguiba made the first moves to develop it with the long-term 
consequences of establishing a manufacturing base in Tunisia. Further, Tunisia's tourism 
sector benefited from Libyan oil money, which allowed the latter country to make substantial 
investments in hotels and resorts. The authoritarian regimes in Tunis and Tripoli played a 
major role in managing joint relations with state-owned companies that were taking the 
initiative.  
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Conclusion 
The conclusion of this thesis will reflect on the analyses from various chapters. A set of 
reflections in the form of a set of categories for analysis will generate a theory from the 
primary sources. Grounded theory will be one of the primary contributions that I seek to 
make through my research. Libyan-Tunisian bilateral relations in the context of the 
dominance and of a subsequent decline in the ideology between 1969 and 2010, will benefit 
greatly from such an approach. The categories of analysis are international and regional 
factors, the durability of authoritarianism, the dynamics between the informal and formal 
spheres, and economic motivations. My research will also be reviewed according to its 
strengths and weaknesses. The final part of my conclusion will propose future areas of 
research based on the analysis and reflections contained in this thesis.  
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CHAPTER ONE: THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
 
Introduction 
North African states have been shaped by factors within and without the region. For the last 
two centuries, the impositions of the modern state and colonialism have often gone hand in 
hand to leave their mark on political institutions. Tunisia and Libya are two countries with a 
common legacy, but with different colonial and post-colonial repercussions. They also share 
an important border, that acts as a porous space for political, economic, cultural and social 
exchange. The fate of these two states was and is, to a certain extent, dependent on the other's 
internal stability and prosperity. During the twentieth century, the factor of ideology played a 
primary role in determining Libyan-Tunisian relations. However, the importance of ideology 
appears to have experienced a decline towards the end of the century. Elite-driven policies 
focusing on neo-liberal economic development replaced the grand narratives of Arabism or 
Socialism. This chapter outlines the object of inquiry and how research will be carried out in 
order to address the hypothesis and the key questions proposed in this thesis.  
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part states in explicit terms what the object of 
inquiry is. Both the period of examination and the key facets of the relations between Tunisia 
and Libya will be identified. Heads of state, such as Habib Bourguiba, Muammar Gaddafi 
and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, appear to wield a lot of influence in how their countries interact 
with each other. Changes in policies were usually introduced as a result of either the ousting 
of rulers who had been replaced by new individuals espousing opposing, if not contradictory, 
views or a reversal of political and economic policies by incumbent leaders.  
 
The next part explores the significance of the study to be undertaken. Relations between 
Tunisia and Libya take place in a context without the existence of effective supra-national 
institutions. Apart from the League of Arab States and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), 
there is a lack of organisations that are formally dedicated to the unity of Arab states. Further, 
the Arab League and the AMU have proved to lack the political will or resources to push 
countries, notably Libya and Tunisia, towards integration.  
 
Part three of this chapter contains the formulation of the hypothesis guiding the inquiry into 
Libyan-Tunisian relations. Pragmatic policies appear to characterise the relations between 
Tunisia and Libya from the early 1990s until 2010. Various contexts serve as important 
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points of reference from which to interpret the political changes in North Africa.  The key 
questions concerning these relations are also asked and these are underpinned by an objective 
of focusing on the factors leading to the de-emphasis on ideology in the process of inter-state 
interactions accompanied by the increasing importance of economics led by a state-elite. In 
light of the proposed hypothesis and the questions to be posed in this thesis, I will apply 
discourse analysis to the data collected in my research.  
 
Part four discusses the use of qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. These 
methods inform the way I approach the subject of the longstanding and contentious relations 
between Tunisia and Libya in a post-colonial environment. More importantly, I aim to use 
discourse analysis that is motivated by the aim to generate a theory that is able to explain 
Libyan-Tunisian relations based on the changing historical and collective nature of human 
agency.  
 
Object of Inquiry: Scope of the Study 
I propose to study Libyan-Tunisian relations from 1969 until 2010. The focus on this period 
is motivated by the sequence of events that is characterised both by efforts towards political 
union and heightened tensions between Tunisia and Libya. Despite the longevity of the reigns 
of Habib Bourguiba and Muammar Gaddafi, these two countries experienced a remarkable 
diversity of phases in inter-state relations. Bourguiba's ousting by Zine El Abidine Ben Ali 
also contributed to further changes, as Ben Ali ascended to the presidency fortified with his 
own ideas about Tunisia's place in the world. The factor of ideology appears in various guises 
alongside the impetus for greater political and economic co-operation on a pragmatic basis. In 
certain instances, the two converge.  
 
Additionally, ideology seems to have dominated the politics of most Arab state elites and 
their populations in the second part of the twentieth century. From pan-Arabism to Third 
Worldism, the regional policies of Tunisia and Libya in North Africa were subject to various 
influences. Moves towards greater co-operation between Tunisia and Libya have occurred 
since the military coup of 1969 in Libya, which witnessed their short-lived union under the 
Islamic Arab Republic in 1974. However, crises were not absent between Libya and Tunisia. 
The Gafsa incident, reportedly involving the capture of the town by Libyan-trained Tunisians, 
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precipitated a severe deterioration in political and economic associations. Gaddafi's 
ideological beliefs, one may argue, served as the backdrop to the intrusion into the political 
sovereignty of a neighbouring country.  
 
The Lockerbie incident was a watershed moment for Libya's regional policy in North Africa 
with the imposition of an international embargo on the country. Ben Ali pursued relations 
with Libya very differently than his predecessor as he turned his attention towards making 
Tunisia a model of neo-liberal development, thereby abandoning a great many of the 
ideological claims of Bourguiba. The period between 1969 and 2010 thus provides a rich 
ground from which to explore the decline of ideology in the inter-state relations of Tunisia 
and Libya. In this thesis, I will undertake an in-depth analysis of these relations with a special 
focus on the state policies led by various regimes in both countries.  
 
Significance of the Study 
Libya and Tunisia are two countries which have made considerable progress towards political 
union in the past, only to make a radical reversal aiming to suspend interdependent economic 
links. The Maghreb provides a broader context to this meandering state of affairs. There is a 
common frame of reference for most, if not all, of the states in this region. History, culture, 
language, economics, bind together Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya in an environment 
that is seemingly conducive to political integration on the same level as the European Union 
(EU). Despite the shared dimensions that make the Maghreb a distinctive and unique mosaic 
of nations, each individual state enjoys closer bilateral ties with the EU than with its own 
neighbours. Since its inception in the late 1980s, many doubts have been raised concerning 
the political viability of the AMU.. Narrowly conceived interests of states, raison d'état, have 
dominated the thinking of policy-makers in North Africa.  
 
Ideology has also been a major source of contention where nationalisms of various types have 
competed against one another in a tension-filled political climate. Bitter rivalry between 
Algeria and Morocco over the question of Western Sahara, with the former demanding its 
self-determination and the latter claiming the territory as part of its sovereignty, as a recurring 
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theme.1 Libyan-Tunisian relations thus appear to have, to a considerable degree in recent 
years, transcended the obstacles hindering closer political and economic co-operation, with 
profound implications for some form of integration. For Michael Hudson, the end of Arabism 
is clearly apparent, but the push towards co-operation among a diversity of states, while 
retaining their political sovereignty, is very much alive.2 Regionalism continues to exert 
influence on inter-state associations.  
 
The Maghreb displays, as previously noted, the ingredients for an ever closer integration that 
is similar to that in other regions. However, the absence of supra-national organisations able 
to bring individual states to negotiate their differences for a common goal has severely 
restricted any efforts towards political and economic unity. The closer ties thus enjoyed 
between Tunisia and Libya from the early 1990s until 2010 represent a remarkable 
divergence from the conflictual relations among the nations of the Maghreb. Another 
important dimension lay in the fact that these closer ties were formed largely without the 
involvement of supra-national institutions: regimes and open borders facilitated an exchange 
of people and goods.  
 
Libya and Tunisia find themselves in a region lacking the political will and resources to 
impose a catalyst for integration from above. The lack of co-operation among the countries of 
the Maghreb can be better understood as a product of both internal and external factors. 
Dependency on oil revenues, as the main source of national income, has facilitated direct ties 
with oil-importing countries and regional blocs, such as the EU.3 Algeria and Libya are two 
prime examples of nations which have forged bilateral trading connections with Southern 
European countries across the Mediterranean Sea. Europe continues to be the main trading 
partner for both of these North African countries.  
 
Little or no investment in the industrial sectors in the economy of the Maghrebi countries has 
led to a weak manufacturing infrastructure. Subsequently, Western countries have filled the 
                                                 
1 Y.H. Zoubir, 'Algerian‐Moroccan Relations and Their Impact on Maghribi Integration', The Journal of North 
African Studies5/3 (2000), 43-74. 
2 Michael C. Hudson, 'Introduction: Arab Integration: An Overview', 28, in Michael C. Hudson (ed.), Middle 
East: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).  
3 Abdul Hassan Zalzala. Joint Arab Action and the Comprehensive Development and Self-Reliance: Models 
Rely on Oil, Not Self-Reliance (Beirut: University Institute for Research, 1987).p 7 . 
13 
 
vacuum in exporting industrialised goods and products to the region.4 Unstable relations 
among the states in the Maghreb have had deleterious effects on the level of economic 
exchange. Profound disagreements motivated by clashing political agendas appear to be 
contributing to the poor relations within AMU.5 Libyan-Tunisian attempts at economic co-
operation in the 1990s must be situated in a context that is in part informed by the shared 
political and economic experience of the Maghreb.6 
 
Hypothesis 
Repeated failures to generate enough momentum for political unity in the Maghreb were 
largely based on the conflicting interests of each state. The postcolonial context of Tunisia 
and Libya was characterised equally by opportunities and limitations for greater political and 
economic co-operation. In this period, the widespread proliferation of various ideologies, 
ranging from Arabism to Socialism to Third Worldism, inevitably influenced the thinking of 
state elites in Arab countries. Paradoxically, the adoption of the idea of the creation of a 
supra-national state among the Arabs, particularly by Gaddafi, proved to be divisive. Arabism 
was largely understood in terms of revolution, rather than gradual integration or co-operation 
among sovereign states. There were several attempts at the creation of a political union of 
Arab states during the Cold War. From 1969, the ruling regime in Libya actively pursued the 
path of Arab nationalism which was on the march during the fifties and Sixties. The Gaddafi 
regime in Libya, influenced by Arab nationalism that reached unprecedented heights in the 
aftermath of the Suez crisis, led to the existence of the United Arab Republic between Egypt 
and Syria in 1958. However, most of these attempts were not spearheaded by supra-national 
organisations. Instead, the initiative was driven by fusing existing national institutions, which 
later separated when political union was deemed to be a failure. Gaddafi's Libya was a 
passionate yet ineffectual advocate of Arab unity in the short-lived political projects of unity 
with Egypt and Sudan in 1970, Tunisia in 1974, Syria in 1981, and Morocco in 1984.7  
                                                 
4Mustafa Abdullah, 'Joint Arab Action and the Comprehensive Development and Common Self-Reliance', Unity 
Magazine, NO 89 (February 1992).pp. 45-59. 
5Mustafa Khushaim, 'Euro - Maghreb Partnership Agreements and Its Impact on Foreign Trade of AMU.', 
Maghreb University Magazine, No 7 (2009).p 49. 
6ibid.p 51. 
7Meelad Harthy, Libyan Unitary Experiences (Jamaheryah Publishing House, 1997).p 147.  See also, kaead 
Mohammed Tarbosh, Unitary Experiences in the Arab world.( First edn. Alexandria . Egypt,campus Modern 
office,2006. 
14 
 
Other grand projects with revolutionary implications for the Maghreb can be found in the 
socialism espoused by Algeria and Tunisia, which was later replaced by neo-liberal reforms 
aimed at creating a vibrant private sector in line with the dictates of the International 
Monetary Fund. Bourguiba had espoused Tunisian nationalism, which rejected Arabism and 
other revolutionary ideologies during his rule. The ideology of the Tunisian regime defined 
the nation in narrow terms, ignoring the claims of radical politicians, such as Jamal Abdul 
Nasser and Gaddafi, which then led to a bitter rivalry between Bourguiba and these men. For 
a few decades, Gaddafi formulated his project of Arab unity through the discourse of 
revolution. Perhaps the forceful implementation of Gaddafi's ideology was a cause of failure, 
as it soured relations with neighbouring regimes in the quest to base their rule on stability 
rather than the ensuing uncertainty that is normally associated with revolutions. However, 
Sanusi Hammad attributes this failure to the socialist system adopted in Libya during that 
period. This system resembled, in its economic policies, the socialist system followed in the 
USSR during the same period.8  
 
In the last decade of the twentieth century, the Libyan regime, still under the firm grasp of 
Gaddafi, changed its policies about how to achieve a form of Arab unity. Gradual integration 
of the economic and social spheres of the countries located in the Maghreb became the 
guiding agenda. In light of the above, I propose the following hypothesis: two distinct periods 
characterise inter-state relations between Tunisia and Libya. The first period, between 1969 
and 1987, was primarily marked by tensions, with Bourguiba and Gaddafi espousing 
opposing ideologies for the countries they ruled. While Tunisia fostered amicable links with 
Europe and the United States of America, Libya turned to other newly independent nations in 
what became known as the Third World, inspired by anti-imperialism. Libya was not a 
bystander in crises such as the Arab-Israeli conflict.9 The second period begins with the 
succession of Ben Ali to the Tunisian office of President in 1987 and it ends with his 
overthrow in 2010. Neo-liberal reforms were implemented that sought to curb governmental 
intervention in the development of an economy with free market mechanisms.10 Ben Ali 
discarded Bourguiba's previous insistence on Tunisia, as a nation distinct from other Arab 
                                                 
8Sanusi Hammad, Political and Economic System in Libya (First edn.: Tripoli: Publishing House, 2008).p 139.  
9 Abu Qasim al-mabruk, 'Effects of Political Factors on Arab Maghreb Union', MA Dissertation ( Politics 
Department (Tripoli, Libya: Academy for Graduate Studies, 2007). P 56. 
10Mustafa Khushaim, 'The Inter-Arab trade. From the political sensitivity to the digital gap :A case study of the 
Libyan foreign trade towards the Arab states.', Conference of inter-Arab trade and economic integration 
(University of Jordan, Amman, 20-22 September 2004).pp124-145. 
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states. Instead, he began a process of fostering better relations with regimes in the Arab 
world, the Maghreb and Africa.  
 
In the early 1990s, harsh international sanctions were imposed on Libya as a result of the 
accusations levelled against the role of Gaddafi in the Lockerbie bombing. Further isolation 
after the dissolution of the USSR changed the international balance of power in the world to 
the disadvantage of Libya's pan-Arabist and Third World policies. It can be argued that a 
more moderate and rational approach to global and regional issues of politics were adopted 
by Tripoli.11 Ideological considerations seem to have been set aside for the overt objective of 
economic survival in a radically changed geopolitical context. The decline of ideology in 
Libyan-Tunisian relations created a previously restricted opportunity for economic and 
political exchange. Differences of opinion in the ideological sphere positioned two 
longstanding regimes against each other. Crucial links between Libya and Tunisia, the 
hypothesis I will try to establish in this thesis, improved when ideology was de-emphasised in 
the quest for greater political stability premised on economic co-operation.  
 
Key Questions 
The contemporary history of Libya and Tunisia is bound together in a sequence of events 
which requires investigation into the factors leading to both antagonism and co-operation. For 
this purpose, I propose to ask a set of questions against the backdrop of the above hypothesis. 
These questions will enquire into how relations between Libya and Tunisia were conceived 
and into the changes occurring in the conceptions articulated. I have divided the questions in 
two categories. The first category contains the primary question. Category two poses further 
questions that are derived from the primary question in an attempt to address the hypothesis 
stated in this thesis.  
 
Category One: 
1. How has the decline of the role of ideology in Libyan-Tunisian relations led to greater co-
operation between the two countries? 
 
Category Two: 
                                                 
11ibid. 
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1.1 What is the context within which Libyan-Tunisian relations have developed? 
1.2 What were the motivations behind the inter-state policies pursued by Libyan and Tunisian 
statesmen? 
1.3 How were Libyan-Tunisian relations manifested? 
1.4 What are the challenges and obstacles that hinder co-operation between Libya and 
Tunisia? 
 
These questions will be posed in relation to the ideas, opinions and views of political groups 
which have directly participated in the decision-making process on inter-state relations 
between Libya and Tunisia. Official narratives produced by political elites possess a lot of 
weight in exploring the hypothesis and answering the research questions contained in this 
section. I am chiefly interested in finding out what the motivations for greater co-operation 
between Libya and Tunisia are, against a context which has not necessarily led to amicable 
links between these two states and other Maghrebi nations. Further, the potential for Libyan-
Tunisian co-operation was realised, to a larger degree than in previous periods, in a new 
situation. A process of 'de-ideologisation' appears to have effected an improvement in the 
relations between these two countries. Foreign policy initiatives were premised on the 
achievement of joint interests which were conceived in a context of both neo-liberal reforms 
for Tunisia, and the need to break out of political isolation for Libya. Local dynamics were 
important in facilitating co-operation across borders, without the precarious threat of ideology 
leading to the deterioration of political ties and negatively affecting economic links.  
 
I aim to explore how this co-operation unfolded with a new leader in charge of Tunisia and a 
dramatically transformed geopolitical context for Gaddafi's Libya. The insights arrived at 
through addressing the hypothesis and answering the research questions ought to lead to a 
new body of information, which can then be used by policy-makers involved in deepening 
the ties between Tunisia and Libya in the Maghreb without being entangled in a web of 
ideological debates. Co-operation rather than antagonism is the key concept emanating from 
this line of inquiry. Improvement in relations between Libya and Tunisia can perhaps be used 
as standard from which to evaluate the existing relations among the other nations of the 
Maghreb and also a model for emulation to foster greater integration based on plural 
sovereignties. The Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee is a noteworthy organisation 
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dedicated to resolving the bilateral differences between Tunisia and Libya. Minutes and the 
decisions from this committee will demonstrate the motivations, tactics and goals of 
individuals who are charged with overcoming the obstacles to Libyan-Tunisian integration.  
 
Research Methodology 
Inter-state relations can be subjected to a variety of methods of investigation. The focus on 
changes in policies needs to be situated next to continuities of practices and norms. Political 
actors are motivated by many intentions to pursue a course of action. Regimes are an example 
of a collective organisation composed of individuals that are united due to class interests, 
political affiliations, kinship ties or ideology. Libya and Tunisia were ruled by regimes which 
displayed a remarkable ability to withstand internal and external challenges. The reigns of 
Bourguiba and Gaddafi covered more than half of the period of independence with their 
influence still being felt in the present. Different factors pulled and pushed Tunisia and Libya 
in the opposite directions of antagonism and co-operation over three decades.  
 
However, the succession of Ben Ali in Tunisia ushered in a new era of neo-liberal economics 
to the northernmost tip of the Maghreb. The dominance of ideology, particularly Arab 
nationalism, thus fell victim to the policy of the free-market that was adopted in Tunis and 
later benefitted Tripoli. In this thesis, I will investigate why and how this change took place, 
with particular reference to the motivations of political actors and the increasingly frequent 
instances of co-operation between Tunisia and Libya. I will employ a qualitative 
methodological framework to examine the primary sources in the process of addressing the 
hypothesis proposed. Additionally, the research process is divided into two stages. Stage one 
is centred on the collection of data, which is followed by the interpretation of this data at the 
second stage.  
Primary Sources 
Various research methods will be used in the course of this research. They are underpinned 
by the need to collect and interpret data. There exist an immense number of sources, ranging 
from interviews to government documents to correspondence. Data from primary sources, it 
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is argued, possess a high degree of reliability due to their not being processed.12 First-hand 
information from decision-makers or participants is an invaluable source for the researcher. 
The data contains the testimony of individuals who act as witnesses to the significant 
moments in contemporary history. Potential risks of exaggeration and distortion cannot be 
ruled out.13 Subjective elements necessarily intrude in the act of retelling or recording a 
distant or more recent event, with political, ideological or personal biases being present.  
Personal Interviews  
Interviews with prominent individuals will be used to collect data. Eliciting information from 
the speech of interviewees is the objective guide to my use of this method.14 Engaging with 
interviewees through a face-to-face technique will be appropriate for the purpose of obtaining 
a depth of meaning and to gain further insights and understanding of the themes of the 
interview.15 Further, the adoption of interviews will produce a set of rich information to be 
interpreted in a variety of ways. Different types of interviews can used to elicit various levels 
of information from interviewees. In the next subsection, I will briefly outline three types of 
interviews: structured interviews, unstructured or in-depth interviews, and semi-structured 
interviews.  
Structured Interviews 
Previously prepared questions are posed to interviewees in structured interviews. The use of 
closed-ended questions is intended to provide uniformity to interviews, based on the same 
questions for a single design scope.16 A large sample of interviewees is identified in the 
attempt to discern a pattern of similarities or differences of opinion. 
Unstructured or In-depth Interviews 
Open-ended questions are asked in unstructured interviews. The primary objective of this 
type of interview is to collect in-depth information from interviewees.17 Further, different 
                                                 
12Jack R Fraenkel, Norman E Wallen, and Helen H Hyun, How to Design and Evaluate Research in Education 
(: McGraw-Hill New York, 1993).. 
13Ibid. 
14K. Louise Barriball & A. While, 'Collecting Data Using a Semi‐Structured Interview: A Discussion Paper', 
Journal of Advanced Nursing, 19/2 (2006), 328-35. 
15J. Ritchie & J. Lewis, Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers 
(Sage Publications Limited, 2003).p. 138. 
16B.J. Zimmerman & M.M. Pons, 'Development of a Structured Interview for Assessing Student Use of Self-
Regulated Learning Strategies', American Educational Research Journal, 23/4 (1986), 614-28. 
17W. Moyle, 'Unstructured Interviews: Challenges When Participants Have a Major Depressive Illness', Journal 
of Advanced Nursing, 39/3 (2002), 266-73.p. 267. 
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participants can be interviewed, which “might generate data with different structures and 
patterns.”18 A sense of anarchy in the focus of the themes to be explored may emerge. 
However, unstructured interviews grant a very large space of freedom to both the interviewer 
and interviewee in which to discuss issues without being hindered by a rigid formula of 
questioning. 
Semi-Structured Interviews 
The acquisition of information through open-ended questions is the defining characteristic of 
semi-structured interviews.19 A certain degree of flexibility is present in the posing of 
questions. Varying levels of standardisation are centred on a drawn up set of questions.20 
Participants should be not stopped when their answers go beyond the conceived scope of the 
themes of the research.21 A simultaneous advantage and disadvantage of employing semi-
structured interviews is that interviewees are granted a wide margin of freedom, thereby 
weakening the influence that an interviewer is able to exert in shaping the overall thematic 
focus of research collection. However, this aspect is substantially less prominent than in 
unstructured interviews.  
 
Semi-structured interviews are the most appropriate method of the three types of interviews 
surveyed above for the research framework for this thesis. Participants will be interviewed in 
order to create the space needed to voice their experiences and opinions freely and without 
undue pressure. Interviewees form a crucial source of data through the use of this method of 
data collection. Written questionnaires have not been adopted in this research due to their 
inability to generate the level and depth of information that is needed to explore both the 
hypothesis and to answer the research questions.22 Primary sources, such as firsthand 
accounts from interviewees on key policy decisions and events lay the foundations for the 
construction of a theory that is able to investigate the hypothesis that is outlined earlier in this 
chapter.  
 
                                                 
18Yan Zhang and Barbara M Wildemuth, 'Unstructured Interviews', Applications of Social Research Methods to 
Questions in Information and Library Science. (Westport, CT: Libraries Unlimited, (2009).p.2. 
19U. Flick, An Introduction to Qualitative Research (Sage Publications Limited, Newbury Park, 1998).p.94. 
20S.F. Rallis & G.B. Rossman, Learning in the Field: An Introduction to Qualitative Research (Sage 
Publications, Incorporated, 2011). 
21H.R. Bernard, Research Methods in Cultural Anthropology (Sage Publications. Newbury Park, 1988).p.205. 
22Judith Bell, Doing Your Research Project : trans ( 1 edn.: Cairo: Al-Farouq Publishing House, 2006).p 145. 
20 
 
The decline in the role of ideology in the decision-making process of Tunisia and Libya from 
the 1990s until 2010 will thus require the interpretation of discourses that were present 
among the leaders of both states. Participants with direct or indirect roles in Libyan-Tunisian 
relations are to be recruited as interviewees. A list of specific questions is to be formulated 
that aim to elicit data in the form of answers from the interviewees. Further, these questions 
should be derived from the hypothesis and the key questions in the light of the known 
background, experience and knowledge of participants.23  
 
Challenges are always present at this stage of data collection. Interviews may experience a 
variety of issues. The duration of interviews can be much longer than anticipated. It will 
require extensive organisation to prepare interviews with participants based in countries 
where the researcher does not reside. Overseas visits to conduct interviews in Tunisia and 
Libya are necessary for this research. The availability of interviewees will thus need to 
ascertained and further arrangements made in order to meet them, e.g., the time and place of 
interview. Interviewees will be presented with information explaining the nature of the 
research and its goals, an official letter from the doctoral supervisor and the academic 
institution of attendance, reassurance that opinions or information will only be used for 
academic purposes, asking permission to make audio recordings of the interview, etc. 
In a case where first-hand information is obtained from high profile decision-makers in Libya 
and Tunisia, this is a challenge. The nature of both regimes makes getting information very 
difficult, because such people think that it is safer not to reveal any data that might affect 
them in different ways in terms of safety and the upgrading of their official position in the 
future.  This has been a challenge to me during my data collection.  I made a huge effor to 
convince those interviewees that my research is for academic purposes and will not be used 
for any political purposes. I also tried to overcome this difficulty by finding ways to 
circumvent it, since I have wide connections and am well-known in Libyan society as both an 
academic and researcher. In addition, I have very good connections with a number of 
colleagues in Tunisian Universities who helped me to contact high profile interviewees in 
Tunisia. Building a kind of confidence in these people through colleagues and friends thus 
facilitated the collecting of the data for this research project. 
                                                 
23 ibid.pp.152-156  
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However, it seems that some decision-makers in Libya and Tunisia retained fears and did not 
reveal information because of the sensitivity nature of these data, or because of the fear that it 
would be used for political purposes. However,, on the other hand, I was surprised at the 
amount of very useful information that I collected from interviewees.  
Official and Past Documents  
State archives are home to a rich assortment of primary sources. Contemporary and historical 
documents, ranging from treatises to internal correspondence between policy-makers, can be 
used to construct an interpretation of both the present and past. Comparative studies of 
political systems have employed experience of international affairs to promote relations and 
resolve diplomatic crises between states.24 In this thesis, the historical background of the 
Maghreb plays a pivotal role in shaping contemporary Libyan-Tunisian relations. Identifying 
the appropriate and relevant documents from government archives which can shed light on 
these relations can deepen the scope of the research to be undertaken here. However, the 
concerns of security surrounding past events, and the need for political sensitivity in the 
current period may impede access to revealing documents.  
 
In light of these obstacles, I have resorted to a few alternative sources of data to compensate 
for any gaps in my knowledge of important events or decisions. Interviews with prominent 
individuals who were either present in the decision-making processes of Libya and Tunisia, 
or had direct access to individuals who were, can in some way mitigate the lack of access to 
certain government documents. I have compiled a number of official documents from a 
variety of Tunisian and Libyan sources. They will be subjected to an in-depth examination 
and critical interpretation of their contents. Copies of signed agreements concerning business, 
security, politics and economics, exist between Tunisia and Libya. Further, there are 
government documents which have never been previously cited in academic studies. These 
vary from colonial treaties during the Ottoman-French period to more contemporary bilateral 
agreements on increased economic co-operation between the two post-colonial nations.  
 
I will use secondary sources to identify gaps in the current scholarship on the themes which 
require investigation. A variety of texts serve as a foundation for my research into the decline 
of ideology in the inter-state relations between Tunisia and Libya and the subsequent 
                                                 
24  Ahmad Hamdani, Foundation in Political Science (Amman: Majdalawi Book House, 2004). P 133.   
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improvement in these relations in the period under examination: books, unpublished theses 
and research projects, magazines, newspapers and internets.25 Reading the secondary sources 
on Libyan-Tunisian relations, the Maghreb, international affairs and Middle East politics will 
lead to an informed approach in regard to this thesis' hypothesis and research questions. I will 
thus be able to reject, refute or validate the claims contained in the range of sources 
examined.26 
 
Deliberations on Discourse Analysis and Political Discourse Analysis 
The primary sources which form the central focus of interpretation in this research 
demonstrate a coherent and meaningful system of ideas. Human beings live in a world that is 
characterised by a constant negotiation of meaning. Languages and images are the main 
expression that conveys the intentions and thoughts of an individual in a society. Debates 
have taken place among theorists and scholars on the definition of discourse, with its 
meaning differing across fields and among researchers.27 In recent years, the concept of 
discourse has been elaborated into a tool for interpretation. Studies of discourse vary from 
reference to mere speech or conversation to the critical examination of a social system.28 
Zellig Harris defines discourse as being an extended series of utterances, consisting of a 
speaker seeking to influence a listener.29 Similarly, for Olivier, discourse is a set of messages 
between different parties.30  
 
In this thesis, the social connotations of discourse are directly relevant to understanding the 
relationship of ideas and agency. Political power is ultimately dependent on social 
formations. Even authoritarian states cannot be autonomous of the broader society from 
which they govern, using a pre-existing set of symbols, language, culture and customs to 
communicate with their subjects. Robert Hodge and Gunther Kress make an important 
distinction between text and discourse. Text can be defined as the internal discourse structure, 
                                                 
25 Jack R Fraenkel, Norman E Wallen, and Helen H Hyun, How to Design and Evaluate Research in Education 
(7: McGraw-Hill New York, 1993).  
26Ibid.  
27Mohammed Nasser Khawaldeh, 'The Concept of Discourse as a Means of Communication', 
<http://kenanaonline.com/users/MOMNASSER/posts/380864 >, accessed 4/8 /2012. 
28Mohammed Al-Sffar, 'Discourse Analysis and the Problematic of the Transfer of Concepts', 
RenaissanceMagazine, 6/ 4 (October 2005).p 100. 
29Zellig Harris, Discourse Analysis (New York, USA: Linguistic Society of America, 1952).pp.4-30. 
30Robo Olivier, Language of Education: Pedagogical Discourse Analysis, trans. Omar Okan (Cairo: Africa 
Forum, 2002). pp.41-42. 
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and is comprised of a vocabulary, structures and sentences.31 Discourse involves a social 
operation that includes texts with textual analysis subsumed into discourse analysis.32 Three 
critical components form a discourse. The author, the text and the reader are involved in a 
process of communication. A basic linguistic unity is present throughout, which enables the 
direct communication of meaning in the form of consecutive sentences from the speaker to 
the listener that are motivated by the goal of persuasion, of the message contained therein, or 
to disseminate a piece of information.33  
 
For Norman Fairclough, discourse is:  
"a social practice which constructs social identities, social relations and the 
knowledge and meaning systems of the social world ... [which] both reflects and 
produces the ideas and assumptions relating to the ways in which personal 
identities, social relations, and knowledge systems are constituted through social 
practice".34  
 
Fairclough goes on to propose that when we look at language as speech and social practice, 
we are committed not only to analysing the text and production processes, but to analyse 
relations between the text and procedures, and their social conditions are related to the 
context and the external circumstances, especially those which are social and institutional.35 
Discourse is thus the abstract relations between signifiers and signifieds, but it can be used as 
ideological weapons that are rooted in a society. Discourses, according to Diane MacDonell, 
are both a means of control and struggle, rooted in a materialist context.36 Identical events 
tend to be interpreted differently by human beings. Although politicians or writers may report 
ont the same event, their accounts will inevitably differ.37 The existence of many discourses 
poses the question about which way is the most appropriate to study them.  
 
                                                 
31Mahmoud Okasha, The Language of Political Discourse, Linguistic Practical Study in the Light of 
Communication Theory (Cairo: Egyptian Renaissance Library, 2002) p 57. 
32Norman Fairclough, ' Discourse and Text: Linguistic and Intertextual Analysis within Discourse Analysis', 
Discourse & Society,SAGE Journals, 3 /2 (1992), pp. 193-217. 
33Rejeb Ramadan Abdulwahab, 'Western Political Discourse Concept and Characteristics', <http://maamri-
ilm2010.yoo7.com/t217-topic >, accessed 20/8/ 2012.    
34A.E. Nielsen & H. Nørreklit, 'A Discourse Analysis of the Disciplinary Power of Management Coaching', 
Society and Business Review, 4/3 (2009), 202-14.p.204. 
35N.Fairclough, Language and Power (London: Longman, 1990). p.66. 
36 Diane MacDonell, Theories of Discourse: An Introduction (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 
97-98.  
37Khawaldeh, 'The Concept of Discourse as a Means of Communication', op cit 
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Wider political and social formations are intertwined with the existence of discourses. Michel 
Foucault locates the phenomenon of a discourse in the power relations of a society. These 
power relations take place between those who control and the controlled, thereby producing 
regimes of truth, reality and values undermining any revolutionary potential.38 Discourses are 
thus historical constructions with social-wide implications. In the Arab world, Mohammed 
Abed al-Jabri's own work has focused on discourse with both empowering and 
disempowering effects. Concepts and frameworks interact to create a world of meaning. 
Rules govern, similarly to Foucault's claims, what can be said or written by an author in a 
discourse and these enable him to convey his point of view to the reader.39 However, the 
reader is not a passive actor in receiving meanings from the author. The reader employs tools 
to negotiate meaning, similar to the approach of the author in his construction of a text, which 
results in plural readings in a discourse.40 
 
Political discourse analysis also offers critical insights into the study of inter-state relations. 
Governments, political parties, resistance groups and popular leaders employ a diversity of 
political ideas to communicate with the audiences. The use of provocative symbols to stir the 
minds and hearts of people is a central feature of political discourses.41 Jamal Abdul Nasser 
was a charismatic figure who achieved a powerful impact, thanks to the content of his 
speeches. beyond Egypt's borders, reaching pan-Arab and Third World constituencies. Media 
outlets and journalists proved to be instrumental in this political discourse in the absence of 
the use of media by his opposition.42 The Voice of the Arabs was particularly effective in 
spreading a revolutionary vision of the Arab world which influenced individuals and groups, 
including a young Gaddafi in the 1960s. The broadcasting of the message occurs within the 
framing of reality in political discourses due to the ability to enact change that is possessed by 
actors.43  
                                                 
38 Frances E. Gill, The Moral Benefit of Punishment: Self-Determination as a Goal of Correctional Counselling 
(Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2003), p. 24-25. 
39Mohammed Abed al-Jabri, Contemporary Arab Discourse, Analytical and Critical Study (Beirut, Lebanon: 
Centre for Arab Unity Studies,1994).p 10.  
40Ibid. 
41 Abdulwahab, 'Western Political Discourse Concept and Characteristics',op cit.  
42Mahmoud Okasha, 'Analysis of Obama's Speech to the Muslim World in the Light of the Rhetorical Effects 
and Political Achievements 
', <http://www.lissaniat.net/viewtopic.php?t=1974&sid=608370fd637940ebb6d6ed95d24e0043>, accessed 
02/04 2014. 
43Abdulwahab, 'Western Political Discourse Concept and Characteristics', op cit.   
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Action and discourse are always linked in political discourses, thereby justifying the need to 
study politics through them.44 More generally, the links between political power and 
discourse do not simply revolve around planning and organisation by authorities, but directly 
relate to the interdependent reality of language and social dominance.45 The study of 
discourse through the context of its construction demonstrates the links of a political 
discourse with its surrounding society, which it addresses and which shares similar values.46 
Governments and regimes use a number of tools to make their citizens subject to their 
authority. From political recruitment to socialisation, political power aims to direct and 
influence the lives of individuals and groups in society in order to obey those in authority.47 
Ideas, for the sender, are the foundation of a political discourse, rather than the words used.48 
 
Modern democratic societies rely exclusively on coercion. Persuasion is a critical element in 
allowing a discourse to gain a degree of legitimacy, or 'soft hegemony', among different 
social groups.49 Hegemony can be understood to create the ideological conditions within 
which the subordination of citizens is involved in a process of consent and persuasion.50 
Force and violence appear as the opposites of consent and persuasion, respectively. In the 
cases of Tunisia and Libya, the dualities of force and consent, on the one hand, and 
persuasion and violence, on the other hand, were by no means mutually exclusive. 
Discourse Analysis and Inter-State Relations 
The above discussion on the scholarship on discourse analysis and political discourse analysis 
shows the diversity of approaches that employ the concept of discourse. Studies in politics 
have tended to reformulate the purely linguistic definition of discourse into a broader 
framework of interpretation focusing on society and politics. This thesis follows the latter 
path in applying discourse analysis to both written and verbal texts from key individuals 
involved in Libyan-Tunisian relations in the period from 1969 until 2010. Improved relations 
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ensued, according to the proposed hypothesis, in the second period from the early 1990s. 
Examination of the data collected, in the form of interviewees' answers and official 
government documents, will provide the opportunity to apply discourse analysis. What 
follows is a detailed outline of the elements in the method of discourse analysis to be 
employed in this thesis.  
 
The second stage of my research, following the collection of data, is its interpretation 
according to the concept of discourse. The analysis of the political and social significance of 
words is a primary objective. The relationship between a signifier and signified is an 
essentially constructed one in "a complex interaction of signifiers, which has no obvious 
endpoint".51 No natural correspondence exists between sounds and meanings. A word 
acquires its meaning in a process with reference to other words and meanings. Discourses are 
thus a world of meaning which is constantly redefined by human beings in a variety of 
settings. Political actors combine the facets of power and meaning in their construction of 
discourse, seeking to endow their ideas and actions with legitimacy. External realities become 
subsumed into an open-ended system of ideas, norms, values and truths. Political actors 
undertake the act of self-interpretation at the same time as they interpret the world. 'Self-
interest' and 'ideology' are conceived in terms of the cultural references of individuals.  
 
At this point, I will try to review the various meanings of ideology that are contained in 
scholarship on the topic. Douglass North proposes to define it as "intellectual efforts to 
rationalize the behavioural pattern of individuals and groups."52 Thought and agency are 
married together in a context which awards a primary place to actions and behaviours, 
followed by their de facto acceptance in a society. A lack of religious content in ideology is 
accompanied by its specific association with a society's socio-economic and political 
structures.53 Psychology has also been introduced in the discussion of the nature of ideology. 
The inclusion of the argument that mental perception is restricted by this exact intellectual 
subordination towards various social forms, the origins and functions of this mental vision, 
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can be seen in different theoretical approaches.54 Broader inquiries into the social dimensions 
of ideology have proposed it to be a society's collection of rational thoughts with a stable 
philosophy and vision of politics, economic, culture, etc.55 The social construction of 
ideology indicates its changing reality. For Mohammed Abed al-Jabri, the acquisition of 
values and concepts by a human being occurs through interaction with the surrounding social 
and cultural environment, including its ideologies, rather than in a natural or instinctive 
process.56  
 
Similarly to discourse, ideology does not allow those who espouse its contents to go outside 
its boundaries. Breaches of these boundaries may lead to ostracising or exclusion from the 
body politic or from mainstream society. Ideas cannot be developed outside of its original 
framework.57 Necessarily, ideology lives in a closed circuit whereby the promotion of 
openness and directness is absent: the inability to make political or cultural compromises 
outside of its intellectual environment is a core characteristic.58 Most definitions agree that 
ideology is a system of thoughts and beliefs.59 The espousing of ideology involves the two 
dimensions of describing the world and prescribing action within it. The interpretations of 
reality are carried out at the psychological and philosophical levels of an ideology. 
Conservative or radical platforms for action are proposed, depending on the sense of 
alienation that is experienced by ideologues and their followers and which is caused within 
the society in which they live. "Uppermost values" in ideologies that are espoused by human 
beings and that are found among religions and nationalism, it has been argued, have had 
successful careers.60  
 
The contents of ideology can vary from rational and scientific postulates to religious or 
mystical symbolism. Totalitarian systems of ideas, norms and behaviours which claim to 
encompass all aspects of human existence, fall into the category of ideology. A critical 
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distinction has been made between ideology and politics.61 While ideology may make 
absolute claims (or none at all) on power, politics and sovereignty, the actual practice of 
politics involves human beings who negotiate social and economic issues within the formal 
and informal spheres of agency. The role of ideology appears to be an important driving force 
behind the actions of regimes, societies and individuals. However, deviations from ideologies 
by political actors who profess to espouse them are as common as strict obedience to beliefs 
and values.  
 
The discourses of regime elites contain the dimensions of power and meaning in the contest 
over ideologies, economic resources and political institutions. Power is understood in terms 
of both coercion and consent, on the one hand, and force and persuasion, on the other. I 
propose that human beings cannot live outside of a discourse. The challenging, contesting 
and subverting of discourses are possible. Even peculiar objects or human beings who are 
seemingly outside a discourse are defined by a discourse. Individuals or social groups can 
abandon one discourse and adopt another in line with its newly adopted institutions, norms 
and rules. Successive regimes in Tunisia and Libya have constructed discourses seeking to 
legitimise their rule and to communicate within and outside the political elite. I aim to apply 
discourse analysis to the data collected from a number of individuals and documents. Key 
words, phrases, synonyms and antonyms will be identified as I carry out a thematic 
interpretation of these texts. I will make links between words and meanings in the broader 
context of Libyan-Tunisian relations in the Maghreb. Antagonism, co-operation and 
integration are determined by the demands of ideology and raison d'état are reproduced in 
these texts in tandem with similar economic and political actions.  
 
An intersubjective reality is constructed through the agreements and disagreements between 
political actors. Words are part of a larger social negotiation in a discourse that is seeking to 
preserve the status quo or alter reality. Discourse can also be viewed as an instance of agency 
in the construction of a meaningful reality. Events are interpreted according to a broader 
cultural worldview which provides the scope of actions that are understood to be legitimate or 
acceptable to the political actor's norms, values and beliefs. Motivations driving the inter-
state relations between Tunisia and Libya can thus be framed around a meaningful system of 
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words that are contained in written and verbal texts. Discourses in both countries have 
indicated a willingness to work with neighbours and prospective partners.  
 
The hypothesis of this research will be investigated using discourse analysis to establish to 
what extent the decline of ideology can help explain greater co-operation between Tunisia 
and Libya. Primary sources are to be interpreted in light of the constructed nature of 
discourses and their importance in the self-interpretation of individuals and groups in a 
society that is experiencing changes. Individual written or verbal texts will be analysed in a 
broader investigation of a collection of texts. Similarities and differences within a single text 
will be established and subsequently followed by identifying similarities and differences 
across texts from individuals. Data will be collected from government documents which 
specifically deal with aspects of Libyan-Tunisian relations. Other data will be gathered 
through the conducting of interviews with officials who played a key role in the formulation 
and implementation of relations between the two countries. These written and verbal texts 
will be situated in a wider explanatory context of the dynamic between antagonism and co-
operation which led to a short-lived political union bringing together Libya and Tunisia and 
an alleged Libyan-backed seizing of Gafsa. Libyan-Tunisian relations were far from stable in 
the period prior to 1987.  
 
My application of discourse analysis is aware of the geopolitical divides in the Maghreb. I 
will not only examine the surface meanings of texts, but go deeper in interpreting the 
unspoken presuppositions that underpin the statements contained in the interview answers 
and documents. The selection of interviews will be based on prior knowledge of the 
proximity of the roles they occupied in the decision-making processes affecting Libyan-
Tunisian relations. Secondary sources will provide the needed background information about 
which government institutions or bodies have directly participated in pushing apart and 
pulling together these Maghrebi states in the last half century. The views of individuals 
working for the government may not always tally with the official discourses of the 
organisation by which they are employed. Deeply subjective factors emerging from a person's 
socio-economic background, ideological beliefs or political affiliations can affect the extent 
to which statements in his answers in an interview diverge or converge with official 
discourses. For example, a formal request to interview an employee from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Tunisia will, it can be assumed, yield information containing the Tunisian 
state's discourses on foreign policy and international affairs. I will carry out an extensive 
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investigation of multiple sources in order to establish the political discourses of the Tunisian 
and Libyan regimes concerning their inter-state relations over the last four decades. The 
frequent comparison of data from various sources will aid this process of interpretation. 
Although there may be indications among the participants of personal opinions which diverge 
from the discourses emanating from the state, these will prove useful in ascertaining the level 
and nature of the support for antagonism or co-operation between Tunisia and Libya among 
the decision-makers.  
 
The force of a discourse in offering individuals compelling answers to their questions about 
the world surrounding them is both descriptive and prescriptive. It claims to analyse reality as 
it is, and it suggests various ways to preserve or change one's society. Force and persuasion 
have tended to go hand in hand in the Arab world. A social hierarchy has often been created 
when new regimes have emerged in Tunisia and Libya. The arrival of Bourguiba, Gaddafi 
and Ben Ali in the offices of power meant a new system, with new ways of thought and 
action in various spheres of life, both in Tunisia and Libya. State-sponsored discourses 
sought to redefine Tunisia and Libya in the images of Bourguiba and Gaddafi respectively. 
The policies of the Bourguiba regime reflected a discourse that was deeply sceptical of the 
call to Arab unity across North Africa and the Middle East. Although Ben Ali was less 
enthusiastic about citing nationalist ideological claims for his policies, he implemented a neo-
liberal ideology in the Tunisian economy. International conditions made themselves felt in 
Tunisia and the regime responded by adapting to this new context.  
 
To the north of Tunisia, the European Union gathered momentum in its expansion, with 
economic opportunities opening up for the Maghrebi nation. Further, the attraction of 
regional blocs was manifested in the establishment of the Arab Maghreb Union. A change of 
discourse appears to have occurred in the example of Tunisia from the late 1980s and early 
1990s. This change led to a pronounced shift in how Tunisia interacted with neighbouring 
Libya in ways that had previously not been pursued, or which had been short-lived. 
Ideological considerations, such as liberalism or a fusionist Arabism, were relegated to the 
margins. Free market ideas were the driving force in Tunis, with greater economic co-
operation being advocated and supported by the new Ben Ali regime from 1987. Libya was a 
direct beneficiary of this novel political and economic approach from Tunisia, as it re-defined 
its own role in the Maghreb and in international affairs. During the Cold War, the Libyan 
regime's political discourse emphasised a pan-Arab agenda.  
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Domestic and international factors had created a particular context from which Libya could 
formulate policies reflecting a bipolar political environment, where the USSR-USA rivalry 
was being played out across regions and continents throughout the world. Proxy wars were 
waged and the Gaddafi regime benefitted from the balance of power that involved the two 
superpowers. However, the internal dynamics of the country changed after the collapse of the 
USSR. A transition occurred from the insistent calls for Arab unity to moves towards greater 
participation in the African Union and symbolic shows of political liberalism. A radical shift 
in emphasis on the issue of inter-state relations can be identified. It can be argued that the 
previous discourse of a strident Arabism had exhausted its possibilities and objectives, 
thereby eroding its credibility. Libya suffered from the consequences of its foreign and 
domestic policies, which were accompanied by a change in the balance of international 
power. A unipolar world followed the dissolution of the USSR, with the USA taking a lead 
role in international affairs without a countervailing power. Tripoli's recognition of this new 
context witnessed a substantially revised or entirely new discourse around Libya's role in 
Africa and beyond.  
Discourse analysis will thus be used as an analytical method with which to explore to the  
extent to which the decline of ideology played a role in explaining the growing co-operation 
between Tunisia and Libya. For this purpose, I will focus on co-operation between the two 
countries that is related to three criteria.  The focus on discourses here reflects how the 
decline of ideology led to developments in bilateral economic relations. It will be used also to 
show how the decline of ideology created greater opportunities in different economic aspects. 
How has  the decline of ideology led to the recreation of the private sector in Libya, and how 
has it played a role in promoting cross-border opportunities for businesses; the attempts at 
building a common and suitable infrastructure for bilateral trading ties and the creation of 
mega projects, as well as the flourishing of the banking sector In the second of the criteria, 
the focus will be on the ways that the decline of ideology led to the founding of regional 
organisations and joint committees that facilitate greater cooperation between Libya and 
Tunisia, such as the Arab Maghreb Union and the African Union, and Libyan-Tunisian joint 
committees. Previously, the founding of regional organisations were based on ideological 
beliefs, particularly pan-Arabism.  In the third of the criteria, the emphasis will be on how the 
decline of ideology has enhanced economic liberalisation in terms of the free movement of 
capital and goods, and the increased volume of cross-border trade and joint commercial 
exchange that were subject to ideologically-based restrictions and standards. I will analyse 
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the joint agreements and laws that were agreed and passed in order to formalise commercial 
ties and joint investments. The focus will be on how trade and commercial relations between 
Tunisia and Libya were formalised.  
 In terms of the three criteria, above, discourse analysis will be used to interpret the text 
(official documents and interviews) in order to allow a better understanding of the meaning of 
greater economic co-operation. The three criteria will constitute a structure of meaning which 
can explain and elucidate on the role of the decline of ideology in the development of 
bilateral relations between Tunisia and Libya. This discourse analysis will help in 
understanding how discourse regulates the political statements and actions (e.g., diplomatic 
actions, economic developments, agreements, etc.) of Tunisia and Libya, which I argue is 
informed by the decline of ideology.    
 
A lack of research into the political discourses of both Tunisia and Libya is clearly evident. 
The research that does exist tends to focus on the linguistic dimensions of discourses, without 
exploring the social and political implications of the ideas. This shortage of critical studies on 
Tunisian and Libyan political discourses can be explained through the imposition of 
academic and journalistic limits by the authoritarian regimes in these two nations. Any study 
of discourses was obliged to be in accordance with the regime's diktats.. Most researchers 
were discouraged from pursuing this line of inquiry, and instead investigated less politically 
sensitive themes and topics. Self-censorship appears to have inhibited the curiosity and 
ability of researchers to look into political discourses and Libyan-Tunisian inter-state 
relations. In recent years, the above stated conditions no longer exist. Both the Ben Ali and 
Gaddafi regimes have been overthrown.  
 
Grounded Theory and Neo-functionalism 
Discourse analysis is best suited for the construction of a theory which is able to shed light on 
the role of ideology in politics. I will employ grounded theory to generate a theoretical lens, 
alongside the addressing of the hypothesis proposed for this research. Further, this hypothesis 
was formulated as a result of an initial survey of secondary and primary sources. The impact 
of the shift from a purely Arabist or nationalist ideology to greater economic and political co-
operation between Tunisia and Libya, has not been adequately explored. One of the key 
implications of such a gap in Western and Arab scholarship on the relations between these 
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two Maghreb states is the freedom to generate and propose a new theoretical lens for the 
purpose of identifying their key social, political, economic and military facets.  
 
Against this background, I will be able, through grounded theory, to formulate a set of critical 
insights that are as close as possible to the data collected from individuals and documents. A 
breakdown of the various elements which make up grounded theory will explain my choice to 
use this promising approach in this research. According to Kathy Charmaz, nine actions 
properly inform research that is based on grounded theory: collecting and analysing the data 
at the same time; focusing on actions and processes; applying comparative methods; utilising 
narrative or descriptive data seeking to generate new conceptual categories; developing 
inductive abstract analytical categories from systematic data analysis; emphasising theory 
construction; using theoretical sampling; looking for variation; developing a category for the 
purpose of interpretation.62  
 
Discourses on Libyan-Tunisian relations are not merely abstract constructions. They are a 
form of agency where meanings are embodied in speech acts or written texts. The research in 
this thesis is based on primary sources collected as a result of interviews, or from documents. 
Frequent consultation and analysis of data throughout the duration of my research will aid the 
process of generating categories of interpretation. A comprehensive examination of various 
sources will strengthen the basis of the insights that will be formulated through a methodical 
interpretation of texts. My proposed hypothesis serves as a useful reference point from which 
to redefine the scope of the investigation, if needs be, as a result of the interpretation of the 
data collected. I seek to explore the significance of the hypothesis while I generate categories 
which are derived from the primary sources. Further interviews may be carried to explore an 
existing or potential category of research.  
 
An initial examination of the secondary sources shaped the line of inquiry into relations 
between Tunisia and Libya. Questions will then be formulated. Data collected from 
interviews will be cross-examined alongside data from official Tunisian and Libyan 
government documents. Additional interviews may be required to refine or clarify the 
categories of interpretation. The frequent revisiting of each stage of the collection and 
analysis of data will also be a key feature of the research to be carried out, using discourse as 
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a broadly conceived concept of historical formations of meaning in a social context. Although 
this research will begin from a general awareness of the lack of secondary sources on Libyan-
Tunisian relations, it will proceed from the collection of primary sources and their 
interpretation and then return to the additional collection of data in a continuous process of 
critical self-reflection.  
 
Differences are noted by Linda A. Wood and Rolf O. Kroge between discourse analysis and 
grounded theory in the apparent eagerness of the latter to construct categories.63 I propose to 
apply discourse analysis with a focus on the details contained in the categories of 
interpretation that are to be constructed in order to avoid the potential clash between these 
two approaches. Discourse analysis will take place at a level of analysis that is interested in 
how political actors constitute reality in a meaningful way, complemented by grounded 
theory aiming to generate a compelling theory of inter-state relations, with special reference 
to Tunisia and Libya.  
 
Political discourses and actions from Tunis and Tripoli do not neatly fit into the pre-existing 
theories which purport to explain the motivations and actions towards greater political and 
economic co-operation. Previous projects of political union failed against the background of 
bitter rivalries between regimes espousing conflicting ideologies. Gaddafi was one of the 
most ardent supporters of a fusionist Arab unity, which he perceived to be urgently needed in 
the fight against imperialism and capitalism. However, none of the supra-national 
organisations which existed, such as the Arab League, possessed the necessary political will 
or mechanisms to give life to such a vision of Arabism. Short-lived integration thus occurred 
between previously established inter-state organisations and personalist regimes that were 
based on kinship ties and technocratic personnel. From the late 1980s, however, a change in 
the relations between Tunisia and Libya brought closer associations in the areas of politics 
and economics. In light of this important facet of Maghrebi-Maghrebi relations, the 
applicability of three schools of thought to this subject will be critically reviewed: neo-
functionalism, institutionalism and inter-governmentalism.  
 
The theory of neo-functionalism is centred on the existence of supra-national institutions 
fostering greater political and economic co-operation. The fusion of different states under an 
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overarching organisation is a key attribute of the way integration in a region can be effected. 
Neo-functionalism finds its vindication in the regional bloc of the European Union, with its 
institutions overseeing closer integration in economic, political and security spheres.64 This 
theory is presumed to be applicable outside Europe in other regions.65 However, the historical 
development of the EU is very different from that of regional organisations across the world. 
Arab countries experienced a series of crises during the Cold War, as much of Western 
Europe did not suffer from conflicts after the Second World War. Further, the colonial 
heritage of the Maghreb created a fragile context for nation-building. While Tunisia did 
possess a tradition of statecraft from the middle of the nineteenth century, Libya was 
originally divided into three separate provinces, with little or no connection apart from during 
Ottoman rule and, later, during Italian colonialism. In the Maghreb, a lack of supra-national 
institutions, with the resources to integrate Tunisia, Libya and other North African states, is 
clearly apparent.  
 
Common or shared interests in the establishment of institutions are a core dimension in the 
theory of institutionalism. Increased co-operation between states is a criterion with which to 
measure the actions and behaviours of states. Governments create institutions so as to 
reinforce their co-operation.66 The shrinking of obstacles and reduction of the cost of 
transactions complement the building of bridges of co-operation in order to develop the 
process of exchange between states, resulting in mutual benefits.67 Organisations with high 
levels of institutionalisation, such as the EU, are a suitable case study for the application of 
this theory.68 The dominance of institutions in political decision-making has received 
renewed attention in "new institutionalism", with its focus on both "formal and informal 
procedures, practices, relationships, customs, and norms".69 This theory shares neo-
functionalism's weakness in not being applicable to the Maghreb with its regional 
organisations, such as the Arab League and the Arab Maghreb Union, which lack either 
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political clout or the necessary resources to influence the domestic politics of countries like 
Tunisia and Libya.  
 
A realist perspective underpins the theory of inter-governmentalism, concerning the role of 
states in foreign policy-making.70 Nation-states are the primary actors that push initiatives for 
co-operation and integration.71 The national interest of a state dominates the ways in which 
policies are formulated in a context with other self-interested states. In Tunisia and Libya, as 
well as other countries, the deliberate calculation of what is or could be the national interest 
has tended to be obscured by the narrow aspirations of regimes defined by patron-client 
relations that are based on kinship ties and global economic interests. Towards the end of the 
twentieth century, neo-liberal market reforms and authoritarian regimes often opened their 
countries to a new system of organising economic affairs, which is in direct contrast to the 
socialist programmes of the Cold War. In this context, Ben Ali's period in office introduced 
closer economic and political links between Tunisia and Libya.  
 
Two general approaches to the nation-state appear to have been strong in the Arab world for 
most of the twentieth century. Acceptance of the nation-state in the first approach that 
staunchly defended the political sovereignty of individual Arab states within broader global 
and regional organisations, such as the Arab League.72 During the Cold War, the regimes 
which subscribed to this view of Arab political identity were described as 'conservative'. 
Integration was a matter of co-ordination among states and should not necessarily lead to the 
fusion of several states under a single leadership. The second approach disagreed strongly 
with this position. Arab unity was the natural aspiration for the Arabs, divided by colonial-era 
borders. A unitary state was the instrument required to fulfil the developmental needs of the 
Arab nation.73 Revolutionaries across the Middle East and North Africa were attracted by this 
message which was propagated in the various guises of Jamal Abdul Nasser, Gaddafi and 
Michel Aflaq. Political and economic challenges faced by the Arabs were to be resolved 
through the co-operation of all Arab states against the forces of division, in the form of 
external or internal opposition, such as the conservative Arab regimes. Limited success was 
achieved in the area of Arab unity under a fusionist model: from the United Arab Republic 
                                                 
70Ian Bache & Stephen George, Politics in the European Union, ( 2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 2006). p 12. 
71Ibid. p 12. 
72 Ibrahim Abdul-Hamid al-Awadi, Theories and Applications of Political Integration in the Arab World: 
practical studies of integration and disintegration according neo-functionalism, a research paper presented in 
Egypt-France forum under the title of globalisation-individualism in the Arab region, Cairo 1989, p 12.  
73Ibid.p13.  
37 
 
between Egypt and Syria (1958-61), to the Federation of Arab Republics (1972-77),74 to the 
Federation between Libya and Morocco (1984- 86).75 
 
Conclusion 
I have outlined in clear and direct terms what the object of inquiry will be in this research and 
how I will carry out the investigation into contemporary Libyan-Tunisian relations. Tensions 
between these two neighbouring states in the Maghreb have dominated the geopolitical 
context of this region. Attempts to find a common ground through integration were frustrated. 
Habib Bourguiba and Muammar Gaddafi presided over regimes with little or no patience for 
public discussions on the legitimacy of the official political discourses of their countries. 
Inter-state relations between Tunisia and Libya form the principal area of investigation in this 
thesis. Ideologies from socialism to liberalism to Arabism were adopted by Bourguiba and 
Gaddafi in newly independent states. Uneasy associations between these two men also led to 
antagonisms in the political sphere, with repercussions in the economic and social spheres. 
Events such as Gafsa were a forceful reminder that integration in any form was not to be a 
realised dream in the near future. Gaddafi subscribed to pan-Arabist and Third Worldist 
ideologies for most of his reign. Implementation of these ideologies impacted on the Libyan 
regime in numerous ways. Towards the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s, political 
isolation pushed Libya into a difficult situation. Tunisia had experienced a coup against 
Bourguiba, which brought Ben Ali to power and created much needed economic and political 
opportunities for Libya. Inter-state relations between Tunisia and Libya seem to have made a 
remarkable improvement.  
Co-operation between Maghrebi nations has not emerged in a context that is determined by 
supra-national institutions. Organisations, such as the Arab League and the Arab Maghreb 
Union, are unable to provide the resources or to push domestic actors to behave in certain 
ways. No consensus exists on how to pursue the project of Arab integration and what it 
would mean in practice. The selection of Tunisia and Libya for this research is informed by 
what appears to be a refreshing exception to the antagonism that is characteristic of 
Maghrebi-Maghrebi relations, such as Moroccan-Algerian disagreements over Western 
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Sahara. To the north of the Maghreb, across the Mediterranean, the European Union has 
managed to unite disparate nation-states with different languages and political traditions. 
However, the countries of the Maghreb have built on their shared heritage for a form of 
political integration with economic effects. Since 1987, Libyan-Tunisian relations have 
undergone a transformation from mutual suspicion to better ties in their mutual economies 
and politics.  
In an earlier section, I proposed the hypothesis that the decline of ideology in the political 
discourses of Tunisia and Libya led to positive developments between these two nations. 
Greater political and economic co-operation replaced the antagonisms of the past. The years 
from 1987 to 2010 are the key period in which this transformation took place, which brought 
mutual co-operation. One key research question is to be asked, and it is subdivided into other 
questions. Inter-state relations between Tunisia and Libya will be situated in a context that 
runs alongside the motivations of political decision-makers. The manifestation of Libyan-
Tunisian relations will be examined, whereby the challenges and obstacles that existed in the 
past and that continue in the present, will be identified.  
The research methodology to be employed in this thesis is rooted in the qualitative tradition 
of the study of politics. A critical focus on meaning that is produced by human beings is 
instrumental in making sense of the behaviour and motivations of political actors. My 
examination of inter-state relations between Tunisia and Libya will lead me to identify and 
explore primary sources, such as government documents and interviews. I will conduct 
interviews with key figures involved in, or related to, the decision-making process in this 
area. Further, the choice of semi-structured interviews is based on the degree of influence I 
will be able to exert in asking questions that are initially derived from the hypothesis and the 
key research questions. At the same time, this choice grants a large margin of freedom for 
interviewees to speak about their experiences and opinions in an honest and frank manner. 
Verbal and written texts will be interpreted to identify the discourse which constitutes the 
participants' world of meaning.  
Applying discourse analysis to the data collected will ensure that the importance of language 
is recognised throughout my research into Libyan-Tunisian inter-state relations. All 
discourses not only say something about the world, but are part of the world. Political actors 
construct a meaningful reality through discourses. Collective institutions, such as regimes and 
states, similarly produce discourses that seek to interpret themselves and their own immediate 
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reality. The search for the legitimacy of what is spoken or thought or written is noticeable in 
political discourses. Regimes led by Bourguiba and Gaddafi were methodical in expressing 
populist, developmental and nationalist ideals to the societies they ruled. Political discourses 
were also directed at neighbouring regimes, with Ben Ali's neo-liberal agenda finding 
expression in actions and words. Further, the construction of a theory that is able to interpret 
inter-state relations between Tunisia and Libya is located in the unsuitability of existing 
theories, such as neo-functionalism, to provide answers to the motivations and behaviour of 
political actors in the Maghreb: Tunisia and Libya. I will seek to generate categories for 
analysis that focus on the actions and discourses of the decision-makers who participated in 
shaping Libyan-Tunisian relations in the period between 1969 and 2010. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
The Maghreb forms a very important area of study for political scientists, anthropologists, 
economists and other social scientists. Further, this region is connected to the wider context 
of the Arab world with its rich history. Other factors also contribute to the interest scholars 
and researchers may have in studying the Maghreb. From the economic and political 
initiatives of the European Union to the global war on terror, the countries of North Africa 
play an important part in the international community. In this chapter, I will examine the 
secondary sources relating to Libyan-Tunisian relations. Three key areas of research are of 
interest to me. The first concerns what has been written on co-operation in the Mediterranean. 
Many regions make up this area, which covers three continents. However, I will examine 
European and Maghrebi relations. The end of the Cold War opened up a number of 
opportunities for economic and political co-operation between an expanding European Union 
and the newly liberalised economies of the Maghreb. Initiatives such as the Western 
Mediterranean Forum and the Euro-Mediterranean Initiative were formed to foster closer 
relations between these two regions. Security, economics and politics are key themes to be 
discussed and acted upon, based on bilateral agreements between Arab states in the Maghreb 
and the European Union, or in individual European countries.  
 
The second area focuses mainly on Arab regional blocs and co-operation among Arab 
countries. The establishment of the Gulf Co-operation Council, the Arab Maghreb Union and 
the Arab Co-operation Council were expressions of broader trends towards regionalism in a 
post-Arabist context. Arab writers and scholars have written at length about the need for Arab 
unity and the obstacles before this aspiration. Co-operation among Arab states has been 
limited to specific regions, rather than to the wider Arab world. The Gulf and the Maghreb 
appear to confirm this phenomenon for Arab researchers. Past rivalries within the Maghreb 
have created a situation that is not at all conducive to integration of the states in the region. 
For some, the European Union provides a model that could inspire an informed policy for an 
Arab unity which is currently a distant dream. 
 
The last area to be examined in this literature review focuses on inter-state relations between 
Libya and Tunisia. Post-colonial North Africa experienced many changes in its political, 
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economic, cultural and social dimensions. During the Cold War, ideology appears to have 
been a strong factor. Observers of Libyan-Tunisian relations have an awareness that more 
disagreements than agreements characterise the interactions between these two countries. 
Ideology is cited by some as a factor for this hopeless state of affairs. A few explanations 
have been suggested for the deterioration of relationship between Tunisia and Libya while 
Habib Bourguiba and Muammar Gaddafi were in power. Ideology, and more specifically 
pan-Arabism, is mentioned as being instrumental in contributing to tensions and even 
conflicts. This chapter is thus divided into three parts, focusing on each of these areas: studies 
about the Mediterranean and Euro-Mediterranean partnership, in general; studies about Arab 
regional blocs; and the volume of economic co-operation among the Arab states.  
 
Studies on Co-operation in the Mediterranean Region 
Libyan-Tunisian relations are located in multiple contexts. One of these contexts is defined 
by the historic interactions within the Mediterranean Sea. Many regions can be found within 
this geographical space. There exist several studies which have highlighted the importance of 
co-operation among the countries of the Mediterranean basin. Mutual interests and shared 
problems are examined at length. New views and political initiatives have emerged from the 
growth of such studies, advocating projects of co-operation between states. The northern and 
southern regions of the Mediterranean have received attention in regard to the current state of 
economic and political links and future prospects for greater trading agreements. Libya and 
Tunisia have pursued closer relations with European countries. In a post-Cold War 
environment, the role of ideology, especially of pan-Arabism and socialism, has declined. 
Subsequently, the creation of bilateral and multilateral agreements appears to be an 
increasingly frequent event. The Western Mediterranean Forum, also known as the 5+5 
Dialogue, included the South-Western European and Arab Maghreb nations. This growing 
trend to co-operation between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean is 
confirmed by the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Initiative in 1995.76 Maintenance 
of co-operation between the two regions was emphasised. For George Joffe and Alvaro De 
Vasconcelos, the Euro-Mediterranean Initiative was the first genuine project that sought to 
work towards the objective of integration between Europe and the southern Mediterranean 
                                                 
76Dorothée Schmid, 'France and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: The Dilemmas of a Power in Transition', 
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countries.77 Another point of view is proposed by Richard Gillespie: that it was part of a 
wider process towards the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area, based on co-
operation in political, security, cultural and social levels.78 Further, there was a noticeable 
emphasis on the economic dimensions of relations between the two regions.79 
 
In other studies, the complex factors of ethnicity, religion, politics and culture in the relations 
between the different regions in the Mediterranean, have been neglected. The 
disproportionate emphasis on economics has tended to shape this view of European-non-
European interactions. France and Italy have been identified as the primary driving forces in 
the promotion of European economic relations, demonstrated by their good economic links 
with the Maghreb.80 The success of the European Union, for Abdul Moneim Said, will have 
an influential presence on other regional contexts, such the Arab world, as it is acutely 
sensitive to ongoing changes in global trends.81 However, a large degree of short-sightedness 
results from the exclusive focus on the economic, at the expense of other equally, if not more 
important factors that shape human societies. Pan-Arab ideology is no longer a major factor 
in shaping the policies of North African states and the responses of their northern neighbours 
across the Mediterranean. Interesting developments have emerged from the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership's embrace of political, security, social and relations.82  
 
Political stability is often related to domestic and foreign security. New projects of co-
operation between European and neighbouring regions, such as the Maghreb, are partly 
informed by the risk assessment of potential or actual threats. Although previous approaches 
to security have been narrowly defined, the present has created a promising opportunity to 
break out of them. The primary concern with safeguarding borders and the use of police 
forces to maintain domestic instability, is deemed to be lacking in effectiveness. Abdul-Aziz 
Muhammad espouses this view of the potential scope of relations between Europe and the 
Maghreb against the background of the Mediterranean. Security and development are 
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strongly linked. However, Abdul-Aziz Muhammad disagrees with the conflation of security 
issues with the military and police. A much wider definition of security, including economic, 
social and political considerations, is needed. Unemployment, corruption, the illegal drug 
trade, money laundering and terrorism are present among poor communities in the 
Mediterranean region. Failure to address these problems will adversely affect the prospects of 
security and sustainable growth between the Maghreb and Europe.83 Another important and 
related dimension to this aspect of relations between the two regions is the sense of insecurity 
in Europe concerning the travelling of problems from the southern shores of the 
Mediterranean: notably illegal immigration, poverty and terrorism.84  
 
European countries have sought to strengthen their economies through securing further 
markets in which to sell their goods and services. Theodor Columbus and Thanos Veremi 
undertook a comparative analysis of the relations between the European and non-European 
countries of the Mediterranean Sea in the 1990s. Following the collapse of the USSR, the 
European Union began to develop its relations with countries in the southern Mediterranean. 
Bilateral agreements between the EU and individual North African countries were also 
accompanied by measures to improve relations with Turkey.85 Abdul Hamid al-Ibrahimi 
argues that the formation of a 'Mediterranean Group' in 1995 was specifically designed by 
southern European states to serve European self-interests. Political and economic co-
operation were chiefly aimed at tackling the problems of illegal immigration from Africa to 
Europe. Europe was to be made more secure in the face of the troubles coming from south of 
its maritime borders. Countries from the Maghreb are not considered full partners by their 
European counterparts. Further, these countries are not capable of integrating into a wider 
cooperative project. Instead, the Maghreb is viewed both as a promising market for European 
exports and of cheap imports, on the one hand, and a potential threat to Europe's interests. 
Accordingly, these countries should be contained in all aspects, so as to maintain Europe’s 
security, prosperity and identity.86 
                                                 
83Abdul-Aziz Muhammad, ' Security and Development in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Implications on 
the Maghreb Countries', PhD Thesis, (Faculty of Law and Political Science; Tunisia , Tunisa. University of 
Tunisia Elmanar, 2007). p 2 
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Containment of the ever-increasing challenges that are faced by the Arab states on the 
southern shores of the Mediterranean have been taking place through active interaction with 
the new changes and developments in the northern portion of Europe.87 The so-called Euro-
Arab dialogue, frozen almost immediately after it began in the mid-1970s, was revived by 
these efforts from countries involved in this process. According to Abdul Fattah Rashdan, 
Arab and European perceptions of this dialogue appear to have differed. For Arab states, the 
easing of customs taxes and duties that are imposed on their products was crucial for 
economic co-operation and the opening up of European markets. These measures are 
necessary to create a competitive environment that is to the advantage of Arab products 
against those imported into the European Union from Eastern Europe. Moreover, Arab 
countries have shown an interest in promoting mutual political and security concerns. In 
contrast, the European Union has focused on security as the main issue in the dialogue with 
Arab countries. Issues like the control of illegal immigration and combatting illegal drugs, in 
the revived Euro-Arab dialogue.88 
 
The Euro-Arab dialogue and the other factors mentioned above have contributed to joint 
security strategies between European and the Maghrebi states. Several bilateral and 
multilateral diplomatic efforts have paved the way to implementing agreements in this area of 
inter-regional relations. Endorsement of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in Barcelona in 
1995, was an important stage on the path to fostering closer ties in the Mediterranean. For 
Stephen Calleya, the importance for participating countries in this partnership lay in its 
security and stability arrangements.89 Nevertheless, it has achieved little success in dealing 
with certain issues, from armaments to human rights. Some of the North African countries, 
such as Algeria, consider these issues to be purely internal affairs and part of national 
sovereignty, objecting to what they perceive to be interference from the EU. For Abdul Fattah 
Rashdan, instructive lessons can be learned from the study of the Euro-Mediterranean project, 
without ignoring other alternatives.90 In contrast, Eberhard Kienle argues that this partnership 
may have ‘more negative than positive consequences for the prosperity and stability of the 
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countries concerned’, due to the imposing of ideational elements by the “West” as a result of 
the imposition of economic liberalisation on the Maghreb.91 
 
For scholars like Abdul-Aziz Muhammad, the Euro-Arab dialogue has served the crucial 
function of opening channels for bilateral agreements among individual Arab countries, on 
the one hand, and between these Arab countries and the European Union, on the other. 
Morocco and Tunisia have pursued this individual course without taking into account their 
immediate regional context. These agreements have raised some concerns about their content, 
consequences and effects in promoting balanced development and security for the Arab 
countries that are involved in them.92 Despite these concerns, the resultant restructuring of the 
economy has led to greater training opportunities for the labour force and the tackling of 
unemployment in society. Changes and reforms within North African countries have also 
benefitted Europe, especially in terms of controlling illegal immigration from Africa to 
Europe. However, Maghrebi-European bilateral agreements run the risk of increasing the 
dependency of 'developing' nations on the 'developed' ones. Rises in the quantity of European 
imports to Arab countries have happened at the expense of exports to the European Union. 
The European stance on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is specifically motivated by the 
further liberalisation of Arab markets for their manufactured goods and services. Local 
industrial activities in the Arab Maghrebi nations are thereby threatened with extinction as a 
result of the inability of Arab products to compete against European products in a fair 
economic climate.93 
 
Studies on the Arab Regional Blocs and Co-operation Among Arab 
Countries 
Regional economic blocs in the Arab world, following the decline of the ideology which 
replaced the revolutionary vision of pan-Arabism, have encouraged scholars and researchers 
to study bilateral and regional co-operation. The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) and the 
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) were founded to co-ordinate economic, political, social and 
security interests among plural sovereign states. Analytical examinations of Arab regional 
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frameworks have been conducted. Emhamed al-Malki, for example, believes that co-
operation and integration were among the main forces behind the involvement of all the 
parties in the Arab bilateral and regional blocs.94 He compares the two experiences of the 
GCC and the AMU. The achievements and failures of these two loosely organised projects of 
integration are highlighted. Al-Maliki makes the claim that the success of any unitary and 
integrative project mainly depends on the clarity of its objectives, and the tactics used to 
achieve them, which are empirical. This requires the linking of all the variables, 
environments and tools that are relevant to the increasing of the feasibility of such unitary 
objectives. It also requires stable and well-established political entities, without the element 
of ideology. to pursue all of the steps towards unity and integration. This goal is usually 
achieved through a long-term strategy that gradually develops the necessary infrastructure. In 
other words, political integration initiatives should be based on gradual and careful measures, 
and on the relevant preparations at various levels.95 al-Malki makes a central point about the 
Arab Maghreb and Arab Gulf unitary projects when he says that the two projects have not 
lacked the political determination to establish the possibility of joint co-operation among their 
members. Nevertheless, in both cases, each state wants to maintain its political sovereignty, 
while, at the same time, being part of the project of relative integration. The Arab Maghreb 
and the Arab Gulf Unions are not located in the political and economic environments needed 
to undertake meaningful and deep integration. Suitable political and economic environments 
are necessary to translate the political determination into the concrete actions that help to 
build active mechanisms to promote regional integration that benefits all members.96 
 
Opposing points of view are also present in the secondary sources. Ali Khalfi has argued that 
the political will among Arab elites and politicians remains weak, due to the espousal of 
different ideologies and they lack the ability to cope with persistent obstacles to unity. More 
interestingly, the countries in the Maghreb lack the foundations for political unity. For Khalfi, 
what divides these countries is greater than that which brings them together.97 Bitter 
disagreements surround the structures and activities of the AMU. Abu Qasim al-Mabruk 
conducted a similar study of the Arab Maghreb Union with the aim of identifying the effects 
of pervasive political environments and factors in the AMU itself. He focuses on the 
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differences between political regimes, in terms of their forms, structures, philosophical 
ideologies and policies: monarchic rule in Morocco, republican rule in Tunisia, Algeria and 
Mauritania, and rigid socialism in Libya. He also highlights border problems, such as the 
Great Desert Crisis between Algeria and Morocco. Moreover, the countries of the Arab 
Maghreb did not support Libya in its conflict with the Western countries in relation to the 
Lockerbie controversy. For instance, Morocco, a member of the UN Security Council at the 
time, abstained to vote in favour of UN resolution 748, which imposed sanctions on Libya. 
al-Mabruk thinks that Morocco could have opposed the resolution. Finally, al-Mabruk 
explains the effects of political factors on the Arab Maghreb Union’s institutions. The failure 
of the Union Agreement is evident, especially in terms of the achievement of its proposed 
goals for the Union. 98 
 
Apparent or hidden rivalries among the ruling regimes of the Maghreb, which subscribed to 
different ideologies, has been proposed as a cause for this failure. Stagnation has since 
afflicted the institutions of the AMU concerning the desire or ability to initiate regional 
aspirations and achievements for integration. Khalfi recommends that countries in the 
Maghreb ought to focus first on building bilateral relations between states, to create the right 
conditions for Arab unity.99 Problems will inevitably emerge when states come together in 
regional Arab blocs for the purpose of integration. These problems vary from one regional 
union to another, depending on the economic, political, social and cultural factors that prevail 
in each society.100 The position expressed by Khalfi on the necessity for political will in 
achieving integration, is compelling in the cases of regional or national unity. Nonetheless, 
political will is not an isolated dimension which would enable increased levels of political 
and economic co-operation among the states in the Maghreb.  
 
Weaknesses in Arab regional unions also emanate from the economic crises, such as the 
generation of jobs that are able to absorb university graduates and that are a fertile ground for 
businesses. This situation may limit the prospects for Arab entrepreneurs and their products 
and services.101 In this respect, Hayder Murad has conducted research on the volume of 
economic co-operation and commercial exchange between Arab countries, in general, and the 
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countries of the Arab Maghreb Union, in particular. His findings point to poor levels of co-
operation among these countries, in spite of efforts to promote this co-operation. Murad 
provides some statistics to illustrate his research. For instance, the volume of Arab bilateral 
trade during the 1980s was between 7% and 8% of total Arab external trade. In 1999 and 
2002, the volume of this trade was, respectively, (9.4%) and (9.5%). Murad provides further 
figures and data, which all show that joint Arab economic and commercial co-operation is 
very low. This situation is basically attributed to various problems involving Arab inter-
relations.102 
 
Instability in the political environment, for Mustafa Khushaim, adversely affects the 
prospects for economic and trading ties between Arab countries. Two other factors also 
contribute to this low level of Arab co-operation. The first revolves around the fact that 
similar products and export structures are present in these countries. Secondly, fluctuations in 
Arab relations and modes of government inhibit the regular and smooth process of economic 
co-operation. For instance, Khushaim uses the Libyan-Tunisian relationship as a model of 
economic co-operation and achievement between Arab countries. Tunisia has always been 
Libya's main Arab economic partner, accounting for the majority of its exports to, and 
imports from, other Arab states. About 76% of Libyan Arab imports come from Tunisia. This 
demonstrates the centrality of economic co-operation between the two countries, and its 
effects on other aspects of their relationship. Mustafa Khushaim concludes that it is still 
crucial to build active bilateral and regional co-operative systems among Arab countries. 103 
 
The increasing external debts of many Arab countries, and the consequent weakening and 
depletion of national budgets, according to Abdul Hamid al-Ibrahimi, have had a negative 
effect on their ability to co-operate with their neighbours.104 In 1994, the World Bank 
reported that there had been an increase in the external debt of the Arab Maghreb countries if 
compared to their GNP. In Mauritania, for example, this debt increased from 125% in 1980, 
to 215% in 1996. In Morocco, in the same period, it increased from 53% to 80%, in Tunisia 
from 41% to 66%, and in Algeria from 47% to 70%.105 This worrying increase in their 
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external debts is considered to be an obstacle to economic growth in the Arab Maghreb 
countries. Seeking support from the World Bank has not only made this crisis worse. It has 
also deepened the dependency of the Arab nations of the Maghreb on external actors.106 
 
Critical evaluation of Arab projects’ regional integration, including the AMU, GCC and Arab 
Co-operation Council (ACC), can lead to the identification of some small differences. 
Dramatic changes and events in the broader global context have accompanied the 
establishment of these projects. The USSR's collapse, and the end of the Cold War, witnessed 
the end of a bipolar system, which became a unipolar one with a dominant USA. Many Third 
World countries with left-wing governments became destabilised. A new international order 
was constructed, based on neo-liberal economics. Third World countries were forced to adapt 
to the new developments, thereby abandoning anti-imperialism for ideas compatible with the 
new system of norms, practices and institutions of unipolarity. The Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM), with a large number of Arab member states, was severely weakened.107 Anwar al-
Sadat's visit to Israel in 1977 later led to the Camp David Peace Agreement between Israel 
and Egypt, which was brokered by the USA. This action effected massive changes to the 
geopolitical dynamics of the Arab world. Egypt was no longer a primary frontline antagonist 
alongside other Arab states in the Arab-Israeli conflict, in a context where other wars raged, 
such as the Iraq-Iran War. In the region, the member states in these unions have not achieved 
the adequate levels of political maturity that are needed to build up and sustain national 
integrity.108 
 
Arab society, particularly the family, is identified as a key factor undermining social and 
political integration.109 Loyalty is directed towards the tribal system and family connections, 
rather than towards the state itself. In this situation it is evidently difficult to build up viable 
regional unions and cooperative frameworks. The key to the success of a regional union is 
thus the existence of stable, well-established and integrative national states. However, al-
Malki argues that Arab regional unitary projects could be successful in the future. This 
success will depend on strengthening the basic ideas of unity and regional integration at all 
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levels, including the principles of democracy.110 Likewise, Ali Khalfi argues that states which 
succeed in establishing well-integrated unions can also achieve high standards of economic, 
diplomatic and military progress at the national level. The European Union is the most 
striking example of such models.111 
 
Nevertheless, Misbah al-N’ass warns that it is important to ensure that the Arab Maghreb 
Union and similar Arab regional blocs do not degenerate into non-nationalist regional 
federations. Regional federations may develop into political, geographical and demographic 
clusters that could undermine any other loyalty. It is true that a regional union might face 
challenges. However, such challenges will vary according to the political, cultural, economic 
and social situations of each society. al-N’ass argues that the Arab Maghreb Union is half-
way between the national state and an Arab federation, but it is not a substitute for the latter. 
The Arab Maghreb Union goes beyond national geographical space to become a wider sphere 
that involves all the member states. This union joins several countries that share common 
features, but, at the same time, keep a place for the integrity of the nation state.112 
 
Khalfi introduces the factor of the 'Leader State' into the analysis of the development of Arab 
integration. In the Maghreb, similarly to other regions in the Arab world, there is not a 
country which possesses the appropriate levels and skills of development to take a lead. The 
lack of a dynamic actor in the struggle for union is conspicuous. France and Germany have 
played such a role in the context of the European Union, to the benefit of other member 
states, for more than half a century. In the Arab case, Saudi Arabia has played a similar role 
in the relative success of GCC.113 On the other hand, the experiences of regional alliances 
raise questions at the levels of formal and public awareness and the will for the necessary 
conditions for making such alliances successful. Indicators of development and respect for 
human rights should be taken into account when considering requests for membership of a 
union.114  
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Studies on Libyan-Tunisian Relations 
Foreign policy in the Maghreb appears to be characterised by a large degree of inconsistency 
at the bilateral, regional and global levels. Tunisia and Libya were key actors in this process 
of policy reversals. The political ideologies espoused by the ruling regime impacted on inter-
state relations for much of the twentieth century. Khalid Hijazi conducted a study of the 
foreign policy of the countries of the AMU in the period following the Libyan revolution of 
1969. In particular, he looked at Libyan initiatives to develop bilateral relations with the other 
states of the AMU. Although Libya tried to balance ideology and its political interests, 
ideology remained the most powerful force. Hijazi observes that disagreement, and 
sometimes conflict between Libya and other countries, both inside and outside the region, 
ultimately led the global superpowers to impose international sanctions on Libya. Being 
disappointed by the lukewarm reactions of the countries of the AMU towards the sanctions, 
Libya turned its foreign policy towards the central African countries. However, Hijazi 
concludes by saying that understanding the principles of Libyan foreign policy requires the 
highlighting of the following points: the organisational structure of Libyan foreign policy, 
especially after the establishment of what is known as the People’s Authority in Libya, on 
2nd March,, 1977; the essential components of Libyan foreign policy, i.e., ideology, 
geographical location and oil; the powerful influence on foreign policy was the Libyan 
President, as Gaddafi insisted on being in charge of the formulation of Libyan foreign 
policy.115 The latter point demonstrates that the roles of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Parliament were insignificant. These bodies were, in theory, responsible for shaping Libya's 
external policy, but, in practice, they merely carried out the instructions of the President 
 
Although Gaddafi's influence persisted in the direction of the Libyan regime, the role of 
ideology in foreign policy became less influential from the late 1980s. Kamila Othman has 
studied the dramatic changes that seized world politics at the end of the Cold War. The 
ideological conflict waged between the capitalist USA and the communist USSR, finally 
stopped. Accordingly, all countries, including Libya, started to rethink their foreign policies. 
Closer relations with Europe appeared to be a feasible option in Libya's broader regional and 
                                                 
115Khalid Hijazi, The Maghreb Union and Libyan Foreign Policy: Balance between Interests and Principles 
 (1st edn.: Tripoli Centre Public Radios. Voice of Africa, 2008). pp.49-56. 
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global relations. The Libyan leadership concluded that developing Libyan-European relations 
would help to promote Libyan policy towards Africa.116 
 
Greater focus in Libyan foreign policy towards Africa came after Libya failed to achieve its 
objectives in its relations with the Arab world. From the 1970s, Libya had experienced long 
periods of political isolation. For example, Libya was excluded from the Euro-Arab dialogue, 
due to ideological differences between Libya and the European Union. Political ideology, 
particularly pan-Arabism, was a major feature of Libyan state policy after 1969. Gaddafi 
played a personal role in this situation. Libya's attitude towards the Maghreb nations was 
reflected in joint agreements and relations. According to Khalid Hijazi, this ideological 
element conflicted with the interests and policies of other states in the region.117 For instance, 
Libyan-Tunisian relations deteriorated in 1980, after the events in Gafsa, with Libya 
threatening to use military force.118 
 
Maurizio Cremasco suggests that the sharp tensions in Libyan-Tunisian relations during the 
Bourguiba era were due to the failure of the 1974 Djerba Agreement, which ‘foresaw a union 
of Tunisia and Libya’.119 Bilateral relations between the two countries ranged from ‘the 
quasi-normal to the very tense’.120 For Cremasco, ideational factors drove Gaddafi's desire to 
change the Tunisian regime to expand the ‘the anti-Western and anti-American front’.121 He 
goes on to argue that the Tunisian regime appeared to be substantially westernised and the 
declining appeal of ideologies such as nationalism, socialism and pan-Arabism in the 
Tunisian society in Tunisia played a role in the state of poor relations between the two 
countries when Bourguiba was in power. In the case of Libya, Cremasco argues that the 
Libyan foreign policy after 1969 was influenced on three main ideological axes: pan-
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Arabism, anti-imperialism and Gaddafi's doctrine, laid down in the Green Book, which 
informed Libyan-Tunisian relations.122  
 
Similarly, Clyde R. Mark argues that ideological factors influenced Libyan foreign policy 
towards Tunisia until Ben Ali came to power in 1987.123 Moreover, for Fred Halliday, the 
coming of Ben Ali to power in 1987 mitigated the tension with Libya because of the 
modernising project that was adopted by the Ben Ali regime. This project intended to 
strengthen the Tunisian state and sought to transform the country in order to bring it closer to 
its neighbours, especially Libya.124 However, Ali Girbaal argues that the development of  
Libyan-Tunisian relations can be attributed to the forging of personal relations between Ben 
Ali and Gaddafi, and the emergence of a new moderate elite that bridged the gap between the 
two counties.125 
Western powers were angered by the ideological policies of Libya that lead to a threat to their 
interests in Africa and the Mediterranean. An obvious gulf existed between this North 
African state and external actors during the Cold War period. The Lockerbie problem and its 
consequences further widened this gulf. While Libya was subject to international isolation, 
the remaining countries in the Maghreb experienced improvements in their relations with 
Europe. These changes encouraged Libya to take a more open approach to Europe.126 
 
The development of Libyan-European co-operation requires Libya to make a balance 
between political realities and political philosophy. This is because Libya's policies in Africa 
may conflict with some European interests on the African continent. Additionally, troubles in 
the US-Libyan relationship might hamper Libyan approaches to Europe. These circumstances 
have finally made Libya accept the European project for security in the Mediterranean Sea, 
which takes into consideration the non-military nature of potential co-operation in the region. 
Libyan co-operation is equally important for Europe, because Libya's coastline on the 
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Mediterranean is about 2000 KMs. long, making it essential for Europeans and Libyans to 
work together to combat secret and illegal immigration from Africa to Europe.127 
 
Conclusion 
The Libyan-Tunisian relationship appears to have developed in multilateral contexts, 
according to the literature viewed above. The effects of these contexts between Libya and 
Tunisia were instrumental on the course of political and economic relations. Increasingly 
closer ties between the European Union and the Maghreb brought many opportunities for co-
operation across the Mediterranean Sea. European desires for a partnership with Maghrebi 
countries accelerated diplomatic endeavours to redefine the relationship between the two 
countries. The inter-regional initiatives and the projects that aimed to increase the partnership 
with the Maghrebi countries helped to mitigate the influence of ideology in informing the 
Libyan-Tunisian relations. These efforts came after the end of the Cold War, when ideology 
was a driving force in international relations. The collapse of the USSR assisted in the decline 
of ideology informing Libyan-Tunisian relations. Most of the studies that focus on projects 
seeking to build partnerships between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean 
emphasised mutual interests in multifaceted aspects that could serve the stability and security 
of the Mediterranean region. Free trade areas and co-operation in political and security 
matters were prominent agendas that were discussed and agreed upon by decision-makers 
from Europe and the Maghreb. These studies show the extent on which the influence of 
ideology declined in the information of the multilateral relations between the two shores of 
the Mediterranean. The decline of ideology, along with popular awareness in society, are part 
of the essential elements that, overall, must be considered in examining the efforts to 
transform the state of co-operation into integration amongst the countries of the Arab 
Maghreb Union. 
On the intra-relations between the Maghreb countries, studies show how ideology and 
differences in political beliefs contributed heavily to the state of poor relations between these 
countries. Abu Qasim al-Mabruk has paid special attention to the differences in the political 
regimes in this region. A twofold context was created that was based on the ideology of pan-
Arabism and socialism, and the differences in their ruling regimes in the adoption of different 
ideological models. Political ineffectiveness within the structures and actions of the AMU 
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was clearly apparent. In addition, the decline of ideology played a role in the emergence of 
Arab economic blocs that emphasised mutual economic benefits among a set of plural 
sovereign countries, such as the GCC. The failure of these ideological projects led to 
improvements on a bilateral level between the individual countries of the Maghreb.  
Libyan-Tunisian relations witnessed heightened tensions during the Bourguiba era in Tunisia, 
where differences in ideology and the regime played a key role in the deterioration of 
relations between the two countries. Studies on this matter show that when Bourguiba was in 
power, Libyan-Tunisian relations were beset by crises created by the role of ideology, leading 
to the collapse of the political union between the countries and to the Gafsa crisis. While 
Khalid Hijazi argues that Gafsa was instrumental in the deterioration of these relations, 
Maurizio Cremasco contends that the failure of the Djerba Agreement to effect political unity 
was the cause instead. At the end of the 1980s, relations between the two countries improved 
with the coming of Ben Ali to power after the ousting of Bourguiba. Changes in the 
personnel of the regime reduced the influence of sweeping ideological claims in defining the 
mood of Libyan-Tunisian relations. Ben Ali's neo-liberal reforms created the incentive to 
open Tunisia's borders to Libya, while the latter country was looking to break out of the 
international isolation imposed by the West.  
The review of previous studies in this chapter demonstrates that there is a shortage of relevant 
studies on Libyan-Tunisian relations from 1969 until 2010. Particular focus by researchers on 
the greater levels of economic and political co-operation between 1987 and 2010 does not 
seem to exist. Political discourses around Libyan-Tunisian relations, have unfortunately not 
received the attention they deserve from those who study politics or foreign policy. Some 
researchers have attributed this deficiency to the absence of a free academic atmosphere that 
would allow scholars to critically study the inter-state relations of Tunisia and Libya.128 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESISTANCE IN THE COLONIAL MAGHREB 
AND THE ARRIVAL OF INDEPENDENCE 
 
Introduction 
The Maghreb experienced a series of radical transformations from the early nineteenth 
century until the present. Particular factors rooted in this region have interacted with external 
events or processes. Socio-economic relations occurred in a context of successive Muslim 
rulers based in North Africa. While Ottoman sovereignty tilted the centre of power towards 
Istanbul, local political elites enjoyed a large measure of autonomy in internal matters. Nearly 
three centuries of Ottoman rule had made a strong impact on North Africa. The age of pashas 
and beys was very much alive. European colonialism entered the Maghreb in 1830, and it 
introduced a new set of factors which can still be felt today. As a result, the current nation-
state system in the region, and throughout the Arab world, is a direct product of colonial 
invasions and administrations over the last two centuries. This chapter, which is divided into 
five parts, will examine the period from the beginning of colonialism until the period 
immediately after Tunisian and Libyan independence.  
 
Part one will identify the beginning of colonialism in the Maghreb. Growing European power 
was felt from across the Mediterranean. Intense rivalries among the states of Europe 
threatened to pull the North African provinces of the Ottoman Empire into conflicts taking 
place on the continent. Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt triggered such a power struggle. This 
part will examine the Italian conquest of the Ottoman provinces of Fezzan, Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica. British acceptance of this conquest will also be explained with reference to its 
rivalry with France. 
 
Part two begins with the examination of the Ottoman-tribal dynamic, prior to its disruption. 
Libyan tribesmen were part of the state in ways which indicated their carefully protected 
autonomy from the interference of the central authorities. For Ibn Khaldun, the renowned 
medieval scholar of Islamic history, tribes were united or divided according to the strength of 
group solidarity or 'asabiyya’, underpinned by religion, maintaining internal stability and 
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creating external opportunities for political co-operation or growth.129 However, the Italian 
invasion of 1911 attempted to control and repress the longstanding informal and formal ties 
between the Ottomans and the local tribes, and which recognised the sovereignty of the 
former and the freedom of the latter. I will look at how the tribal nature of Libyan society 
enabled many to flee from the brutal actions of the Italian troops. Social integration and 
access to institutions of education were relatively unproblematic for Libyans immigrants. 
Libyan resistance to Italian colonialism found expression in armed uprisings. I will examine 
in part three this aspect of the reactions of the inhabitants of Libya to the presence of a 
foreign occupation. Tunisia served as an important conduit for the flow of weapons from the 
Ottoman Empire to the Libyan fighters resisting this new imposition. Simultaneous revolts in 
both colonial Tunisia and Libya appear to indicate cross-border activities waged by resistance 
groups as they moved from one colony to the other. I will examine the examples of the 
Libyan, Khalifah Ben Asker, and the Tunisian fellagha (fighter), Mohammad Daghbaji. 
 
Part four examines the rise of anti-colonial literature that aimed to provoke the colonial 
subjects of Tunisia and, in the Maghreb, to defeat colonialism. A campaign of civil 
disobedience appears to be its main feature. Newspapers were instrumental in spreading the 
ideas of anti-colonial writers, journalists and intellectuals. The Young Tunisians was 
founded, based on the objective of getting rid of colonialism, and its members included 
Tunisians, Libyans and Moroccans. Further, the formation of the Republic of North Africa 
was the culmination of its activities. 
 
Part five examines the era of independence, as Tunisia and Libya became formal nation-states 
in their own right. While a republican system was introduced in Tunisia, led by Habib 
Bourguiba, the three provinces of Libya were united under a monarchy. Both countries 
appear to have pursued a neutral policy concerning the radical politics of their eastern 
neighbours. A rivalry developed between Bourguiba and Jamal Abdul Nasser, complemented 
by strong ideological differences about how to deal with the problems of the Arab world. 
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The Beginning of Colonialism 
Europe's influence in the Middle East increased markedly from the early nineteenth century. 
Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 introduced a new dynamic into the region. The 
previous Ottoman rule was challenged, and it was severely weakened in the Arab provinces 
of its empire. Furthermore, a plan was formulated by Napoleon for an invasion of Algiers, 
which was not carried out until after his reign in 1830.130 Expanding European power was felt 
across the world. Their political and economic interests were increasingly perceived to be tied 
to the acquisition of new import and export markets through colonialism. Ottoman control of 
its Arab territories was thus rapidly eroding, with colonial actors interfering directly in a 
variety of ways, eventually leading to formal annexation. Colonialism in North Africa was a 
complex process involving many factors which witnessed the occupation of foreign armies 
and the reaction of native resistance. France, Britain, Spain and Italy adopted their own style 
of colonial policies and acquired territories in North Africa. Previous rulers were either 
overthrown or were subjected to the dictates of the representative of the colonial power.  
 
The post-Napoleonic North Africa experienced successive waves of imperialism from the 
early nineteenth until the middle of the twentieth centuries. The initial plan to invade Algeria 
finally occurred in 1830 through a diplomatic crisis that was manufactured by the French, 
implicating the Ottoman governor of Algiers. Tunisia was declared a French protectorate in 
1881. Political agitation by native officers in the Egyptian army, known as the Urabi revolt, 
led to British military intervention and the establishment of Egypt as a protectorate. Prior to 
the outbreak of the First World War, Italy had seized the Libyan provinces of Fezzan, 
Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, thereby forcing the Ottomans to finally cede these territories. The 
failure of Italian colonial policy to take control of Tunisia led to increasing attention on 
Libya.131 
 
Despite the apparent differences and ongoing disputes among European states about the 
unfolding of the colonisation of the Ottoman Arab provinces, they were unanimous in their 
support of the Italian campaign to occupy Libya. Britain and France, in light of similar 
invasions of Egypt and Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, respectively, consented to the 
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ambitions of Italy. Notably, the British had encouraged Italy to enter North Africa to balance 
French colonial designs on Libya. Further, Britain did not wish to share the border of its 
protectorate over Egypt with France. A barrier was to be created between its colonies in the 
east and the French control of the western regions of North Africa.132 Additionally, British 
calculations of the relative weakness of the Italians shaped their perception of the need to 
bring in a lesser threat to its interests. This policy followed the advice of Cooper, a British 
traveller, that Britain ought to undermine French colonial plans for Tripolitania through 
another, yet weaker, colonial actor, after the removal of Ottoman rule.133 
 
For Khalifah Atlelisi, the motivations behind Italian colonial designs on Libya were due to its 
desire to join the colonial rivalry between France and Britain over the territories of the 
Ottoman Empire; to secure a foothold on the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, and to 
claim the responsibility of being a civilising agent seeking to modernise other peoples.134Italy 
thus sent a warning to the Ottoman Empire on 27th September, 1911, which expressed its 
intention to occupy the Ottoman’s Libyan territories. Ottoman rejection of the 
aforementioned warning led to a declaration of war by Italy, accompanied by attacks on the 
coastal cities of Libya on 29th September, 1911.135Italian control soon extended into the 
interior.  
 
In the Muslim world, the Italian occupation of Libya provoked hostility. Arab groups and 
individuals, especially in neighbouring Tunisia, threw their support behind the resistance 
movements in Libya, from fighters to financial assistance to equipment.136French tolerance of 
this cross-border activity was mainly prompted by the fear that Tunisians might themselves 
rise up following the battle of al-Jallaz. The mood in Paris concerning colonial North Africa 
can be discerned from the reports of a French journalist who was observing,  
 
However, the joint Libyan-Tunisian borders are very long, which means it is 
impossible to protect them fully. In addition, both the Libyans and Tunisians do 
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not consider these borders to be present. Likewise, there is no international law 
that prohibits trading  among  neighbouring tribes. The Libyan and Tunisian 
tribes have very strong and old blood, social and trade relations, which are 
impossible to break. Accordingly, it was not only impossible but also 
dangerous for France to restrict traditional relations that link close Arab tribes.137 
 
This recognition of the common bonds of tribes across French Tunisia and Italian Libya 
indicates the limits of the power and will of the colonial administration, even on matters of 
military resistance. However, the approach was subject to inconsistencies. Regular French 
armed encounters with Tunisian fighters transporting supplies from one side of the border to 
the other took place.138 
 
Cross-border exchanges were not only military in nature, but also attest to the trading of 
goods. In this contested situation, Libyans and the Italian colonial authorities vied for control 
of the borders. A large influx of Tunisian products found their way into Tripolitania. During 
the first few months of the Italian invasion of Libya, Tunisian exports had multiplied to three 
times what they had previously been. The amount of Tunisian exports, according to reports 
by the Civil Observance Council in Gabes, had increased from 6,000 tons in September, 
1911, to 24,000 tons in January, 1912. Closure of other trading channels, especially the sea 
ports, stimulated the process of supply from the French colonial possession, Tunisia, to its 
eastern neighbours.139 
 
Various interactions between Tunisia and Libya influenced the nature and direction of native 
resistance in the latter. The Italian colonial administration was determined to suppress the 
flow of arms, fighters and resources from Tunisia. Tribal and social relations between the 
colonial subjects of territories were to be policed and limited. This policy, however, was not 
successful, as can be confirmed by the emergence of numerous Tunisian movements 
dedicated to resistance by the inhabitants of colonial Libya against the Italians. Popular 
support, in a variety of ways, was forthcoming for the anti-colonial struggle waged by the 
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Libyan resistance. The territorial displacements of many Libyan tribes to the southern regions 
of Tunisia contributed further to the moral and concrete assistance between borders. Against 
this background of mutual exchange, resistance movements in Tunisia and Libya were 
motivated, in part, by a tribal dynamic which had little or no patience with colonial borders. 
Ongoing recruitment of fighters against the French and Italian colonial occupations, on both 
sides of the border, increased after the outbreak of the First World War.140 
 
Formal Colonial Borders and Informal Tribal Ties 
The colonial period brought about many changes to the territories of North Africa. Ottoman 
rule granted a large measure of autonomy to local governors on the coastline. Further, the 
interior was not subject to direct administration. However, the relations between Ottoman 
officials in the major cities and tribal leaders in the countryside were conducted against the 
background of a balance of interests. A mutually reinforcing relationship existed. Law and 
order alongside education, among other services, from the Ottomans, was complemented by 
the participation of Libyans in local government and administration.141Colonial rule changed 
this context with greater emphasis on bringing the natives into the repressive embrace of a 
foreign army and bureaucracy. To what extent had tribal relations participated in the 
resistance movements in Libya and Tunisia? What were the primary characteristics of 
relations between the colonial subjects in both countries? Popular resistance at the beginning 
of foreign occupation in Libya and Tunisia appears to show tribal and social support taking 
the form of cross-border interactions. These borders were considered to be imposed by 
illegitimate and foreign rulers, at first, followed by the attitude that they were nothing other 
than mere formalities, which could be ignored.  
 
Libyan tribesmen and groups gave their support to the resistance against the French colonial 
occupying Tunisia from 1881. Coordination for the anti-colonial struggle primarily took 
place between the western regions of Libya and southern Tunisia.142 Common social 
structures brought a high degree of co-ordinated relations between the colonial Libyan-
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Tunisian borders. During times of peace and war, the exchange of goods, people and ideas 
persisted. Importantly, shared religion, culture and language were reinforced by marriage ties. 
Tribal communities had grown and developed around the binding of social bonds that were 
based on bringing together different families, or on deepening the connections between 
existing ones. Members of a single family and clan can be found on both the Libyan and 
Tunisian sides of the border.143 Tribal solidarity thus provided the sense of shared tribal 
origins or interests.  
 
Thomas Barfield observes the key tendency of tribal groups to sustain "social and political 
cohesion in opposition to state rule", counting the Bedouin tribes of Libya in his list.144 State-
building efforts were either driven by tribes, such as the case of the short-lived Libyan 
Kingdom of King Idris I, the leader of the Senoussiyya brotherhood, to be discussed later, or 
they remained a constant presence in the calculations of governments. In the 19th and 20th 
centuries, the Senoussiyya was present throughout the Sahara desert. It was founded by a 
pilgrim returning from Mecca and Medina in the Hijaz, who preached the return to a simple 
and uncorrupted form of Islam. Most members of the Senoussiyya were recruited from the 
tribesmen of Libyan Desert. However, the brotherhood’s attention shifted from matters of 
religious ritual to politics, as they first challenged the hegemony of the French in modern-day 
Chad, and then targeted Italian troops after 1911.145 In colonial Libya, the tribal structure 
continued to generate resistance to foreign-imposed political centres.  
 
Tunisia provided a natural refuge for those fleeing the harsh policies of Italian colonial rule. 
Several waves of immigration occurred from Libya into Tunisia in this period. By the end of 
the first year of Italian occupation, 20,000 Libyans had left their homeland. The next wave, at 
the end of 1913, numbered 35,000 immigrants. Security and work opportunities drove many 
to abandon the deterioration resulting from the policies caused by the Italian occupation. 
Local farming and trade were two such fields of employment for these Libyans, alongside the 
phosphate industries.146 
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Academic instruction in Arabic, which had suffered enormously in Libya due to Italian 
efforts, was also a factor in making the journey across the border. The medieval madrasah at 
Zaitouna was one institution which hosted Libyan religious students and scholars, thereby 
giving them the opportunity to integrate into a Tunisian society in the making.147 The various 
difficulties experienced by Libyan immigrants did not stop them from settling down in the 
wider community among the Tunisians. Indications show mass immigration caused no 
serious problems between the subject populations of colonial Tunisia and Libya.148The 
opposite appears to be case, with the membership of Libyan and Tunisian workers in the 
Tunisian Labour Trade Union and the defence of the rights of the labour force in the face of 
the strict policies of the French colonial administration that targeted workers, united Libyan 
immigrants with their Tunisian counterparts. 
 
Libyan Resistance and Ottoman Support 
The Ottoman Empire was caught in a complicated web of relations involving European 
colonial powers. Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan were considered provinces in urgent 
need of the restoration of Ottoman rule. Libyan resistance to colonialism was supported 
through generous financial assistance, mainly directed to buttressing soldiers to defend the 
key city of Tripoli.149Close coordination between the Ottoman government in Istanbul and 
resistance fighters was urged by Nash'at Basha, the last Ottoman governor of Libya, against 
the occupation of the territory. In November, 1912, 150,000 Ottoman Lira were given to 
these fighters.150Additional financial aid of 85,000 Lira arrived to reinforce the existing 
efforts against the Italians.151 A broader plan to repel the invasion of the North African 
provinces under Ottoman sovereignty also involved other dimensions. Importantly, military 
help was also forthcoming. Ships, such as the 'Adernah', made their way to the region, 
containing weapons and other supplies.152 The conflict, putting Italian troops on one side and 
anti-colonial fighters on the other, thus stimulated a growing arms trade between Libya and 
Tunisia. However, several ships in route to Libya via Tunisia were impounded. One 
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unsuccessful Ottoman attempt to arm Libyan fighters by sea saw the capture of the 'Odessa' 
on 1st September, 1912.153 Greatly needed military supplies continued to be sent by the 
Ottomans until the ceding of Libya to Italy in the O'Shea Treaty, which was signed at 
Lausanne.154 
 
European acceptance of Italian control of Libya was soon followed by the invasion of the 
desert interior of its new colony. Fezzan was finally conquered on 12th August, 1914. 
However, Italian rule in the province was short-lived in the face of intense resistance. Local 
anti-colonial forces, joined by fighters from other parts of Libya, had managed to defeat 
Italian forces at the battle of al-Qardabiyah on 29th April, 1915. Subsequently, colonial 
control retreated and was more or less limited to the coastal cities. 
 
Libyan success against Italy on the battlefield was accompanied by an anti-colonial revolt in 
neighbouring Tunisia. The simultaneous waging of these two campaigns of native resistance 
in the separate colonies strengthened co-operation between fighters on both sides of the 
colonial boundary. While Italy had joined the Allied camp, the Ottoman Empire agreed to 
support Imperial Germany. Against this background, Khalifah Ben Asker, a prominent 
resistance leader, was prompted to launch several attacks that sought to drive Italian forces 
from the countryside. The Ottomans sought to exploit the situation in its former provinces to 
their own advantage during the war.155 
 
Knowledge of the environment and geography of the shared Libyan-Tunisian border regions 
was utilised by Tunisian colonial subjects to aid Libyan resistance fighters.156 I noted, in an 
earlier section, that the existence of solidarity brought about a sense of shared tribal origins or 
interests. This created a context where informal cultural, political, economic and social ties 
cut across the formal structures of colonial power. French and Italian imposed borders, 
bureaucracies and policing failed, to some extent, to curb the political consequences of the 
solidarity between their native subjects.  
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The battle of al-Jallaz, in Tunisia, involved Libyans and Tunisians against French colonial 
troops on 7th November 1911.157 A 'Unity of Destiny' between the native inhabitants of the 
colonies in North Africa, particularly Tunisia and Libya, is perceived to have manifested 
itself.158Cross-border activities continued to facilitate the flow of goods, weapons and people 
in both directions, which was especially evident during the colonial period.159 
 
Fighters recruited from Tunisia had joined the resistance, led by Khalifah Ben Asker, which 
was being waged against the Italian colonial occupation.160 Mohammad Daghbaji, a former 
Tunisian officer in the French army, had deserted his position to join the anti-colonial 
struggle. He led a campaign of militant agitation, earning a reputation as a fellagha, against 
the colonial authorities in Tunisia, from Libya. However, Daghbaji was caught by the 
Italians, who then handed him over to the French, which lead to his execution on 1st March, 
1924.161 
 
A set of factors appears to have given rise to the resistance efforts of individuals, such as 
Khalifah Ben Asker, in the colonial Maghreb. Liberation from colonialism, socio-economic 
displacement, military, social and moral support from neighbouring states and the Ottomans, 
the imprisonment and torture of tribal members, such as Khalifah Ben Asker, contributed to a 
complex situation with high levels of discontent.162An informal tribal will, expressed as 
solidarity across colonial borders, continually frustrated the asymmetric balance of power 
between the European colonial armies and native fighters. 
 
The disruption of the traditional economy of the provinces in Libya resulted from the Italian 
attempt to wrest control from the Ottomans. Severe obstacles to the carrying out of the 
normal activities of trading and the earning of a livelihood, emerged. Subsequently, the 
Libyan population experienced increasing levels of poverty. The western hilly areas, and the 
area of Nalut, suffered most from this situation. France also closed the border between its 
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colony and the areas being attacked by the Italian army. Those Libyans who directly took part 
in the cross-border trade thus lost their main and only source of income.163 
 
Southern Tunisia was increasingly vulnerable to anti-colonial agitation, particularly, to 
infiltration by fighters through the border, which was perceived to pose a danger after Italian 
troops were expelled from the area.164Increased political agitation on both sides of the 
colonial boundary was a source of concern for the French colonial authorities, as it was 
thought that it might lead to a popular uprising against French colonialism in the Arab 
Maghreb.165Tribes from the south of Tunisia did participate in campaigns of resistance that 
lead to some major victories over the colonial forces in both Libya and Tunisia.166In colonial 
Tunisia, the Tataouine Military French Centre was among the targets. Battles were fought 
between resistance groups and their tribal supporters against the French troops, such as the 
battle of Dehiba I, in September, 1915, Dehiba II in January, 1916, Um Suwaigh II in 
October, 1915, and Ramada in October, 1916.167 
 
Tribal and resistance leaders, like Khalifah Ben Asker, were able to win battles against the 
French.168These victorious occasions encouraged anti-colonial fighters from Italian Libya and 
French Tunisia to  co-operate to realise a common cause: the end of colonialism. Tribes, such 
as the Makhalbah, Dehibat and Tari’efah, played a key role in expanding these activities and 
later formed the core of the Tunisian resistance movement.169The co-ordination between the 
leaders of the resistance, reinforced by tribal solidarity on the different sides of the colonial 
border, proved to be instrumental in harassing French troops. This situation led the French 
field officer, Trestournel, to withdraw from Dehiba and to stay in Tataouine.170 Anti-colonial 
sentiments were running high against French and Italian colonialism. The Ottoman religious 
authority also made its position clear on this matter: the struggle to expel the colonialists was 
a religious duty. The former rulers of the Maghreb used the notion of the head of state of the 
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Ottoman Empire as the caliph to mobilise Muslims, especially in North Africa, to revolt 
against its enemies during the First World War.171 
 
The Battle for Hearts and Minds: The Republic of North Africa 
Resistance to colonialism was not restricted to the sphere of armed acts that sought to 
undermine the physical dimensions of French and Italian domination in the Maghreb. The 
battle for the hearts and minds of the colonial subjects of this region was just as urgent. A 
rapidly growing anti-colonial literature had emerged. Newspapers provided one of the most 
effective forums in which to express discontent and anger with the imposition of colonialism 
in Tunisia and Libya. In this form of print media, the calls for peaceful demonstrations and 
workers’ strikes were made as an expression of hostility to foreign occupation.172 Social, 
political and economic tensions caused by the First World War created an environment that 
was ripe for popular mobilisation. Encouraged by journalists, writers and intellectuals, the 
colonial subjects of Tunisia and Libya began campaigns of civil disobedience against the 
French and Italian administrations in their countries.173 
 
During the early twentieth century, one of the leading protagonists of this push for the end of 
colonial domination was Abdul-Aziz Tha'albi in. Tha'albi was joined by other activists, who 
arrived at conclusions on the painful awareness of the imminent collapse of the Ottoman, and 
that the lands of the Muslims and Arabs were objects of European colonial ambitions.174 
Consequently, the Young Tunisians was founded in 1907 by Tha'albi and Ali Basha Hanyeh. 
Islamic and nationalist grounds were given by this movement against the Italian occupation 
of Libya in 1911. Activists and thinkers from the Maghreb, Tunisia, Libya and Morocco, had 
joined the Young Tunisians. Its appeal cut across national boundaries, originally imposed by 
the colonial powers, with its emphasis on political unity. The idea of the Republic of North 
Africa, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to Libya's eastern border with Egypt, was a key 
objective. Senior leaders of this group, who adopted this idea, included Tha'albi, Ali Basha 
Hanyeh, Saleh Sharif and Sheikh Safayhi.175 
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The Ottoman Empire, imperial Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire recognised the 
Republic of North Africa in an act that was intended to embolden its protagonists. It had 
registered with the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague.176 When the Ottoman 
Empire entered the First World War, on the side of Germany and Austro-Hungary, this 
objective had been achieved, according to Sheikh Taher al-Zawi. However, the Germans had 
demanded that the Republic of North Africa should call for revolution against French and 
Italian colonialism in the Maghreb.177 
 
The Era of Independence 
The independence of Tunisia in 1956 and of Libya in 1951 ushered in  a new stage in the 
Maghreb. A historic transition from colonialism to a post-colonial political arrangement 
brought about the existence of new states. I will illustrate in this section the birth of relations 
between Tunisia and Libya until Gaddafi's rise to power in 1969. A novel context 
accompanied by different norms and structures shaped the nature of Libyan-Tunisian links. 
Libya and Tunisia had emerged from colonial dependence to formal independence in a period 
of swift decolonisation across Africa and Asia. The foreign policy of both these countries was 
biased towards the capitalist Western bloc, namely France, the United Kingdom and the 
USA, during the early years of the Cold War. Libya's ability to act in regional and 
international affairs was limited. King Idris I, the first King of Libya, pursued a broadly 
conservative policy. Treaties of friendship were signed with the UK and the USA in 1953 and 
1954, respectively. British and American military bases were to be established as a result. 
Financial and economic assistance was to be provided to the newly independent North 
African kingdom. An agreement with France in 1955 demarcated Libya's southern borders 
with Chad.178 
 
Arab relations were not developed by the new royal regime, with its shared capital cities of 
Benghazi and Tripoli. Isolation appeared to be the direction followed by King Idris I. While 
Libya had already joined the United Nations upon independence, the decision to become a 
member of the Arab League in 1953 occurred only after mounting public pressure. American 
foreign policy, based on 'Filling the Void', was followed by Libya in the Arab world. A 
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neutral position was to be taken by the royal kingdom concerning events in the region. A 
policy of good neighbourliness and non-interference in conflicts dominated Libya's foreign 
relations.179 
 
While no military agreements were signed by the new post-colonial regime, Tunisia similarly 
adopted a pro-Western line in its foreign policy. French cultural and political influences were 
immediately felt in the public affairs of the country. The Arab and Islamic identity of this 
Maghrebi nation appear to have been marginalised in the formulation of policies. In the 
transition period to independence, differences of opinion on the future direction and the 
foreign policy of a post-colonial Tunisia existed among members of the ruling elite who were 
pushing for decolonisation. Although Habib Bourguiba and his followers wanted to focus on 
the negotiations with the French for independence, Saleh Ben Youssef, among others, 
concluded that only an armed uprising could secure the end of colonial rule. For Bourguiba, 
continuity with the immediate past was confirmed by the fact ‘that unity between Tunisia and 
France is unbreakable and is central for the Constitution Party’.180 The opposing view 
adhered to the pan-Arab ideology that was being propagated by Jamal Abdul Nasser in 
Cairo.181 A future Tunisia would reflect the Arab and Islamic identity of the Tunisian 
people.182 
 
Post-colonial Tunisia turned away from its Arab neighbours in a deliberate policy 
promulgated by Habib Bourguiba, aiming to adopt a neutral position in the Middle East and 
North Africa. Bourguiba's stay in France proved to hugely influential on his thinking. The 
ideals of the French Republic were attractive alternatives to the Arab and Islamic identity that 
were current in the Arab world. A preference for a European model of the nation-state during 
independence ignored or replaced Tunisian cultural and political concerns.183 
 
The Suez Crisis, involving co-ordinated military action by France, Britain and Israel against 
Egypt, and witnessed a patent lack of support for the Arab nation.184The attack by France, 
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Britain and Israel was received by Bourguiba as a victory over his rival Nasser. Relations had 
deteriorated between the two men due to Egypt's backing of Saleh Ben Youssef and the 
presence of Ahmad Ben Bella in Algeria. He was a compatriot of Nasser and an ardent Third 
Worldist. It was only a matter of time, thought Bourguiba, before these two leaders would 
lose power.185 
 
Post-colonial relations between Tunisia and Libya were influenced by the ideological and 
political concerns of the new regimes. There was a lack of action in the area of integration. 
Despite Bourguiba's declaration that the two peoples of Tunisia and Libya formed one 
integral nation and were part of the greater Arab Maghreb, no steps were made to develop the 
political implications of this sentiment.186 Interestingly, Libya's treaty of friendship and co-
operation with Tunisia, in 1957, was perceived by Bourguiba as a blow to Egypt's role in the 
Maghreb.187 
 
Additionally, the political path pursued by Bourguiba seems to have increased the tensions 
with neighbouring Algeria.188Libya thus perceived Tunisia to be an unreliable partner in the 
region. Instead, relations with Bourguiba could be more of a burden than a benefit, following 
the discovery oil in Libya in the early 1960s. American and British military bases could 
provide the guarantee of security for the Senoussi ruling family, thereby substituting for the 
need for strong relations with the Arab states surrounding Libya.189 Further disagreements 
were caused by Bourguiba's controversial plan to resolve the Palestinian issue through the 
acceptance of the UN resolution for partition, with the effect of recognising Israel. The Arab 
League had rejected this plan in 1968. Subsequently, although Bourguiba resorted to a 
boycott of the Arab League, reaffirmed Tunisian support for the Palestinian resistance. 
 
Discord among the newly independent Arab states may have resulted from ideological 
conflicts about what policies should be adopted to resolve the problems faced by the Arab 
world. Pan-Arabism dominated the regional and national debates on how to organise 
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politically. Tunisia aimed to be the exception to the trend, pushing for political union among 
the Arabs. Bourguiba narrowly defined Tunisian nationalism without reference to other 
sources of identity, either ethnic or religious. Whereas Arab unity possessed relevance for the 
Mashreq, it had no place in the Maghreb. Popular sentiments in the Maghreb show a shared 
Arabo-Islamic identity during the 1950s. This identity provided protection from colonial 
attempts to divide the western region of the Arab world from its sister region in the east.190 
Bourguiba's policy thus appears to have ran contrary to large sections of Arab public opinion. 
Calls for Arab unity echoed in the Maghreb. In the Mashreq, Abdul Nasser had attracted a 
large following among intellectuals, students, labourers and politicians in Arab states. 
Support also emerged in Libya and Tunisia. King Idris's eventual ousting was carried out by 
junior military officers in the Libyan army, influenced by the revolutionary currents 
spreading in the Arab world.  
 
Political life in colonial Tunisia had, ironically, been freer during the colonial period than 
under Bourguiba's reign. Certain levels of freedom in the press and civil society were 
permitted by the French colonial authorities. Independence saw a worsening of the censorship 
practised by the post-colonial regime. An attempted coup d’êtat against Bourguiba in 1961 
provided him with the pretext to further control Tunisian political life. Independent 
newspapers, political freedom, the Communist Party and the activities of trade unions and 
professional syndicates, were subjected to severe restrictions.191 
 
Bourguiba's ideological flirtations with socialism in the early 1960s saw Tunisia being 
governed according to an authoritarian one-party state. Tunisian public life was a direct 
reflection of the ideology espoused by Bourguiba, with no dissent tolerated in the media. 
Civil society organisations disappeared with the expansion of the state. A huge gulf had 
grown between the wider society, especially the intellectuals and the youth, on the one hand, 
and an increasingly despotic Bourguiba, on the other. Opposition to the regime had emerged 
and was driven by the leftist and Islamist movements among disaffected university students. 
Heightening tensions soon led to popular uprisings, such as the violent protests of January, 
1978. Domestic instability, in the form of these protests and Bourguiba's authoritarian 
tendencies, caused him to establish strong political ties with the conservative Arab 
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monarchies. This move can be seen to be an apparent reversal of Bourguiba's 1957 
campaigns in Tunisia to abolish the monarchy. 
 
Conclusion 
Colonial rule in Tunisia and Libya appears to have deepened the pre-existing social, political 
and economic ties between inhabitants on both sides of the border. Anti-colonial campaigns 
were waged in ways which did not recognise the legitimacy of political boundaries. Informal 
relations driven by tribal solidarity were powerful in creating a rebellious spirit among the 
tribesmen of North Africa. Local fighters from Tunisia and Libya joined common causes to 
fight both the French and Italians. This threat to the colonial authorities led to an active 
policy of containment. Native resistance fighters were arrested, deported or executed. A 
popular Libyan sheikh, Suleiman Baroni, was deported to Tunisia, but he continued his 
struggle against the Italian occupation from exile.192 
 
In Tunisia, two main trends emerged from within the independence movement. One trend 
was committed to the ideals and culture of France. A Francophile group of like-minded 
individuals pursued a policy of negotiations with France for the peaceful exit of the colonial 
administration. The second trend, inspired by an Arabo-Islamic model of renewal, was more 
vocal about the need for an abrupt end to colonialism. Only an armed struggle could end 
French rule over Tunisia.193 Independence from France would finally arrive on 20th March, 
1956. The movement which secured this momentous achievement, the Neo-Constitutional 
Party, was divided according to ideological and other lines, on the nature of the new 
government. Habib Bourguiba, on becoming President, ended this controversy that  emanated 
from this division through the adoption of a narrowly defined agenda of political 
conservatism. Tunisia was not to be influenced by the Arabo-Islamic dimensions of its 
heritage. Instead, Bourguiba’s modernisation programme was largely secular in content. The 
state was to be the primary object of loyalty, rather than the dominant traditional ties of the 
family, clan or tribe. The nationalisation of Islamic endowments, which had sustained 
autonomous sources of income for Muslim scholars and organisations, was part of this 
broader strategy. Total replacement of Shari’ah courts with a secular code of law, including 
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changes in the Personal Affairs Directorate, especially in the area of women’s rights, was 
carried out.194 
 
In Libya, a nationalist movement had also emerged. The anti-colonial struggle against the 
Italians managed to survive in Libya thanks to the persistence of tribal and Sufi organisations, 
both in the country and abroad. Negotiations, after the defeat of Italy in World War Two, led 
to formal independence. Mohammad al-Senoussi became King Idris I of the Kingdom of 
Libya on 24th December, 1951. However, independence brought a series of new factors 
which emphasised the importance of ideology, particularly in its pan-Arabist version, in the 
relations of post-colonial states. Bourguiba rejected the regional claims of Nasser and his 
neighbours. King Idris similarly decided to limit Libya’s relations with the revolutionary 
regime to the east of his border. Great Britain and the USA would be more useful allies to 
secure his throne, rather than the passionately anti-monarchical Nasser. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: TRANSITIONS TO THE POST-COLONIAL 
NATION 
 
Introduction 
The transition from colonial rule to independence was not a simple process. Instead, the 
weight of the past heavily influenced the new regimes that were in charge of Libya and 
Tunisia. Narrowly-defined policies were adopted by Habib Bourguiba and King Idris I in the 
domestic and international concerns of their states. While Francophile ideals were a source of 
inspiration for Bourguiba, religious conservatism and a close friendship with the British 
defined Libya's politics. However, the ousting of Idris by Libyan army officers, while he was 
in Turkey seeking medical attention, was an important moment in Libyan contemporary 
history. An era of radical politics was initiated, reflecting the ideological battles of the Cold 
War. I will illustrate in this chapter the political context of Libya and Tunisia. Further, 
attention will be focused on three key areas of this context. The examination of domestic 
politics, the economies and nature of religion in the countries examined in this thesis, will 
help to understand their foreign policy in a broader framework. Inter-state relations between 
Libya and Tunisia were shaped by these areas in ways which indicate their closeness to each 
other.  
 
The first area in this chapter focuses on the domestic politics of post-colonial Libya and 
Tunisia. A rising authoritarianism in these two nations became the main characteristic of their 
politics. Bourguiba had chosen the path of modernisation, strongly influenced by French 
culture and ideas. Alternative points of view were either ignored or eliminated. Islamists 
demanded that Islam should be acknowledged as a core element of Tunisia's identity. Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali, after ousting Bourguiba, decided to embark on a path of political pluralism 
and to include the Islamic Tendency Movement, which had changed its name to the 
Renaissance Movement ‘Ennahdha Movement’. In Libya, Gaddafi implemented a socialist 
ideology that was inspired by the Arabism of Jamal Abdul Nasser. The end of the monarchy 
signalled the beginning of a revolutionary period for the country. Expansion of the state into 
society would leave little space for the free market or competitive politics.  
 
The second area examines the impact of economics in Libya and Tunisia. These two 
economies were very different. King Idris had presided over the discovery of oil in a largely 
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tribal society. Plans for modernisation were formulated that were based on a free market 
model. However, the change in political regime introduced a radical ideology in charge of 
Libya. Socialist developmental plans were implemented, with more failures than successes. 
Tunisia's economy differed sharply from the other states in the Maghreb. The lack of natural 
resources was made up for by the reliance on agriculture and tourism. Ben Ali's open door 
policies aimed to bring foreign direct investment into the Tunisian economy.  
 
The third area looks at Islam's influence on the politics and society of the Maghreb that can 
be seen in the history of the region. Religious institutions often act as social organisations at 
the same time. Bourguiba insisted on the separation of religion and the state. His bitter 
struggle with the Islamists seems to confirm this conviction. However, Ben Ali's policy 
towards his religious opponents, particularly the Islamic Tendency Movement, was initially 
that of engagement, until he adopted Bourguiba's tactics of using the security services and 
judiciary to control alternative religious discourses. In this chapter, the example of the 
Senoussiyya Brotherhood in Libya shows the interdependence of religion, society and state-
building. Although Islam was employed to create a climate of religious conservatism in 
Libya, Gaddafi tried to transform it into a revolutionary force. The above factors will be 
discussed in order to shed light on how they created limitations and opportunities for Libyan-
Tunisian relations. I will examine these relations in greater detail in the following chapters.  
 
Domestic Politics 
Revolution and Socialism in Libya 
Widespread changes in Libya were introduced after the overthrowing of King Idris I. The 
1969 revolution brought Muammar Gaddafi to power, with other officers, in the declaration 
of the 'Libyan Arab Republic', signalling the end of the 18 year old monarchy.195 However, 
Gaddafi became Prime Minister in January, 1970, and implemented a radical agenda, which 
challenged the status quo. A programme of nationalisation targeted the foreign-owned oil 
companies that were present in Libya. The monarchy-era military bases were closed down. 
Arabism became the ideology of the new regime. A 'Cultural Revolution' was subsequently 
launched in 1973. Libya's legal system was abolished by Gaddafi in an attempt to initiate a 
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revolutionary plan to reconstruct the society of his country. Political activity was 
consequently restricted to the official narrative of the state. The publication of Gaddafi's 
Green Book captured his ideological beliefs and objectives about politics, economics, society 
and religion in Libya. In 1977, the outlining of the theory, the 'Authority of the Nation', was a 
major turning point for the Libyan domestic political scene. Political parties were to be 
banned, and this was accompanied by the clear warning that those who established these 
entities were traitors to their homeland. A number of party leaders, university students and 
activists were subsequently executed.196 
 
Two key sources of power in Libya can be mentioned to explain how Gaddafi was able to 
dominate its politics. The actual process of decision-making was no longer in the formal 
sphere. Institutions such as the legislature, judiciary and executive, were either severely 
weakened or emptied of any real impact on the lives of Libyans. Instead, the vast wealth from 
natural resources and tribal alliances maintained Gaddafi's tight and unpredictable grip on his 
society.197 It may be suitable to examine here how the informal structure of decision-making 
in Libya among clans and tribes subordinated or marginalised the formal institutions of the 
state. However, these institutions were still needed for the purposes of legitimacy and 
bureaucracy. Rigid boundaries between state and society were gradually eroded in a very 
particular form of populism.  
 
Similarly, Gaddafi's policies did recognise a distinction between politics and the economy. 
The Libyan economy also fell within the responsibility of the new regime in Tripoli. 
Gaddafi's ideology advocated an enlarged role for the state in the daily lives of Libyans. 
Socialism was adopted to be the means to redistribute wealth on a more equitable basis. 
Naturally, the existence of the institutions and practices of the free market were eliminated. 
New laws and regulations were introduced, and these aimed at recreating a new society that 
was free from the oppression of foreign imperialism and its domestic agents. Government-
owned companies and sectors were born. Large revenues from oil and natural gas drove and 
sustained the new economic policies of the revolutionary regime. The ratio of Libyans to the 
revenue being generated from natural resources allowed Gaddafi's ideology to avoid the 
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problems plaguing the redistribution of wealth in states with large populations. This 
economic policy was very much in force for almost 35 years.198 
The 'President-for-Life' and the Islamist Challenge 
The regime, led by Bourguiba, in neighbouring Tunisia was similarly under the tight control 
of a single figure and party. Power was concentrated in the Constitutional Party, the 
movement which had negotiated independence from the French, with no genuine competition 
from other political parties. Tolerance of these parties appears to have been motivated by the 
need to have the facade of pluralism to grant further legitimacy to the republican regime. 
Democracy was seen as a challenge to the stability of the state. The prestigious status and 
ability of the state could only be fully realised through a strong autocratic leader who was in 
charge of the country.199 
A 'one-man state' was the primary vision of Bourguiba in a post-colonial Tunisia. However, 
this inevitably created a fertile situation for collision with other political actors. During the 
1960s, university students had clashed with state security forces. A large gulf between 
Bourguiba and his political opponents was now out in the open.  
  
Political rifts also appeared within the ruling party. It began to lose influence on the regime 
during the 1970s. A multi-party system was formally introduced in the early 1980s, due to 
political and economic pressures in Tunisia in this period. However, the move towards multi-
partyism in April, 1981, failed to convince the opposition of the genuineness of political 
reform.200 Bourguiba's regime still had a tight grip on the reins in all the institutions of the 
state. The change to the party system was ridiculed by the opposition as a legitimacy 
enhancing act, solely for the benefit of Bourguiba and his decision to be 'President-for-Life' 
of Tunisia.  
 
During Bourguiba’s reign, public opposition took the form of protests during the 1980s. 'The 
Bread Uprising' in 1984 signalled a greater readiness to voice anger against the Tunisian 
regime's policies. Bourguiba responded to the protests by sacking his Prime Minister, 
Mohammad Mzali, in 1986. During the same period, the Islamic Tendency Movement, a 
recently formed Islamist movement, posed a forceful challenge to the stability of the 
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authoritarian regime.201 The roots of the rivalry between Bourguiba's essentially Francophile 
policy and the Arabo-Islamic platform could be found in the colonial era. An unresolved 
ideological disagreement between Bourguiba's Neo-Constitutional Party, established in 1934, 
and the Constitutional Party, led by Abdul-Aziz Tha'albi, has persisted throughout the 
decades since independence. The Islamic Tendency Movement had organised themselves into 
a social force before proceeding to establish a political party. Bourguiba's reaction was to 
eliminate the religiously-motivated claimant to power. Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was 
appointed in his capacity as Prime Minister to confront this threat to the power of the 
republican regime and to Bourguiba personally. However, the Islamists emerged as a stronger 
political actor, gaining more popular support from ordinary Tunisians. The arrest of Rachid 
al-Ghannouchi by Bourguiba in 1987 sparked clashes on the streets and university campuses 
of Tunisia.202 Events quickly degenerated into an uncompromising political crisis, 
precipitating Ben Ali to take steps to remove Bourguiba from power on 7th November, 
1987.203 
Tunisia now had a new President with Ben Ali's succession. Leaders of the Islamist 
movement were freed as a political gesture of goodwill. A smooth transition to the new 
regime, unhindered by the problems of the previous regime, was the intended objective. 
Nonetheless, the demand for a less authoritarian state did not disappear. Leaders and activists 
from the Islamic Tendency Movement were arrested in another round of political persecution. 
Many also fled abroad to escape Ben Ali's society-wide crackdown on Islamists. The new 
regime seems not to have been a complete break from the Bourguiba era. No room was made 
for the peaceful transfer of political power, with Ben Ali firmly controlling the state 
institutions and the economy. In the former area no genuine efforts were thus made to 
maintain the separation of power. Media censorship continued uninterrupted. I will now 
examine in more detail the policies pursued by Ben Ali when he was President.  
A New Leader and a New Future for Tunisia? 
Initially, Ben Ali attempted to project the image of a President who was driven by a reform 
agenda, after decades of authoritarian rule. The Neo-Constitutional Party was reinvented 
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according to democratic lines. In November, 1988, a speech by Ben Ali to party members 
declared, 
Today, we start a new phase in the history of our party, which will qualify it to 
include all those groups who have real intentions to work together in accordance 
with the new directions. At this point, the actual dimensions of the decision of the 
Central Committee to change the name of our party to become “The 
Constitutional  Democratic Assembly” appear. The Assembly will be open to all 
citizens who  might wish to join its various structures.204 
 
Apparent changes to the formal institutions of power were meant to signal a new political 
environment, with Ben Ali occupying the positions of President and Chairman of the ruling 
party. Tunisia's political order indicated continuity with the reign of Bourguiba when Ben Ali 
was President. Political consolidation of the new regime occurred through the involvement of 
opposition parties. Civil society organisations, trade unions and human rights associations 
had approved the National Charter of 7th November, 1988. Despite the evident participation 
of organised political groups in the transition process from Bourguiba to Ben Ali, no genuine 
democratic reforms were affected. Five consecutive electoral victories for Ben Ali in 
Presidential elections from 1989 until 2009, demonstrate the persistence of authoritarian 
practices in Tunisia. Ben Ali appears to have planned to be a 'President-for-Life' in the same 
manner as his predecessor.205 
 
A review of the Islamic Tendency Movement, renamed later as the Renaissance Movement, 
in Tunisia at this stage will help to identify the variety of ideas and platforms which could 
have been adopted by the new Ben Ali regime in the areas of domestic and foreign policies. I 
will then explore the dynamics between this movement and the Tunisian state in more depth. 
The presence of Islamist actors, as an organised force, still presented a threat to Ben Ali's 
legitimacy that was similar to the situation in Bourguiba's reign.  
 
Political pluralism was an urgent issue for Ben Ali in his new role as President. Senior 
officials in his government echoed the same ideas about the need to include previously 
excluded actors in the political life of Tunisia. Disagreements exist about the extent to which 
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this was realised. A view proposed on the motives and results of the seeming political 
reforms points to its employment as a tool of propaganda, used to gain legitimacy for a new 
regime.206 A diversity of political parties, espousing different ideological and political 
platforms, can be identified during Ben Ali's reign with some disappearing from Tunisia's 
political map after 2011.207 From 1956 until 2011, the Democratic Constitutional Assembly 
Party presided over a de facto one-party state. Abdul-Aziz Tha'albi was a founder of the 
organisation, originally known as the Free Constitutional Party, dedicated to the cause of 
ending colonial rule in Tunisia. In 1934, Habib Bourguiba changed its name to the Neo-
Constitutional Party.208 Another alteration to the identity of the party occurred when Ben Ali, 
after 1987, replaced 'New' with 'Democratic', in line with the high expectations of the time. 
Construction of a democratic civil society, based on respect for human rights and law, was 
the declared objective.  
 
The reinvention of the Islamist movement also took place, as it began to participate in what 
seemed to be a freer political climate in Tunisia. It was originally founded as the 'Islamic 
Group' in the 1960s.209 An Arabo-Islamic cultural identity is the primary focus of the loyalty 
and inspiration behind the Renaissance Movement. On 6th June, 1981, the group adopted the 
name ‘Islamic Tendency Movement’ to assert an ideological alternative to Bourguiba's 
Francophile policies after his thirty-five years in power. A process of ideological evolution 
characterises the beliefs of the leadership and its members. Democracy, human rights, justice 
and freedom are major principles that have shaped the ideology of the Renaissance 
Movement in a context that was dominated by the authoritarianism displayed by both 
Bourguiba and Ben Ali.  
Rivalry between the Islamic Tendency Movement and the Ben Ali Regime 
Bourguiba's approach to the challenge posed by the Islamists was more or less motivated by 
the need to contain them, using the coercive and judicial arms of the state. Mass arrests and 
court cases took place that were aimed at finishing off the Islamic Tendency Movement once 
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and for all with Bourguiba determined to apply the death sentence on Ghannouchi.210 
However, the ousting of Bourguiba led to the release of the majority of the Islamist leaders 
jailed in this period. The Islamic Tendency Movement was encouraged to participate in an 
apparent political liberalisation of Tunisia. It signed Ben Ali's sponsored National Charter in 
1988, expressing the desire to take part in Tunisian politics on a democratic and multi-party 
basis. In 1989, the Islamist group had become the Renaissance Movement, in another move 
where it sought to integrate itself into the new political situation. In the same year, Ben Ali 
won the Presidential elections with a majority.211 
 
The appeal of Islamist ideas had spread among workers and students during the late 1970s 
and 1980s. Official recognition of political party status was repeatedly rejected by the 
political authorities. Instead, the Islamist group resorted to contesting parliamentary elections 
through independent electoral lists.212 Although formal political institutions had managed to 
successfully exclude the Renaissance Movement, the worsening living conditions in Tunisia 
pushed many to support it. Islam, if properly interpreted and implemented, could provide the 
solutions needed for the political, economic and social problems that the country was facing. 
The Renaissance Movement soon grew to be the second largest political actor after Ben Ali's 
ruling party.  
 
The increasing prominence of the newly renamed Islamist group also raised concerns in Ben 
Ali's regime, which had intended to accommodate and defuse potential threats to its 
legitimacy. To begin with, Ben Ali had adopted a tone of conciliation with the various 
political actors in Tunisia, including the Islamists. His invitation to join the political process 
was perhaps underpinned by the need to first secure stability. The consolidation of power and 
the task of rebuilding the country seem to have been priorities. Another explanation behind 
Ben Ali's initial tolerance of the opposition, particularly the Islamist, groups in the country, 
was the inheritance of a heavy burden from the Bourguiba's reign. Reluctance to become 
involved in divisive political contests which might lead to chaos, could have motivated the 
attempt at political pluralism. The objective of easing political tensions was to be 
implemented through new reforms of the formal structures of politics.  
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Positive messages about the imminent democratic changes to the Tunisian political system 
were sent by the Ben Ali regime and acknowledged by the opposition movements. Reforms 
in the areas of human rights, and the registration of three new political parties, the 
Progressive Socialist Party, the Unionist Democratic Party and the Social Liberal Party, 
secured an expanding base of legitimacy for Ben Ali's early years in office. However, these 
steps failed to include one of the leading actors in Tunisia, after early constructive 
engagement, in the form of the Renaissance Movement. No such recognition of its political 
party status would be awarded to the Islamist group. Two different ideologies had put Ben 
Ali and the Islamists on opposite sides in a similar way to that in which they had generated 
conflicts between Bourguiba and his religiously-inspired opponents. Increasing support in 
Tunisian society was also a cause for concern. These factors were behind the anxiety 
displayed by the regime, and they would lead to a clash with the Renaissance Movement.213 
A full reversal by Ben Ali from the path of political liberalisation would end with the ban and 
the arrest of many members of the Islamist organisation. The political pluralism of the early 
Ben Ali years was replaced by increasing authoritarianism by a regime focused on managing 
dissent through elections or force. Opposition political parties, in this context, remained 
weak. Parliamentary elections indicate the continued dominance of one-party rule, with 34 of 
182 seats in the 1999 elections going to other parties.214  
 
A constitutional reform in 2002, making way for Ben Ali's re-election as President two years 
later, appeared to draw wide social support. Ben Ali's changes to the political system 
consisted of the creation of a new parliamentary body, called the 'Board of Advisors'. 
Electoral participation was intended to realise, according to the official narrative, the desires 
and political rights of citizens.215 Voter turnout was high, and a large number backed the plan 
for political reform.216 Nonetheless, the cosmetic changes to the constitution did not alter the 
actual exercise of power in the hands of Ben Ali's regime. Instead, they simply reinforced the 
authoritarian nature of this regime with an appearance of democratic legitimacy.  
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Economic Factors 
The economies of the Maghreb are diverse and vary from country to country. State policies 
shaped the import-export capacities, industrial and other economic sectors of its countries in a 
changing world. During the Cold War, socialist systems were locked in a clash with the 
agenda of the free market. Post-colonial states, such as Libya and Tunisia, did experiment 
with socialism, and this was accompanied by varying levels of success. The economic 
structures of these states enabled them to negotiate in investments, trade and the financial 
markets.217  
Oil and Development in Gaddafi's Libya 
Discovery of crude oil in Libya during the 1950s was a major milestone in the economic and 
political development of the country. By the early 1960s, the first exports of oil began. A 
previously weak and decentralised economy was transformed and it became one of the rich 
states in the Maghreb. At that time, the total Libyan population did not exceed one and a half 
million.218 King Idris's government formulated ambitious plans for development. The private 
sector was encouraged to participate in developing the Libyan economy, which witnessed the 
growth of private and public companies in various economic sectors. 
  
The coup of 1969, carried out by military officers, carried a strong message of being opposed 
to the status quo under the Senoussi monarchy. Development was to be achieved according to 
a different political model that influenced the socialist policies of Libya's neighbours and 
other Third World countries. A long term plan was articulated in light of these new changes. 
The regime was to initially realise a three year development plan, 1973-1975, followed by a 
five year plan, 1976-1980, to end in a five year plan, 1981-1986, in order to achieve the goal 
of development.219 
 
However, the grand plans for the development of Libya did not lead to the intended results. 
The following are a few of the areas which not materialise: a suitable infrastructure for 
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modern economic activities; national programmes for light manufacturers and strategic 
industries, such as the oil industry; the generation of other sources of national income; and 
the promotion of self-sufficiency projects. As a result, Libya became largely dependent on 
importing goods and services from abroad, with oil forming about 95% of Libya's national 
income.220 The failure of Gaddafi's socialist plan of development was attributed to the lack of 
expertise and knowledge underpinning these programmes. Agricultural projects for 
development did not succeed, due to the lack of suitable and informed reviews on the level of 
water resources needed for their implementation. Consequently, a large depletion of 
groundwater in the areas that were subject to these experiments led to their desertification.221 
 
The ideology of the Libyan state was the principal factor driving the development projects 
and their subsequent failures, as mentioned above. A centralised public sector, controlled by 
an authoritarian state, was present in all sectors of the economy. The nationalisation of 
private foreign companies and financial institutions was the first stage in Gaddafi's plan for 
making Libya a shining model of development in the Arab world and among post-colonial 
nations. Certain goods and services were delivered by new public sector organisations. The 
private sector was one of the first victims of a development plan based on the nationalisation 
of the economy.  
 
In the late 1970s, Libya underwent another round of political and economic changes 
according to a new ideological agenda that was formulated by Gaddafi. The nature of the 
state was radically transformed under the banner of the 'People's Authority'. The seemingly 
democratic premise was that the “Libyan people are the source of political power in the 
country”. In the wake of these changes, the regime also altered the formal name of the 
country, from the Libyan Arab Republic, to the Libyan Arab People’s Socialist Jamahiriya.222 
A regime-imposed vision of the ideal society, combining socialism and Arabism, dominated 
Libya. The 'Third Global Theory' was proposed as the only viable alternative to the political 
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and economic systems of Western capitalism and Soviet communism. Gaddafi's Green Book 
contained various policies and ideas, allocating shares in the ownership of companies and 
factories to their workers and employees. Phrases such as "Partners not Workers" 
demonstrate the seemingly egalitarian nature of the vision, especially on workers' rights, 
which were expressed by Gaddafi in his book.223 
 
Rules were outlined in this ideology that sought to create a worker-based ownership of 
organisations. Additional rules restricted the role of the private sector in the Libyan economy. 
Gaddafi was motivated by a desire to redistribute the large revenues of wealth entering Libya 
from its natural resources. Modernisation was to be achieved according to a particular model 
of development that was inspired by his economic theory. The following are a few key 
themes in this theory: fulfilment of the basic needs of society stood at the heart of all 
economic activities, thereby excluding the profit-led logic of the private sector; freedom from 
foreign influence or control in the domestic affairs of Libya; a system of sharing the 
ownership of the means of production was to replace the previous unjust system of wages; a 
reorganisation of the legal rights of ownership, complemented by new regulations, in order to 
guarantee fair living conditions for all members of society.224 
 
I think Gaddafi's revolutionary policies were mainly aimed at the restriction of private 
companies. A free market economy would be an obstacle to the implementation of his vision 
of changing Libyan society. All economic and industrial sectors were to be owned by either 
the state or the people. Further, I think that Gaddafi's strict control of private capital was 
motivated by ideological and political objectives. The extreme inequalities of wealth that are 
created by capitalism were to be avoided. Additionally, the continued existence of private 
capital under the conditions of economic freedom, would lead to political freedom in Libya, 
which posed a threat to the tight grip of the Gaddafi regime over Libyan society. In the 
preceding analysis, I have tried to show the dependence of Gaddafi's economic theory on a 
centralised system that was driven by the public sector. Redistribution of wealth and the 
restriction of private ownership were supplemented by the need to avoid market-based 
fluctuations in the prices of goods and services. 
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These views changed after 1977, to take the form of policies and laws which governed the 
Libyan economy for more than thirty years. Libya had achieved, according to Yuonis Ahmad, 
a certain degree of self-sufficiency, particularly in the production of foodstuffs, during the 
1980s. These policies expanded the basis of the national industries. He goes on to argue that 
human development was achieved in the areas of the production skills of workers and in 
living conditions.225 However, the reality on the ground was quite the opposite. Economic 
conditions, in fact, deteriorated, and total production in the economy, including the 
nationalised factories, declined. Inconsistent implementation of the development plans 
envisioned by the Gaddafi regime seems to the source of the failures mentioned. From the 
early 1990s, the private sector was admitted into the mainstream Libyan economy.  
 
Another explanation for such a deliberate policy reversal can be located in the changes in 
international affairs. The balance of power between the USA and the USSR which dominated 
the period of the Cold War, came to a sudden end with the collapse of the latter. Socialist 
models were regarded as an unwanted legacy of the past. However, I think the change in the 
Libyan regime's policies was pushed forward by two factors. The first factor lies in the 
removal of the private sector in the plan for economic development, which had led to a 
decline in the Libyan economy. New rules from the revolutionary regime sought to curb 
private investment during the 1970s and 1980s. Government-supported popular committees 
singled out private firms and prosecuted their owners under the socialist laws in force. The 
second factor revolves around the inexperienced and weak public sector, which was 
overburdened by Gaddafi's ambitious ideological goals for economic development. Failure 
was thus the result of this policy. Administrative and financial corruption had increased 
throughout the state at levels that were unprecedented prior to 1977. A fall in the quality of 
the provisions for health and education plagued public services. Broader economic sectors, 
such as industry and agriculture, failed to generate national income.226 Oil remained Libya's 
main source of wealth.  
 
Libya's economic resources were used to maintain its regional policy. Companies jointly run 
by Libya and states in its immediate region had official backing to compete with foreign 
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corporations. Intensive investments in Tunisia that were due to inter-state agreements 
demonstrated Gaddafi's desire for integration with his neighbours through his economic 
power. The Tunisian economy saw an inflow of Libyan investments, facilitated by private 
and public firms.  
Tunisia's Export Economy and Europe 
Tunisia's economy differs markedly from the economies of its neighbours in the Maghreb. It 
is a developing country with no oil or natural gas reserves. Agriculture and tourism provide 
the Tunisian economy with sources of national income. While Europe is the country's main 
export market for agricultural products, the tourism sector generates about $2 billion 
annually. Further, this sector is the second largest sector, in terms of employment, in the 
country, after agricultural activities.227 
 
The small size of the economy was not an obstacle to the development of Tunisia's human 
resources. A reasonably adequate infrastructure exists in the provision of health, education 
and other sectors. Schooling is similar to the French model, as a result of Bourguiba's 
Francophile policy and at the expense of an Arabo-Islamic traditional or conservative 
tendency. Tunisian economic development achievements are thus substantial if compared to 
the achievements of some oil-rich countries.228 
 
During Ben Ali's reign, an open door policy, in accordance with the International Monetary 
Fund. was implemented. Encouragement of the private and public sectors was an important 
part of the process of economic development. Foreign direct investment appeared to be a 
priority for the Tunisian government, in order to stimulate growth. Lax tax regulations were 
introduced to attract national and foreign investors. Tunisia's relative political stability in a 
region that was characterised by insecurity, such as the civil war in Algeria and the pariah 
status of Libya, made it an appealing prospect for investors. Further, this aspect of the 
country was conducive to growth in the tourism sector.229 Economic agreements with Europe, 
Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Egypt were signed. Libyan-Tunisian relations were preceded by 
a political move to resolve a longstanding border dispute, beginning in the Bourguiba era, 
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seeking to establish the foundations for inter-state dialogue. Libya's response also contributed 
to a thawing of relations. Libya invited Tunisia into its exploitation of the Bouri Oil Field. 
This field was later called the 7th November Field in commemoration of a visit that M. 
Gaddafi made to Tunisia in 1988. 230 
 
Islam and Society in the Maghreb 
The role of religion in the Maghreb is tied to the thousand year old presence of Islam in the 
region. Social institutions were influenced by religious scholars and movements. Further, 
political authorities needed to be seen to possess legitimacy gained from religious texts or 
interpretations. Pre-colonial North Africa witnessed successive dynasties that were based, 
more or less, on Islamic norms and ideals. The 10th century Fatimid Caliphate, originally 
from Tunisia, drew its inspiration from the seventh Shi'ite imam. Religion, politics and 
society were closely intertwined. Ottoman sovereignty over Tunisia and Libya did not change 
the relationship between religion and society. Islam continued to be the primary identity of 
the state. The rulers and their subjects were connected by the bond of Islamic rituals and 
norms. During the colonial occupation of the Maghreb, discussed in detail in the previous 
chapter, radical changes to this relationship were underway. There was an attempt to weaken 
the legitimacy of Islam among the Muslim subjects of the Maghreb.  
 
The Sahara Desert in North Africa was home to the Senoussi Revivalist Movement, with 
origins in the western region of the Arabian Peninsula. A simple message of a return to 
Islamic sources without obstruction from centuries of traditional scholarship had attracted the 
tribesmen of the Libyan interior. Further, the Sufism offered by the religious leaders of the 
Senoussiyya satisfied both the spiritual and social needs of the tribes. Lodges were 
established for communal living, which provided a social backbone to the movement, and 
later the Senoussi state.231 For many Libyans, especially tribesmen, Islam was synonymous 
with Sufism. Libya's first post-colonial head of state was a grandson of the founder of the 
Senoussi Movement. The revivalist trend thus provided the building blocks for the 
construction of the state under a monarchy.  
 
                                                 
230Ibid. P 79. 
231 Ishak M. Husaini, "Islamic Culture in Arab and African Countries," in Kenneth W. Morgan, Islam - The 
Straight Path: Islam interpreted by Muslims (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1993), p. 244. 
89 
 
French colonialism was not tolerant of religion, and sought to restrict its scope. The French 
notion of ‘laïcité’ appears to have influenced colonial policy. Similarly, the post-colonial 
elite, led by Bourguiba in Tunisia, wanted to divorce religion from politics. Islam was to be 
restricted to the private sphere. Inevitably, opposition to this ideological position appeared 
among certain segments of Tunisian society. The Islamic Group, later the Islamic Tendency 
Movement and, finally, the Renaissance Movement, advocated a project of Islamic 
revivalism in the 1970s. However, Bourguiba was determined to keep religion out of politics. 
Persecution of the Islamic Tendency Movement finally brought about a confrontation with 
Ghannouchi and his fellow Islamist members.  
 
While Bourguiba did  co-operate with Saudi Arabia to establish the Organisation of Islamic 
Countries, it was not to be a supra-national institution fostering any form of pan-Islamism.232 
Instead, a safe distance from Arab and Muslim states was kept. Transnational ideologies were 
distrusted. Gaddafi's Arabism was thus perceived to be a direct threat to Tunisia's national 
sovereignty and stability, on the one hand, and to Bourguiba's personal authority, on the 
other. For Gaddafi, the power of Islam was to be employed for the defence of the oppressed. 
Its message, once reinterpreted, could offer an alternative to the conservatism of Arab 
regimes.  
  
A Francophile agenda adapted to Tunisia seems to have shaped its relationship with Islam in 
domestic, regional and international politics. Religion was acknowledged in Tunisia after 
Bourguiba was overthrown by Ben Ali and Tunisia was under the control of the new regime. 
Tunisian foreign policy started to cite the factors of Islam and Arabism in the regional 
context of the Arab world. These two cultural strands of Tunisian identity would now be 
cornerstones of the country's interstate relations. However, Bourguiba's aggressive 
engagement with Islamists would return under Ben Ali, with no religious discourses being 
permitted except those that were sanctioned by the state.  
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Conclusion 
The post-colonial contexts of Tunisia and Libya point to a complex set of factors interacting 
with each other to produce stability or instability, and successes or failures in policies. I 
examine three key areas of concern in this chapter. Domestic politics in Tunisia and Libya 
were soon transformed into authoritarian systems which did not tolerate differences of 
opinion after independence. Early hopes for greater freedom did not materialise. 
Modernisation and development pushed a heavy burden on the countries of the Maghreb. 
Pluralism was a not a priority for the regimes that were in charge in Libya and Tunisia. 
Political parties found themselves either banned or severely weakened. The Islamic Tendency 
Movement fell foul of both Bourguiba and Ben Ali, and after initially supporting his 
transitional efforts at pluralism, the members of the Movement were forced into prison or out 
of the country.  
 
In Gaddafi's case, the use of Libya's vast wealth, generated from oil and natural gas, drove his 
radical policies. Socialism and Arabism were brought together, similarly to Nasser's Egypt, in 
a society still dominated by tribes and clans. These tribes and clans were part of a web of 
power relations which allowed Gaddafi to avoid the formal structures of politics in order to 
govern. Nonetheless, the apparent failure of Gaddafi's ambitious plans for the development of 
Libya squandered its wealth. Tunisia's dependence on agriculture and tourism encouraged it 
to reach out to Europe for export markets and visitors. The open door policies implemented 
by Ben Ali, after the Bourguiba regime was no longer in power, had brought greater foreign 
direct investment. Further, Tunisia's relationship with Europe was crucial for economic 
development. 
 
The role of religion in Tunisia and Libya reflects the particular history of each colony under 
the French and Italians, respectively. Laïcité was a key conviction for Bourguiba, and for 
other Francophile leaders. Islam was to be excluded from politics in every way possible. In 
society, the presence of religion should be marginalised. Resistance to this policy was 
manifested in the formation of the Islamic Group. This movement struggled first with 
Bourguiba, culminating with the threat of a death sentence hanging over Ghannouchi in 
Court. Ben Ali soon freed opposition groups. Islamists also found a freer climate that allowed 
them to participate in the transitional process, with the new President's guarantees of political 
pluralism. Islam and Arab identity were finally accepted into the official narrative of the 
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Tunisian state. The expectations for pluralism were ended when Ben Ali restricted the 
activities of his opponents and banned the Renaissance Movement, after it had changed its 
name from the Islamic Tendency Movement.  
 
The Libyan case presents an interesting example where Islam, society and state-building were 
brought together in the post-colonial period. Libya's first head of state, King Idris I, was the 
leader of the Senoussiyya Brotherhood. This revivalist movement was founded in the 19th 
century, motivated by the desire to return to the simple and pristine faith of the early 
Muslims. Although this radical theological call grew fainter over time, the Senoussiyya 
opposed Italian colonialism and were able to start a process of state-building in Libya where 
none had existed. King Idris's ousting was followed by renewed attention to Islam by the new 
regime. However, the impact of religion would not be restricted to the immediate 
environment of Libya. Instead, the Islamic faith would be reinterpreted with a grander 
objective. A revolutionary ideology in foreign policy that was linked to socialism and 
Arabism, both in the Arab world and outside its boundaries. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: IDEOLOGY: BETWEEN CONSERVATISM AND 
ARABISM IN LIBYAN-TUNISIAN RELATIONS 
 
Introduction 
The regimes leading Tunisia and Libya after independence had inherited the colonial borders 
imposed on North Africa. Various treaties between colonial powers, such as the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement in 1916 and the Bannerman Conference of 1907, formed the foundation of the 
nation-state system. Political change had created an opportunity to consolidate emerging 
nation-states. Local elites agreed and disagreed about how to organise their states. Domestic 
affairs influenced the foreign policy pursued by postcolonial states. Libya and Tunisia began 
their existence as formal nation-states in a region still experiencing the last vestiges of 
colonialism. The Algerian War of Independence against the French was being waged 
between 1954 and 1962. Major challenges stood before Libya and Tunisia. In this chapter, I 
will analyse the primary sources in order to establish the extent to which ideology dominated 
Libyan-Tunisian relations in the period from 1969 until 1987. The decline of ideology after 
1987, following Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's ousting of Habib Bourguiba, will also be 
examined in the discussion below.  
 
A number of factors play an important role in shaping the foreign policy of states. Decision-
makers take into account economic factors, in order to identify the scope of foreign policy.233 
Similarly, political ideology helps to direct the orientation of foreign policy-makers helping 
to shed light on and interact in their context.234 For some, ideology retains its importance at 
different levels of politics.235 Geography is also a key factor for a state, and it can enable it to 
achieve a certain policy.236 States like Egypt, Oman and those in the Gulf, are thus able to 
play vital roles in global trade due to their locations.237 The impact of political elites on 
foreign policy is also worth mentioning, because of their ability to formulate strategies in this 
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area.238 However, challenges to this ability can be seen in the Arab world. Former colonial 
states continue to try to influence Arab countries through economic aid programmes.239 Some 
Arab statesmen had thus adopted particular ideologies to maintain the sovereignty of their 
countries in a context characterised by unfavourable global conditions.240 
 
The Early Political Context of Libyan-Tunisian Relations 
In the first years of independence, political relations between Libya and Tunisia were 
relatively smooth. Libya, under a monarchy, allied itself to the camp of the capitalist West, 
against the socialist camp and Republican Tunisia, and it also ignored the call for revolution 
that was voiced by its neighbours. Bilateral relations between these two countries remained 
stable. Nasserism's spread throughout the Arab world, sometimes to the disdain of regimes, 
was creating a new atmosphere in the region. Arab unity was becoming an appealing 
ideology for the masses and for the aspiring political elites. Nonetheless, Tunisia and Libya 
were pursuing a conservative policy of consolidating and maintaining the rule of regimes 
whose legitimacy was partly based on the belief that they were the most appropriate actors to 
occupy their position. King Idris I of Libya was the head of a regional Sufi brotherhood, 
which had stood its ground against the Italian occupation of his country for three decades. 
The Senoussiyya had taken part in the resistance campaigns of the Arab tribesmen from the 
desert, providing the much needed organisational framework to survive. However, the 
traditional understanding of Islam that was adopted by the Senoussiyya was reformist in 
nature, and it presented no serious diversion from the emerging and narrowly defined Libyan 
nation-state. The formal structures of the modern state were more or less secondary to the 
informal nature of the rule of Idris I.241 He was presented as a figure of unity rather than of 
division, in a country with a wide network of informal relations among different tribes and 
clans.  
Subsequently, the ideology of the state was not a source of controversy with neighbouring 
Tunisia, which was busy implementing Habib Bourguiba's vision of the state. The 'Tunisian 
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Nation' was the primary focus of this vision.242 The amicable relations between Tunisia and 
Libya, according to Nour -Eddin al-Alawi, were based on reciprocal visits and commercial 
transactions. These relations failed to have any long-lasting impact due to the limited 
economic capabilities of both countries.243 Returning Libyan families from Tunisia was 
perhaps one of the few areas of co-operation. So-called 'returnees'244 played an important role 
in King Idris I's capitalist-driven development process, providing numerous individuals with 
expertise and knowledge, who then headed organisations.245 Further, the discovery of oil in 
Libya resulted in a general improvement in the living standards of Libyans.246 The first two 
decades of Libyan-Tunisian relations were thus characterised by a period of concentration on 
domestic affairs. Nation-building within the former colonial boundaries was the priority. 
Tunisian foreign policy reflected Bourguiba's satisfaction with the notions of an open 
neighbourhood, cordial relations and non-interference.247 However, political groups, 
especially the Youssefi faction in the political elite, were dissatisfied with this foreign 
policy.248  
Bourguiba the Francophile 
Differences in the ideology adopted by leaders or regimes may have an impact on inter-state 
relations. Authoritarian states tend to concentrate power in the hands of the few. Families, 
clans, tribes or political parties enjoy the prestigious status of government positions, or they 
benefit directly from the wealth generated from nationalised resources or companies. 
However, ideology in the Maghreb has had a strong influence on the bilateral relations of the 
region's states. The Francophile Bourguiba, a graduate in French Law, was part of a recent 
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tradition of liberal intellectuals and activists who looked across the Mediterranean for 
inspiration, rather than local forms of traditional or reformist Islam. Close links between the 
West and Tunisia can be explained with reference to Bourguiba's political background and 
education.249 He had acquired his experience of politics from the anti-colonial struggle in 
French Tunisia. Subsequently, Bourguiba succeeded to the Tunisian presidency. Tunisia's 
politics reflected his controversial personality.250 Interestingly, Bourguiba's ideological 
beliefs appear to have been inconsistent. Liberalism was replaced by socialism in an era of 
populism. Third World politics was caught in the middle of the Cold War. Despite 
Bourguiba's authoritarian character, Tunisia was receptive to the wider ideological moods of 
the Arab world. The failure of socialism in the area of domestic policy in the late 1960s, soon 
led to the restoration of liberalism, in the early 1970s. The apparent lack of coherence in 
government policy may be attributed to a lack of coherence in Bourguiba's political and 
economic ideology.251 
 
A close relationship existed between the domestic sphere and the regional policy of Tunisia. 
Government policy was mainly defined by Bourguiba in a personal show of power. An 
ongoing struggle was taking place between Bourguiba's supporters and the Youssefists within 
the ruling party. This was a clear threat to Bourguiba's dominant position in the state. An 
attempted coup d'état, led by al-Azhar al-Sharaiti and al-Sasi al-Aswed, took place in 
September, 1962. Force was used to try to change the direction of Tunisia under policies that 
were personally directed by Bourguiba, and the high levels of discontent they generated from 
actions such as the closing down of the well-respected Zaytuna Madrasah. Ali Mahjoubi 
notes that the failed coup caused Bourguiba to tighten his grip further on the country's politics 
by banning political parties.252 Single-party rule became a dominant feature of life in Tunisia. 
The coup against Bourguiba made him have a deep contempt for the role of the military in 
politics, which I will explore later in this chapter concerning his relations with Muammar 
Gaddafi in Libya and Jamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt. The coup, according to Ahmed Bannour, 
a former Director of Tunisian Intelligence, was largely received as being only the beginning 
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of future uprisings against Bourguiba's rule, if radical reforms did not occur. Although some 
of these reforms went against his convictions, they were implemented.253 
In 1963, during Bourguiba's socialist period, a new economic phase was initiated. Ahmed 
Ben Saleh254 was the Prime Minister in charge of this phase. "The ten-year perspective plan" 
was announced, which was also popularly known as the 'co-operatives'.255 Socialism was 
adopted in post-colonial Tunisia, largely due to the influence of Ben Saleh, a trade unionist, 
on Bourguiba in the Neo-Constitutional Party. A former Tunisian Prime Minister, Mohamed 
Mzali, observes that: 
The main factor that led to Tunisia‘s adoption of Socialism was the great influence 
of Ahmed Ben Saleh. The latter convinced Bourguiba about that system, as being 
the easiest and shortest way to reach social justice and equity with regard to the 
distribution of the country’s wealth. He also argued that the promotion of the 
working-class and the elimination of poverty would be achieved through the 
nationalisation of land and the establishment of socialist associations, mutual 
funds or cooperatives.256 
For Ben Saleh, who was a senior member of the ruling party, the redistribution of wealth 
through nationalisation was urgent. Development could not wait for a free market model to 
stimulate economic growth for the benefit of the majority of society in a gradual process. 
Instead, a top-down re-organisation of the economy was needed. Indeed, Mostafa al-
Zaghnouni, Minister of Planning during the rule of Bourguiba, confirmed that Ben Saleh was 
behind the implementation of socialist policies in Tunisia. These policies were thus put into 
practice, perhaps against Bourguiba's Francophile and liberal convictions. Tunisia's weak 
economic condition compelled a change towards the redistribution of national wealth, led by 
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the state.257 
Pragmatic concerns, rather than ideological considerations, may have influenced Bourguiba 
to listen to his left-wing colleague in the Neo-Constitutional Party. According to al-
Zaghnouni,  
In 1963, Tunisia’s economic indicators were bad, so Ahmed Ben Saleh, who was 
in charge of the Unions, informed Bourguiba that the only way to promote the 
Tunisian economy was the adoption of Socialism. Hence, Bourguiba accepted that 
system as a realistic person; despite of this move was out of Bourguiba’s personal 
conviction or admiration for Socialism, but rather it was derived from the fact that 
he realised the necessity to have positive results and to rescue the Tunisian 
Economy, whatever the method used to achieve that.258 
In the first decade of independent Tunisia's existence an emerging crisis was to be resolved 
through the adoption of socialism in the economic sphere. Bourguiba's personal approach to 
politics had proved to be decisive in the acceptance of Ben Salah's advice about a change in 
policy. Ideology did not play a large part, for Bourguiba, in the decision in this matter, or in 
politics more generally. His lack of belief in an economic ideology appears to be the case. 
Shadli Iyyari reports a personal conversation with Bourguiba, where the latter said: 
I am with any method that would lead to positive results and help the Tunisian 
society develop, regardless of its name. You just have to keep away from the 
Russian and Chinese models of Socialism, where there are suppressions of 
freedoms and social problem, which I do not accept. Then, you may even mix 
Socialism and Liberalism, if you like.259 
Despite Bourguiba's authoritarian approach to all forms of political opposition, he rejected 
totalitarianism, based on the experience of Russia and China, for Tunisia. Political 
engineering was not to be undertaken as a matter of conviction. Rather, the problems in 
Tunisia required a pragmatic policy which borrowed from both socialism and liberalism. 
Bourguiba envisaged a form of socialism without the crucial dimension of class struggle 
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which would lead to further divisions in his country.260  
A few features of Tunisia's ruling party were changed at the Bizerta Conference in 1964 to 
reflect the new socialist philosophy. The Neo-Constitutional Party was renamed the Socialist 
Constitutional Party, to incorporate Bourguiba's acceptance of 'Tunisian' socialism and the 
Central Committee of the Party, that was independent from other socialist parties throughout 
the world.261 What appears to be an ideological platform, which can be described as 
'Bourguibaism', was born. The social inequalities dominating society were singled out for 
attack. The means of production were thus to be in the hands of the state in order to 
redistribute the wealth of Tunisia from the few to the many. Previous principles of economic 
liberalism, prior to 1963, were to be held back in light of the plans of this new socialist 
government.262 However, policy failures tended to be laid at the doors of others. Scapegoats 
were blamed for mistakes in which Bourguiba himself was the instrumental factor.263 The 
lack of success of the socialist policies during the 1960s led to the removal of Ben Saleh, and 
he was put on trial in 1969.264 
 
Conservative and Radical Regimes in Ideological Conflict 
The seizure of power by Libyan military officers altered the nature of Libyan-Tunisian 
relations. Two factors can be cited to explain this new stage between these neighbours. 
Muammar Gaddafi's emergence at the head of the new regime changed Libya's foreign policy 
in line with the ideology of Arabism.265 Large revenues from oil were used to support a 
broader regional role.266 Consequently, Bourguiba took steps to foster closer bilateral 
relations with Libya. His neighbour was an important source of income for Tunisia, with 
guest-workers sending their remittances. The radical ideology adopted by Gaddafi needed to 
be curbed, and Bourguiba had hoped Libya would continue in its role as a buffer state 
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between Tunisia and Egypt.267 However, the situation turned out to be quite the opposite. A 
series of crises plagued the relationship between Bourguiba and Gaddafi during their time in 
power.  
Arabism was a strong force during the Cold War, both in republican states and monarchies. 
Naturally, relations between Libya and Tunisia were influenced by the ideological currents of 
the age. The 'Tunisian Nation', in post-independence Tunisia, was an expression of a trend 
which went against the prevailing political climate. Bourguiba and Bashir Ben Salama 
formulated this concept with the same connotations that were given by Arabists to Arab 
unity; a nation united by the same language or dialect, bringing all Tunisians together. A 
distinct dialect and the Maliki School of Islamic Law made Tunisia a nation in its own right, 
with both being in need of official state recognition.268 Narrowly defined nationalism, such as 
that of the 'Tunisian Nation', is a manifestation of the political settlement present in Arab 
countries.269 In Libya, under the Gaddafi regime, a pan-nationalist ideology was shaping and 
driving its foreign and domestic policies.270  
It may be argued that Arab countries occupied a stage between the nation-state and Arab 
unity. Unsuccessful experiments at integration were accompanied by other problems. The 
failure to attain economic growth, security, development and political stability showed 
weaknesses among the Arabs. These problems persuaded the states in the region to look for 
new forms of inter-state co-operation, which sometimes failed due to internal and external 
challenges.271 The narrow definition of the interests of the regime appears to have 
undermined the creation of durable and effective regional or bilateral relations among Arab 
countries.  
The Maghreb was subjected to the above mentioned forces in weakening the push towards 
integration or co-operation. According to Hisham Hajji, the region is characterised by a set of 
countries, which are neither nation-states, nor are they united by a single supra-national state, 
as a result of the ideology espoused by political leaders. Integration was not the defining 
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ideology, with the notion of the nation-state dominating Arab states.272 A similar point of 
view was expressed by the President of the International Co-operation Department at the 
Libyan Ministry on the allegiances of officials and policy-makers in Libya. A sense of 
belonging to the country of origin influenced the attitudes of Tunisian and Libyan officials in 
regard to the actual process of bilateral relations. The President argued that: 
These senses and attitudes were inconsistent with the principle of integration that 
was recommended by all institutions in the context of each of the two countries’ 
bilateral relations; patriotism was characteristic of their behaviours and 
discourses.273 
Despite the official narrative on pan-nationalism, the persistence of a narrowly conceived 
identity found its way into the practical dimensions of foreign policy. This is further 
confirmed by the following statement from the same interviewee:  
While a petroleum and derivatives pipeline link between Libya and Tunisia was 
being studied by the preparatory committee, for instance, they discussed whether 
it would be in Libya’s best interests to execute the installation only on the Libyan 
part, or whether it should also be involved in that on Tunisian land.274 
Raison d'êtat appears to have influenced the ways in which Libyan-Tunisian relations were 
thought and spoken about. Immediate benefits to Libya, for decision-makers, involved 
reducing the possible effects of the oil pipeline project on Tunisia. Jamal al-Barq, a former 
senior official in the Libyan government, disagrees with this view of Libyan-Tunisian 
relations. Libyan debates and decisions contradicting bilateral interest were caused by the 
lack of studies which would have supplied information about the long-term economic and 
social benefits of joint projects. Such studies could have helped Libyan officials to make the 
right decisions.275 However, the interests of the nation-state obviously had a negative effect 
on Libyan-Tunisian relations.276 Nationalist sentiments that were opposed to the demands of 
pan-Arabism were widespread in the institutions of power. 
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Nonetheless, the ideas of Arabism were inspiring both the general public and the regimes to 
pursue the dream of Arab unity. Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Libya were in the revolutionary camp. 
The advocates of the revolution demanded the end of the nation-state, to be replaced by a 
wider Arab nation.277 Conservative regimes, headed by Saudi Arabia and Tunisia, believed in 
gradual solutions to the Arab world's problems.278 Jamal Abdul Nasser's politics of Arabism 
and anti-colonialism appealed to the Libyan regime.279 This revolutionary struggle for 
Arabism and anti-colonialism continued until the late 1980s.280 Nasserism had a profound 
impact on the thinking of Libyan foreign policy-makers, and on Gaddafi in particular, 
concerning regional and international issues, for more than two decades. Libya's geographical 
location was recognised as a factor in foreign policy deliberations. This led Gaddafi to note: 
Luckily enough that we, the Libyans, have joint borders with Arab countries and 
peoples from the East and from the West. This case makes us feel secure and 
safe. We still have our Northern borders, but despite their seriousness and 
vulnerability, they are not adjacent to a foreign country.281 
 
The Arab borders of Libya gave it a sense of security which was otherwise missing on its 
coastline. In the above statement,  the assumption of a bond among Arab nations appears. 
Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt were regarded as natural allies. The political, economic and 
military capabilities of Libya were thus to be employed for the objectives of Gaddafi's 
foreign policy in light of this situation. The promotion of Arab unity was the ideological goal 
in a region of divided states. Arabism drove Libya's foreign policy in the Arab world.282 
 
Political union with Egypt and Sudan, between 1970 and 1973, was a manifestation of 
Gaddafi's Arabism. However, the failures of integration motivated a change in direction by 
the Libyan regime with a shift in focus to the Maghreb. The Hassi Massaouh Agreement was 
signed with Algeria in 1973. The 'Islamic State', bringing Libya and Tunisia under a single 
state, was proposed in 1974. Mauritania also benefitted from Gaddafi's westward orientation 
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for Arab unity, as it received financial aid. Socialist and resistance movements in Africa were 
also backed by Gaddafi during this period. The overall goal of anti-colonialism still 
influenced the Libyan regime. Revolutionary sentiments can be seen in the following 
statement from Gaddafi that: 
 
We, the Libyans, in the People’s Republic, have to lead a new stage in regional 
relations. Libya is in the middle of the Arab world; the East and the West of this 
world are the two wings of Libya. This is why the imperial and the Zionist 
powers focused on Libya, as the country has a major role in Africa, the 
Mediterranean Sea, Europe and the Arab countries.283 
 
Foreign policy was not only restricted to the Arab world, but to broader concerns in 
international affairs. Gaddafi was aware of the need to locate Libya in the continuing struggle 
against anti-imperialism in the heart of the Middle East, Palestine, and throughout the world. 
I will discuss later how Bourguiba's ideas on Palestine represented a very different position 
from those of Gaddafi and other Arab leaders.  
 
Conservative and revolutionary regimes had clashed on a number of foreign policy and 
domestic issues. The populist leaderships of Nasser and Gaddafi were based on the economic 
and political resources of their countries. Taher Bel Khoja observes that Nasser wanted to 
expand his leadership over the entire Arab world during Bourguiba's rule. Such an ambition 
was dependent on Egypt's political muscle and reputation. The goals and ideas of Nasser 
were widely welcomed and supported by many Arabs at the time. A more limited ambition to 
lead the Maghreb seems to have been entertained by Bourguiba in light of Tunisia's limited 
political and economic potentials.284 This ambition was given expression in the following 
speech, delivered on 10th December, 1958, at Sfax in Tunisia, 
 
Tunisian and Libyan peoples are almost the same, and we consider ourselves to be 
part of the great nation of the Maghreb. We aim to form, with Libya, one nation 
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that has one police, one army and is under one flag.285 
Interestingly, Bourguiba said these words before Gaddafi rose to power on the back of a coup 
against the Senoussi monarchy in Libya. King Idris I appear to have been a reliable partner, 
with whom a political union could take place. Further, Bourguiba's aspiration to lead the 
Maghreb was demonstrated in his reaction to Ahmed Ben Bella's first state visit to Egypt, 
rather than to Tunisia, after Algeria's independence. He only paused in Tunis Airport on his 
return, to proclaim: "We are Arabs", three times in front of officials and the people who had 
come to greet him. Such an announcement was understood to be a message of opposition to 
Bourguiba's ideas about the Tunisian nation and the Maghreb from Algeria's new 
revolutionary regime.286 Tunisia thus shared a border with a revolutionary regime in Algiers, 
to its west, and Nasserist Egypt, further east. Libya continued to provide some relief on the 
pressures of Arabism until the 1969 ousting of King Idris I.  
However, Libya under Gaddafi still provided the opportunity for Bourguiba to work towards 
his pan-Maghreb dream. Mohammad Mzali, a former Prime Minister, cites Bourguiba's 
enthusiasm for Libyan-Tunisian unity in 1974. No consultations with ministers were carried 
out after Gaddafi suggested to his Tunisian counterpart that he should be the President of the 
political union between the countries, under the official title of the Islamic Arab Republic. A 
closed-door meeting between Bourguiba and Gaddafi, in January, 1974, led to the surprise 
announcement of the republic. His former Interior Minister describes the chain of events in 
the following sentences: 
We were with the President on a tour of duty in Hammamet when the Tunisian 
Foreign Minister informed us that Gaddafi was in urgent need of meeting with 
President Habib Bourguiba. We thought there was a serious threat to the country’s 
security and the Libyan Leader wanted to discuss the matter with him. We 
therefore decided to meet with him on the following day in Djerba, a city close to 
the Libyan border. The meeting carried the surprise, which was Gaddafi’s 
proposal for unity between Tunisia and Libya, whereby Bourguiba would be the 
President of the two countries.287 
Unification of Tunisia and Libya was a personal affair. The authoritarian leaders of both 
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states were able to make a decision with far reaching implications, not only for their nations 
but also for the wider Maghreb. This may explain Bourguiba's enthusiasm for the idea. A 
once-in-a-lifetime opportunity presented itself for Bourguiba, who was aware that a 
combination of Libya's vast natural resources and Tunisia's know how would help to realise 
his pan-Maghreb dream. He regarded this union as a first step in the right direction.288 
According to Mohamed Masmoudi,289 unification represented an opportunity for a form of 
integration between the two countries to take place. Tunisia's human resources and expertise, 
and Libya's financial muscle, would complement each other.290 At the same time, the 
agreement of a political union was perceived by some as not to be to the advantage of the 
Tunisian regime. Libya was attempting to take over Tunisia. The new republic failed a few 
days after the announcement was made. Its failure was largely due to the hasty nature of the 
decision by both countries' regimes, without either careful study, or a series of discussions on 
the issue.291  
Both the former Tunisian Vice-Foreign Minister and the Director of Tunisian Intelligence 
argued that the timing of the signing of the agreement was suspicious. Apparent haste was 
intended to add the false impression of spontaneity. Hedi Nouira, then Prime Minister, was 
absent from the meetings and he was not notified of the details of the agreement.292 Although 
Mohammad Masmoudi was aware of the proceedings, he states that the Djerba Agreement 
was prepared by the Libyan regime. Further, he denies having played a role in convincing 
Bourguiba to agree to the political union. A referendum was planned in Libya and Tunisia, 
either to accept or reject the proposal for the Islamic Arab Republic. However, the Tunisian 
Constitution did not allow such a move.293 Taher Bel Khoja believes the enthusiasm of the 
Libyans to achieve unity in a short period of time shows that the agreement was 
spontaneous.294 He stated further:  
On January 14th, Khweldi al-Hamidi, the Libyan Interior Minister at that time, 
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come to me with a model of the referendum and the new country’s flag. This rapid 
rush to complete the procedures and to make the agreement a legitimate document 
was accompanied by public movements, as illustrated by a public march. This one 
was organsed by the Libyan regime and it started from Tripoli to Tunis, on 
purpose to express support for Bourguiba, as the President of the new state.295 
The chance for a political union appears to have been a product of both long-term and short-
term factors. Gaddafi's persistent willingness to pursue a pan-Arab project with other heads 
of state played an important role in creating the impetus for unification with Tunisia. 
 
Bourguiba’s Political Allies and the Revoking of a Union 
Opposition from conservatives appears to have led to Bourguiba's consequent revoking of the 
agreement to union.296 Intellectuals and politicians close to the President were not happy with 
the speed and nature of the events surrounding the Djerba meetings. Hedi Nouira and Wassila 
Ammar, Tunisia's first lady, were prominent figures in this group. Scepticism within Tunisia’s 
political elite towards revolutionary ideologies or statesmen, which were espoused by 
Bourguiba himself, pushed many to oppose the newly proposed republic, despite the fact that 
their President would be its head of state. The fear that Tunisia would be swallowed up by 
revolutionary regimes in other countries generated a reaction: that the speedy push for unity 
should not be accepted.297  
Verbal confrontations took place between Nouira and Masmoudi at a ministerial meeting. 
Further, the Chairman of the meeting singled out the hasty speed of the signing of the 
agreement, and he held Masmoudi personally responsible for the event.298 The Interior 
Minister, at that time, prevented a pro-unity march, beginning from Tripoli, from entering 
Tunis. It subsequently remained close to the Libyan-Tunisian border.299 Tunisia's conservative 
elite passionately rejected union with Libya, and a previous attempt to unite with Algeria. 
Bourguiba had himself rejected Algeria's offer for unification in 1973.300 The dismissive 
attitude held by Bourguiba is reported by Taher Bel Khoja:  
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The Algerian Former President, Houari Boumediene, met with Bourguiba in May, 
1973, in El Kef, Tunisia, where he proposed unity between the two countries, be it 
in a con-federal or federal form. It was a similar offer to what Bourguiba had 
called for 13 years previously, precisely on October 7th, 1960. He declared that 
Tunisia would support Algeria in its struggle against the French occupation in 
order to be able, after liberation, to develop democratic legitimacy and to pave the 
way for establishing Unity, be it as a confederation, a federation, or in any other 
form. These were evidently the same words as those of President Boumediene, but 
Bourguiba cleverly obviated them by saying: “Mr. President, Algeria is large, 
while Tunisia is small, so why don’t we go back in time to adopt the borders the 
way they used to be before — why don’t you give me Constantinople as a 
whole?301 
A changed context had produced a rejection of the Algerian proposal for unity. Socialist 
Algeria was allied to Nasserist Egypt in the 1960s. While Bourguiba was not prepared to 
share power with the one-party state governing neighbouring Algeria, the relatively new 
Gaddafi regime appears to have presented a chance for him to be the elder statesman. Further, 
the new rulers of Algeria were the anti-colonial fighters from the National Liberation Front, 
which reinvented itself as the national army. Bourguiba distrusted military interference in 
politics. He had expected the rise of a civilian regime after the bloody anti-colonial struggle 
in France's last colony in the Maghreb. Instead, Ahmed Ben Bella headed a revolutionary 
regime, only to be ousted by Houari Boumediene, with a military dictatorship acquiring 
power.  
The conservative political elite in Tunis were deeply suspicious of the radical ideologies of 
the age. Repeated warnings from Bourguiba's closest allies in Tunisia led to a distancing from 
Gaddafi's political activities. The fear that radical Libya would devour Tunisia seems to have 
been confirmed by Gaddafi's dual positions as Vice-President and Defense Minister of the 
Islamic Arab Republic, as a prelude to a coup d'êtat. Bourguiba’s newly found caution drew 
upon his fear of the army, and from Gaddafi’s history of coups.302 Nour -Eddin al-Alawi 
noted that: 
It may be commonly believed that Bourguiba was not in favour of this unity, but 
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he could not reject such a generous proposal, made by Gaddafi, because he 
thought it would serve to realise his dream of leadership of the Maghreb 
afterwards.303 
It seems Bourguiba and Gaddafi might have been able to work together, for however brief an 
association, towards a pan-nationalist goal. Different objectives motivated the actions of both 
men in their project to expand their political influence and control. The context of the 
Maghreb provided opportunities to develop or restrict the likelihood of various types of co-
operation between regimes, or even of political union. However, the vision of the future 
adopted by conservative leaders like Bourguiba, described by his supporters as 'rationalism', 
clashed with the perceived excessive 'revolutionism' of Gaddafi and his fellow statesmen.304 
Controversial issues, such as Palestine, Arab unity and socialist revolution, continued to 
divide Arab states. 
Algeria’s Rejection of the Islamic Arab Republic 
Algeria's position as a regional power in the Maghreb led it to view the proposed union of 
Libya and Algeria as a threat. As a result, relations between Tunisia and Algeria were filled 
with tensions following the Djerba Agreement. Boumediene refused to receive Taher Bel 
Khoja and al-Habib al-Shatti, in their capacity as Bourguiba's official envoys.305 The 
opposition of Algeria to the Libyan-Tunisian union, for a former chairman of the Neo-
Constitutional Party, was also a major reason for its failure.306 Further, the offer extended to 
Boumediene to join the union was met with rejection, since he said: “Algeria does not get on 
a moving train. It gets on trains before they start up”.307 Ahmed Bannour observes that the 
Tunisian President did not expect Boumediene to oppose the union between Libya and 
Tunisia. Boumediene is reported to have warned his counterpart in Tunis that “They had 
better consult me before signing that agreement. This unity between you and Libya will not 
succeed”.308 The Algerian position was not simply a rejection of being part of the Islamic 
Arab Republic, but was against its very existence, which led to Bourguiba to revisit his initial 
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eagerness for the agreement.309  
External and internal obstacles to the agreement signed at Djerba were too strong for 
Tunisian-Libya co-operation to rapidly develop into a union with a single state. A turning 
point had come when the union was abrogated soon afterwards. Two ideological systems, 
with high stakes for the survival of the nation-state in the case of Tunisia, and Gaddafi's 
political expansion of pan-Arabism, proved to be incompatible. In his book Nasibi Min Al-
hayat (My Share of Life), Mohamed Mzali explained “that it was impossible to continue to 
such a hasty unity; the ideological differences at the economic, social and political levels 
were not taken into consideration while signing it.” However, Bourguiba's pan-Maghrebi 
vision also fell victim to the intrigue of his own allies and Algerian pressure. 
Jericho's Palestine Solution 
The famous speech310 delivered by Bourguiba at Jericho in 1965 is perhaps the strongest 
indication, for his supporters, that he was a 'realistic' leader. Israel's superior military and 
political power, aided by the West, was recognised.311 A solution based on the relative 
weaknesses of the Palestinians thus needed to be put forward in such a situation. Palestinians 
had to finally accept the partition of Palestine that had been stipulated in United Nations’ 
resolutions.312 Israel's recognition was part of a broader process of negotiation in a “get and 
demand” policy.313 Previously, Bourguiba had proposed the same idea at the first 1964 Arab 
Summit, without provoking any objections from his fellow Arab leaders, according to 
Mohammad Sayeh, who accompanied him to Cairo. Sayeh claimed that Tunisia's President 
was of the view that the Palestinians needed to rely on themselves and not on Arab armies to 
solve the issue of occupation. "A set of phases" had to be formulated, pursuing a strategy 
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between diplomacy and armed struggle.314 Another visit to Cairo, before the Jericho speech, 
saw Bourguiba put forward his Palestinian proposal to Nasser, who reputedly accepted it and 
promised political support. Tahir Bel Khoja had accompanied Bourguiba and reports the 
following conversation between the Tunisian and Egyptian Presidents: 
“Concerning the Palestinian issue, I think, out of good politics, we should cling to 
international legitimacy. Because of the Zionist propaganda, the world believes 
that Israel is a small nation being surrounded by a large Arab army. If the Arabs 
cling to the solution proposed in the partition resolution, we will seem to the 
world to be a nation committed to international legitimacy. Afterwards, we would 
urge the Palestinians to engage in the armed struggle without getting a single Arab 
soldier involved; we will support them financially and diplomatically.” said 
Bourguiba. “If you show interest in this strategy, maybe Arab public opinion will 
support you” he added. Nasser replied that you (Bourguiba) could propose those 
ideas. “Do you mind if I propose these ideas, not here, in Cairo, but in Palestine?” 
Bourguiba then asked. “You could do that, and we will support you” Nasser 
replied.315 
This solution to the 'Palestinian issue' was understood on a world stage that was slanted 
against the Arabs, and the Palestinians in particular. Interestingly, Bourguiba also suggests a 
form of pan-Arab support for Palestinian efforts to liberate their lands without direct military 
intervention. Nasser's reply appears to be receptive of the proposal's contents. A letter was 
sent by Bourguiba to Nasser on 29th April, 1965, discussing further the proposal and 
responding to the criticism generated in the media about it. In the letter, Bourguiba 
recommends that: 
We should thoroughly plan our political actions; words alone, as I have already 
stated, do not yield positive results. We must gain supporters and prepare 
international public opinion to support us in one way or another. Therefore, I have 
proposed approving the United Nations’ Resolution that recommended the 
refugees return to their homeland and Israel renounce an important part of 
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Palestine.316 
Another excerpt states, 
I was certain, and events proved it, that the great powers would condemn 
reprobate Israel’s rejection to abide by the United Nations’ Resolutions. Hence, 
that would lead to the Arabs’ implicit victory and shake the ground under Zionist 
colonialism; this rejection would rupture the relationship between Israel and its 
supporters. This situation would culminate in either of two scenarios: In Scenario 
One, which is a far-fetched one, Israel would eventually approve the resolutions 
of the international organisation. In this way, Israel would consent for the refugees 
to return to their homeland and it would give up a part of the land it occupies. The 
situation will thus change in favour of the Arabs, and a new possibility to solve 
the issue will be created. In Scenario 2, which is the most likely to occur, Israel 
would insist on rejecting the resolution and then the Arabs would be stronger in 
case a war breaks out.317 
Bourguiba appears to have been aware of the international balance of power against the cause 
of the Palestinians. The international community can be a source of strength. Exclusive 
reliance on Arab states or military force would not deliver the desired goals for the liberation 
of Palestine. While Bourguiba is very explicit about condemning "Zionist colonialism", he 
also advocated a radical compromise: mutual recognition of the states of Israel and 
Palestine.318 An unresolved contradiction emerges in light of the seeming inability of the Arab 
states to defeat Israel on the battlefield before the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973.  
 
Ordinary Arabs had rejected Bourguiba's declarations in a very public show of 
demonstrations in the cities and towns of the Arab world. Newspaper columns attacked the 
Tunisian President. Influential radio stations, such as the Cairo station (Idaat al-Qahira) and 
the Voice of the Arabs (Sawt al-Arab), also broadcast stinging criticisms. Bourguiba's 
scheduled visit to Iraq was cancelled following the Iraqi government's message that it could 
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not guarantee his safety.319 A severe backlash was generated across most sections of the Arab 
media. Popular feelings against Israel dominated the Arab world with the frontline states, 
Egypt, Syria and Jordan, being officially at war with Israel. Slogans such as ‘throw Israel into 
the sea’, besides others, were loudly proclaimed in campaigns about nationalist issues. The 
revolutionary camp, led by Nasser, after witnessing the reaction against Bourguiba, appears 
to have turned away completely from the prospect of the recognition of Israel. Instead, 
Bourguiba's proposal was understood to accept Israel as a state built on the ruins of Palestine, 
and therefore as a message of submission to the enemy. The armed struggle to liberate all the 
territory of Palestine was to be carried out through the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, a 
newly founded movement, backed by the Arab states.320 
A Failed Coup Against Bourguiba 
I previously mentioned the failed 1963 coup d'êtat against Bourguiba, and the consequent 
changes introduced to his regime. The Tunisian armed forces were thus removed from the 
political arena. Military officers did not receive any ministerial positions. Civilian politicians 
were to fill the post of Defence Minister. A standing force of 20,000 soldiers was maintained. 
Battalions and units were stationed in the countryside to undertake civic projects, including 
building roads and infrastructure.321 Mohammad Mzali notes: 
Bourguiba’s extreme caution was clearly manifested in the constant watch he kept 
over officers and their political affiliations; he dismissed those who represented a 
threat. This scrutiny of military affairs was accompanied by negligence in 
developing the Tunisian Army, so as to ensure it was less powerful and was 
incapable of playing any effective role in internal political life. Indeed, the 
Tunisian Army had a modest budget in comparison with the budgets of some of 
the Arab regimes’ armies; only 5％ of the country’s general budget was allocated 
to it, because Bourguiba had always been of the opinion that “the army’s place is 
in the barracks, not in political life.322 
The regime headed by Bourguiba viewed the military, from a political viewpoint, to require 
strict control. Constant surveillance of military officers was a key part of a broader 
authoritarian strategy in a country where political parties were banned, and no opposition was 
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tolerated. As a result, Bourguiba sought to weaken the army's ability to act against him, 
thereby avoiding any future coup d'êtats. The army was underdeveloped in terms of 
manpower and equipment. A separation between politics and the army was implemented.  
 
Suspicion of Gaddafi and Nasser's Military Backgrounds 
Bourguiba's fear of military interference in the security of his regime also included those of 
other countries. His experience of the 1963 coup caused him to distrust the military regimes 
of Arab states in the Maghreb and Mashreq. The Tunisian leader felt superior in his 
awareness of being the only civilian leader in the Arab world, as opposed to the seizure of 
power by Nasser and Gaddafi through military coups.323 Relations with Gaddafi are 
described, by Salah-eddin al-Jamali, to have been based on the fact that: 
Bourguiba believed that the Maghrebi leaders had no convincing political vision 
and lacked political experience due to their military backgrounds, he was scornful 
of them. His behaviour towards them, in general, and to Gaddafi in particular, was 
inconsistent with the norms and behaviours of diplomacy which were commonly 
followed in inter-Presidential relations, which did not please Gaddafi.324 
Involvement in Tunisia's anti-colonial struggle and his subsequent period in the position of 
President appear to have given Bourguiba the confidence to dismiss other forms of 
authoritarian rule. The above description of the relations between Bourguiba and Gaddafi 
indicates a complex situation where personalities appear to be more important than 
governments or ideology. Gaddafi's speech at Palmarium,325 attacking the USA, provoked a 
stern reaction from Bourguiba, in an expression of his seniority. The Palmarium speech was a 
clear demonstration of the differing ideological views that were dominant in Tunisia and 
Libya. Gaddafi's own pronouncements on Arab unity and the West were being watched live 
by Bourguiba, who decided to immediately head to the stage and to voice his own opinions. 
The leader of Tunisia began to criticise the notion of Arab unity, and this was directed at 
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Gaddafi himself.326 Subsequently, Gaddafi harboured a grudge against Bourguiba. Inter-state 
relations between Tunisia and Libya suffered from an emerging personal rivalry between 
these heads of state. Palmarium publicly confirmed Bourguiba's dislike of pan-Arabism. 
Further, it was an indication that he feared the presence of the revolutionary regimes 
bordering Tunisia, namely, Libya and Algeria.327  
Abdul Razzaq al-Mathelouthi, a former Tunisian Consul to Libya, observes Bourguiba's 
parental intentions to share his experience with the 29 year old Gaddafi, who was a graduate 
of the Libyan Military School.328 In the Maghreb, the President of Tunisia was happy to play 
the part of the elder statesman. Military regimes were unable to run the countries under their 
control. Further, a military background could not be a substitute for political experience. 
Nonetheless, Bourguiba was wary of Gaddafi, due to his own experience with the Tunisian 
army and the latter's demands that the elderly heads of state in the Maghreb should leave 
power to make way for younger leaders espousing Nasserist ideals.329 An ideological clash, 
which I noted earlier, between conservative and revolutionary Arab regimes seems to have 
created tensions between the Tunisian and Libyan leaders. Salah-eddin al-Jamali argued that: 
In addition to his great ambitions, both inside and outside Libya, Gaddafi never 
accepted discussion and always held to his opinions ─ we were actually in an 
ideological conflict with him. He did not want to be close to Bourguiba and was 
influenced by the revolutionary thinking of the Egyptian President, Jamal Abdul 
Nasser, especially after the latter’s famous speech in Libya. In this speech, he 
declared Gaddafi to be the Secretary General of Arab Revolutionism and/or 
Nationalism, which greatly affected his personality. Gaddafi always fanatically 
believed his thoughts to be the right ones, which explains his tragic end.330 
It is important to note that Gaddafi was no less authoritarian than Bourguiba. His socialist 
policies in Libya forced political parties and the private sector to the margins of society. 
Direct and personal acts of power replaced the machinery of the state. Gaddafi's pan-Arabist 
beliefs, under the influence of Nasser, thus also meant that it became the official ideology of 
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Libya. Gaddafi's military background and revolutionary ideals stood in stark contrast to 
Bourguiba's liberal convictions.331 Arabism, in this period, was embodied in the person of 
Nasser. Anwar al-Sadat's succession to the Egyptian Presidency fell extremely short of his 
predecessor's charisma and convictions in the area of ideology. In this context, Gaddafi saw 
himself, confirmed by Nasser's speech in Libya, as the young revolutionary who was to be 
the next leader of the Arabs, to carry the flag of Arabism. As a result, the Libyan leader 
became a relentless advocate of Arab unity for almost twenty years. 
A former Secretary of State in the Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs describes Bourguiba's 
approach to have been a case-by-case one, seeking to serve Tunisia's interests in various 
spheres, especially the economy. The Libyan leader was strongly influenced by socialist ideas 
of populist revolution and the immediate redistribution of wealth, which had contributed to a 
deterioration in relations with his neighbours and with Tunisia.332 In 1970, the Tunisian 
National Progressive Front was formed to oppose Bourguiba's control over Tunisia. A 
revolutionary agenda reflecting Youssefism characterised this group, which enjoyed 
Gaddafi's backing.333 Members were also involved in the section of Arab action within the 
liaison office of the Revolutionary Committees334, charged with providing support to 
Tunisian opposition groups.335 
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Crisis in Gafsa 
Events at Gafsa represent a major deterioration between Tunisia and Libya in the Maghreb. 
The capture of the Tunisian town by militants occurred in January, 1980, in a context where 
Gaddafi provided support to Bourguiba's opposition. About 40 Tunisians, who had been 
trained in Libyan camps and then moved to Italian and later Algerian camps, infiltrated the 
country through the Tunisian-Algerian border. According to their confessions during 
interrogation, their plan was to seize the security headquarters and army camps in Gafsa 
when the clock struck midnight, marking the beginning of January 26th, 1980. They expected 
to receive popular support and thus a revolution would commence, ending Bourguiba’s 
regime.336 Despite these stated intentions, the Tunisian security services and the army 
managed to chase out and catch the would-be revolutionaries in the southern parts of the 
country. 
 
Exclusive blame placed on Libya appears to have hidden Algerian involvement in Gafsa. 
Nour -Eddin al-Alawi argued that the commander of the raid had links to, and was connected 
with, the Algerian intelligence services. Further corroboration of this suspicion of Algiers' 
complicity comes from Azzeddin al-Sherif, who admitted relations between his group and the 
Algerian authorities, including its intelligence arm. Close links were established in the 
process of transporting weapons via Algeria from Libya to Polisario fighters struggling 
against the Moroccan government in the Western Sahara.337 Algerian intelligence services 
were believed, by Nour -Eddin al-Alawi, to have helped in facilitating the entry of the Gafsa 
attackers through Algeria to Tunisia.338 Interestingly, the revelation that Libyan and Algerian 
intelligence services were involved in the incident did not lead to Tunisian investigations 
against Algeria, due to the desire not to have two opposing states at the same time.339 In this 
period, for Hisham Hajji, Algeria's support of Libya in the Arab League is another indication 
of the former's complicity. Tunisia's request to convene an Arab Summit to discuss the Gafsa 
incident and to impose resolutions against Libya, was met with failure. 340 Libya's foreign 
minister refuted Tunisian allegations of involvement at a meeting of foreign ministers for the 
Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, which represented the revolutionary camp, including 
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Algeria, in the Arab League. 341 
Libya's offer of support in the armed rebellion against Bourguiba in Gafsa could be 
understood to be the peak of Libyan hostility against the Tunisian ruling regime.342 A great 
rift was thus created. An exchange of accusations in the national media of these two countries 
eventually led to a severing of relations. Tunisia's inability to contain the regional ambitions 
of the Libyan regime became apparent. Previous relations with Libya under the Senoussi 
monarchy were generally not antagonistic. Both states respected the other's sovereignty to act 
freely within their borders. Further, Libya acted as a buffer state to the revolutionary policies 
of Nasserist Egypt in an ideological rivalry that was accompanied by conflict and 
contention.343 Tunisia's close relationship with the West also became clear as a result of the 
chain of events emerging after the Gafsa incident. Military support arrived from France and 
the USA, with the former moving its warships and the latter moving its Sixth Fleet close to 
the Tunisian coastline, in case of Libyan aggression.344 
The failure of the Islamic Arab Republic was perhaps the most important factor in creating a 
tension-filled atmosphere with mutual conspiracies that were produced by both regimes, and 
particularly those of Gaddafi.345 An assassination attempt on Hedi Nouira in 1978 can be seen 
as part of the wider fallout between the two states over the proposed political union between 
them a few years previously. Libya worked towards regime change, according to Taher Bel 
Khoja, exploiting a precarious period in Tunisia's domestic scene, e.g., the conflict between 
the government and the trade unions in 1978. A string of economic crises afflicting Tunisia 
presented opportunities for Gaddafi to encourage rebellion among the country's population. 
In 1976, thousands of workers were expelled back to Tunisia from Libya. Negotiations were 
rejected by the Gaddafi regime regarding Libyan-Tunisian disputed territorial waters, which 
contained large deposits of oil.346  
The interaction of external and internal factors compelled Bourguiba to act to maintain the 
stability of the regime. Daoui Henblia, the Minister of the Interior, was removed and replaced 
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by Idris Gaga.347 Despite Nouira's disapproval of the choice of the new minister, Gaga close 
relationship with Tunisia's First Lady was perhaps a factor in his appointment.348 Nouira's 
stroke led to the dissolution of the government, with Mohammad Mzali becoming Prime 
Minister in 1980.349 The attempt to defuse the internal situation in Tunisia motivated 
Bourguiba to release political prisoners, in a public show of reform. Mzali represented the 
'pan-Arab' trend in the country. His appointment to the office of Prime Minister allowed him 
to implement an Arabisation programme of the educational system.350 
 
A New Chapter of Co-operation between Ben Ali's Tunisia and Gaddafi's 
Libya 
In the final years of Bourguiba's reign, Gaddafi worked towards de-stabilising his neighbour's 
regime. In 1986, Tunisian workers in Libya were expelled at a time of economic crisis, 
leading to a worsening of the situation in Tunisia and the eventual overthrow of Bourguiba in 
the following year.351 A new regime in Tunis changed the country's political direction. 
Foreign policy was also affected as a result of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali becoming President. 
A departure from the previous Bourguiba years on the matter of Islam appears to have been 
the new regime's intention. The first year of Ben Ali's reign was filled with mention of this 
new orientation in Tunisia's domestic and foreign policies.  
We tried to maintain the link between the internal and external politics of our 
country. The Tunisian diplomatic efforts should reflect the new changes, 
including the Arab-Islamic identity, the affiliation in Africa and the interests of 
our people, especially their noble values.352 
 
Three areas of activity were identified, and a tight bond between the internal affairs and inter-
state relations of Tunisia. Islam, Africa, and the Tunisian national interest were to be 
combined. A distrust of international politics was not present in Ben Ali's initial rhetoric. 
Instead, a high level of confidence was displayed in Tunisia's ability to adapt to a new 
context. Further, public demands for the greater recognition of Islam in society and in politics 
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were evident. The new government may have tried to respond to this pressure through co-
opting religious symbolism. There was renewed interest in the importance of Arab culture 
and Islam in the political stability of the country.353 Previous isolation in international affairs 
was now to be replaced by active engagement. The regional and global contexts of Tunisia 
were equally important in setting the priorities of its foreign policy. Ben Ali's changes to 
Tunisian foreign policy generated opposition. These changes did not produce the expected 
political and economic results on the ground.354 Further, no genuine shift from the previous 
era's stances on the world stage had taken place. Relations with other Arab states and 
societies also continued. Despite the Islamic and Arab rhetoric on various issues, Tunisia's 
secular politics still dominated. A narrowly defined Tunisian nation-state defined Ben Ali's 
regime.355 
Political relations with other states in the Maghreb lacked the suspicion displayed by 
Bourguiba. Previous fears of military rulers and popular revolution disappeared. Libya was 
welcomed as a close ally. The new Tunisian leader emphasised that Libya was the strategic 
extension of Arab and Muslim Tunisia.356 Improved inter-state relations were driven by good 
interpersonal relationships between Ben Ali and Gaddafi. Libyan ministers, such as Khweldi 
al-Hamidi and Baghdadi Mahmudi, played a constructive role on many occasions to improve 
Libyan-Tunisian ties.357 Shared interests, based on security concerns and the ruling families, 
inspired moves towards the stability underpinning their bilateral relations.358 The political 
survival of the Gaddafis and the Trabelsi-Ben Alis was a priority. Family members were 
placed in positions of political authority and economic importance. The inter-state relations 
between Tunisia and Libya were thus family affairs.  
 
In Tunisia, Ben Ali's new regime was influenced by nationalism, which not did exclude 
working with neighbours. The establishment of the Arab Maghreb Union in 1989 appears to 
confirm this view.359 Interestingly, he was considered by some to be a product of the Libyan 
political leadership. In the Djerba Agreement, Gaddafi suggested that Ben Ali occupy a 
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position as a security official in the unity government.360 The preceding explanations about 
Ben Ali's enthusiasm for the AMU and his rise to power are debatable, of course. Salah-eddin 
al-Jamali dismisses the possibility that Ben Ali was a product of the Libyan intelligence 
services. Precautionary security measures were adopted by both countries in the period when 
Ben Ali was General Director of National Security. Tunisia’s security apparatus made great 
efforts to monitor pro-Gaddafi agents within its territories.361 Similarly, Hisham Hajji argues 
that Ben Ali did not hold Gaddafi's revolutionary and nationalist ideas. However, he was not 
against Arabism in the same way Bourguiba had been.362 Various explanations have been 
suggested to identify the factors motivating Ben Ali to pursue an improvement in Libyan-
Tunisian relations. Ben Ali's goal of working towards the realization of Tunisia's national 
interests appears to be common ground between them. Political, economic and financial 
interests governed the new relationship, with each leader trying to benefit the most from it.363  
 
The succession of Ben Ali did not bring a revolutionary ideology that sought to redraw the 
borders of the Maghreb. Rather, the new regime was concerned with maintaining the existing 
state in Tunisia. During the international embargo imposed on Libya, Ben Ali acted as an 
intermediary between his neighbour and the West.364 Better relations among the states of the 
Maghreb, based on the mutual self-interest of their political elites, appear to have replaced 
ideology and personal disagreements. The authoritarian nature of the state in Tunisia and 
Libya allowed such a reversal of relations from those of the Bourguiba era in their inter-state 
relations. Egyptian efforts to mediate were also present. However, Libya preferred Tunisian 
mediation, e.g., in the diplomatic crisis involving France’s accusation that Libya was behind 
the French airline UTA crash in Niger.365 This choice was made, according to Hisham Hajji, 
in light of the negative consequences emerging from the military contribution of Hosni 
Mubarak, President of Egypt, to Western intervention in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait.366 Tunisia did not oppose Libya’s points of view on some issues which were 
extremely sensitive for its regime.367 The First Gulf War was such an example where: 
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The invasion of Iraq in 1990, and the consequent international intervention, did 
put Tunisia in a predicament concerning its regional relations and those with Arab 
countries. Therefore, it decided not to attend the Arab Summit, which was held in 
Cairo, so that it would avoid conflicts with countries in its regional 
surroundings.368 
Concerning the campaign to generate support for Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, the 
disadvantages outweighed the advantages of joining it. Inter-state relations within the 
Maghreb were given priority over those of the Gulf or the West. Egypt's participation and 
approval of this intervention were not received well by Gaddafi.  
Tunisia also provided relief for Libya's internationally-imposed blockade between 1994 and 
2004. Some Tunisian airports were transformed into Libyan zones of commerce. The Libyan 
flag was raised at Djerba Airport when political officials from Libya were received. Many 
Tunisian commentators and diplomats understood these transformations to have been the 
yielding of Tunisian territories to Libya.369 However, inter-state relations between the 
countries had beneficial effects for both regimes. Libyan finance enriched the Tunisian 
economy in the form of grants, loans and trade. Western states had implicitly consented to the 
increasing interdependence of Tunisian and Libya.370 The Libyan regime's adoption of the 
notion of constant revolution, in the form of Universal Theory371, drove it to export this 
version of radical change to states inside and outside the Arab world. 372 Ben Ali was aware of 
the threat posed by Libya's ability to export these ideas and to polarise countries.373 
Containment of the Libyan regime was thus the preferred strategy, using joint ventures of co-
operation to achieve common interests.374 Tunisian relations with Libya needed to take 
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advantage of the opportunities for economic integration without falling into the trap of 
surrendering to the ideological agenda of Tripoli.  
 
Conclusion 
In the above discussion, I have examined Libyan-Tunisian relations through the analysis of 
primary sources collected mainly from interviews. I was able to identify seven key areas 
which have been illustrated in this chapter. The dominance of ideology between 1969 and 
1987 appears to have been the case. However, this statement needs to be explained with 
reference to the key personalities in this period, and their wider context. The first area points 
to the fact that post-colonial states in the Maghreb were generally governed by authoritarian 
regimes. Before 1969, Libya was ruled by a monarchy. with absolute powers based on an 
informal web of tribal and clan alliances. Bourguiba was busy consolidating his power 
through the Neo-Constitutional Party. While some economic activity existed between Libya 
and Tunisia, the level of co-operation did not lead to efforts for integration. In Libya, the 
revolution brought a new regime to power which continued to use the tribes as the basis of its 
political strength, complemented by the vast oil wealth of the nation.  
The second area identified in this chapter focuses on the impact of Bourguiba's education and 
politics on his policies. No clear political and economic ideology appears to have been 
espoused by the Francophile Bourguiba. His regime demonstrated the personal nature of 
power. The authoritarian structure of the regime enabled Bourguiba to pursue policies that 
were firstly based on liberalism, then on socialism, only to revert back to liberalism. Ahmed 
Ben Saleh was the Prime Minister, who seems to have influenced the Tunisian President to 
adopt socialism to carry out a rapid and much needed development of Tunisia during the 
1960s. Pragmatic considerations, rather than ideological ones, led Bourguiba to formulate 
what was called 'Tunisian socialism' or 'Bourguibaism'. However, the failure of these socialist 
policies to achieve their intended objectives forced Bourguiba to imprison Ben Saleh in 1969.  
The third area identifies the division between conservative and radical regimes in the Arab 
world. An ideological conflict took place during the Cold War. Bourguiba's Tunisia and 
Nasser's Egypt were locked in a rivalry over the future vision of the Arab world. While 
Bourguiba advocated a narrowly defined Tunisian nation-state, the Arabism of Nasser 
recognised no borders. Four attributes can be identified in Bourguiba's foreign policy, which 
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is generally based on his conservative beliefs: a personal 'realistic' view; the Tunisian nation-
state; western models of state-building; and the avoidance of alliances or unions with Arab 
states.375 Gaddafi's regime in Tripoli adopted the Arabism of his Egyptian neighbour. Libya 
had formed unsuccessful unions with Egypt and Sudan between1970-73. Libyan-Tunisian 
union would arrive a year later under the Islamic Arab Republic. Bourguiba had accepted 
Gaddafi's proposal to be the President of this union. The prospect of a pan-Maghreb union 
appealed to the leader of Tunisia. However, pressure from Bourguiba's own conservative 
allies in the Tunisian political elite, including the First Lady, and the Algerian President, 
Houari Boumediene's, forceful comments, led to its dissolution. Algeria refused and rejected 
the existence of the Islamic Arab Republic. The failure of the Djerba Agreements appears to 
have marked a period of deterioration between Bourguiba and Gaddafi in Libyan-Tunisian 
relations. 
The fourth area pays attention to Bourguiba's controversial 1965 speech in Jericho, Palestine. 
He had outlined a proposal to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Palestinians were to accept the 
UN resolutions that partitioned Palestine. This would inevitably lead to the unimaginable 
prospect of recognising the state of Israel. No Arab statesmen would even suggest such an 
action in this period. In this context, Bourguiba's comments created a storm in Arab media. 
Public demonstrations across the Arab world showed how badly these comments were 
received. From the above analysis, Nasser and other Arab leaders appear to have been fully 
aware of Bourguiba's sentiments and of his plans to voice them, and they pledged their 
support for him. However, the events following the Jericho speech demonstrate the Tunisian 
leader's isolation among Arab heads of state and their populations.  
The fifth area examines how Bourguiba's reaction to a failed coup d'état led him to view with 
suspicion the military leaders of the Arab world. A 1963 attempt to overthrow Bourguiba 
caused the Tunisian President to exert strict control over his army in order to keep it out of 
politics. A line was to be drawn between the activities of the military and participation in 
politics. Bourguiba had intended to play the role of elder statesman to the young Gaddafi 
after he had overthrown King Idris I. However, Gaddafi adopted the radical ideology of 
Arabism. This explains Bourguiba's further dislike of Gaddafi, when the latter chose to 
pursue the path of Nasser, a military officer who had attained power through a coup, in a 
bitter rivalry between Tunisia and Egypt in the Arab world.  
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The sixth area examines the crisis caused by the attack on Gafsa by Tunisian militants, who 
were allegedly supported by Libya. These militants were reputed to have been trained by 
Libya, seeking to lead a revolution against Bourguiba. Interestingly, the intelligence services 
of Libya and Algeria were said to have played a direct role in aiding this attempt to get rid of 
the Tunisian leader. The impact of the radical ideologies of Algeria and Libya was not 
restricted to political change within their own borders. 
The seventh area identifies a new stage in Libyan-Tunisian relations after Ben Ali overthrew 
Bourguiba in 1987. Islam and Arab identity were to be part of the new foreign policy of 
Tunisia. Ben Ali appears to have been less suspicious of the radical politics of Libya. 
However, he remained wary of the revolutionary threat that Gaddafi posed to Tunisia. The 
new President of Tunisia chose to promote closer economic co-operation between the two 
countries in a new political environment. For Ben Ali, this policy was meant to allow Tunisia 
to benefit from Libya's wealth oil through economic exchange and to contain the radical 
politics of his Libyan counterpart. For Gaddafi, the economic opportunity with Tunisia 
enabled Libya  some relief from the negative effects of the international sanctions imposed on 
it between 1992 and 2004. Common interests motivated by different factors appear to show a 
decline in the role of ideology in the inter-state relations of Tunisia and Libya. 
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CHAPTER SIX: A NEW POLITICAL ERA AND THE 
FORMALISATION OF LIBYAN-TUNISIAN ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I identified the key personalities, events and processes in the inter-
state relations between Tunisia and Libya. Habib Bourguiba and Muammar Gaddafi 
dominated the politics and economies of the countries in ways which reflected the 
authoritarian powers they enjoyed. Politics was expressed in both formal and informal 
manifestations. The impact of ideology was felt in these two areas. Gaddafi's seeming lack of 
executive office was underpinned by an informal network of allies. Socialism allowed him to 
seize the natural resources and assets of private businesses. At the same time, the vast wealth 
generated by oil was tightly controlled by the new Libyan regime, which followed the 
Senoussi monarchy. Bourguiba's hostile rivalry with his neighbours came to an end in 1987. 
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the new President of Tunisia, adopted a more conciliatory approach 
in the Maghreb. Libya was a direct beneficiary of this new approach. Greater co-operation in 
the area of the economy was accompanied by better relations between the regimes in Tripoli 
and Tunis. Ben Ali and Gaddafi appear to have recognised benefits from a thaw in bilateral 
relations between Tunisia and Libya.  
 
I will examine in this chapter how decision-makers in Tunis and Tripoli took advantage of 
the opportunities resulting from the changes after 1987, which included a new regime in 
Tunisia, international sanctions on Libya, and other key factors. There are eight parts in this 
chapter, which focus on specific aspects of the changing bilateral relations between Tunisia 
and Libya. I will begin by illustrating the differences between the two nations in their 
economic structures and policies, shaped by the long reigns of Bourguiba and Gaddafi. The 
remaining parts will discuss the following aspects: the stage of unorganised Libyan-Tunisian 
economic relations accompanied by the rise of the black market of 'the Tunisian Souk' in 
Libya; the application of the National Treatment Principle, aimed at the equal treatment of 
Libyan and Tunisian goods; the activities of the Libyan-Tunisian Economic Chamber, which 
was committed to promoting cross-border opportunities for businesses; the attempts at 
building up a common and suitable infrastructure for bilateral trading ties and the creation of 
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mega projects; the survival or presence of the private sector; the impact of the international 
embargo in the development of Libyan-Tunisian economic links; and, finally, the differences 
present in the banking and tourist sectors that are characterised by a certain degree of 
unpredictability, especially from the Libyan regime, in creating a stable environment for 
fruitful bilateral relations.  
 
Differences in the Economic Structures and Policies of Tunisia and Libya 
The personal nature of power, underpinned by authoritarian regimes, influenced the 
economic structures and policies in both states. Economic relations were weak and limited for 
reasons explained previously. Arab regimes were divided into 'conservative' and 'radical' 
camps during the Cold War era. Habib Bourguiba had a personal and ideological dislike of 
the politics of Gaddafi's Libya and of Nasser's Egypt. The Libyan revolutionary leader was 
determined to reshape the borders and states in the Arab world into a single Arab state. Union 
after union had failed in this attempt. However, Gaddafi's enthusiasm for Arab unity lasted 
for more than twenty years. Different policies in the domestic affairs of Tunisia and Libya 
appear to have played a part in the low level of trade between them. A lack of joint initiatives 
in both the public and private sectors is clearly noticeable. Examination of the main 
characteristics of the economy of Libya and Tunisia will enable me to identify their past 
differences in this sphere. Political personalities and regimes, and Libyan-Tunisian relations 
were, and continue to be, interdependent factors.  
 
Tunisia's limited resources and occasional economic crises encouraged Bourguiba and Ben 
Ali to implement an agenda that was based on its strengths. Liberal policies in the early 
1970s followed the failure of socialism that was based on a plan of rapid modernisation. 
Foreign companies were invited to import much needed technology into the country. The 
generation of a high number of jobs for Tunisians was understood by al-Habib al-Homami to 
have been the key goal in this policy. Indeed, Tunisia is home to the largest number of skilled 
worked in the Maghreb.376 Previously, the economy was largely based on local industries 
involving crafts and agriculture. Changes to the very economic structure of the Tunisian 
economy would require a radical approach. Modernisation based on socialism, under the 
influence of Ahmed Ben Saleh, proved unable to achieve the results needed for Bourguiba 
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and his regime. The drive to industrialise became a top priority. The following excerpt from 
Murad al-Hattab and Ali al-Thawadi confirms this position, 
 
This is consistent with what the economic expert, Murad al-Hattab, says. 
According to him, Tunisia focused its industrial policies on light manufacturing 
during this period, for two main reasons:377firstly, it does not possess enough 
financial resources and high technological expertise to invest in heavy industries. 
Secondly, its main objective at that stage was to confront the high and increasing 
unemployment rates among Tunisians. As confirmed by Ali al-Thawadi Tunisia 
mainly aimed to establish industry that used minimal cost and advanced scientific 
technological expertise, but which was also capable of employing the largest 
possible number of workers. Indeed, since Prime Minister Hedi Nouira, it has 
started moving in this direction. It has established 3000 factories for textiles, 
which offered over 400,000 jobs, in addition to 800 other factories for the food 
industry, whose products have been exported to many countries.378 
 
The government's agenda concentrated on light manufacturing instead of the capital-intensive 
heavy industries. A lack of the finance to push forward the modernisation goals of the 
Tunisian regime led to greater efforts to adopt policy with the lowest costs and the highest 
benefits. Mass job creation was the intended objective, as I mentioned earlier. A few 
thousand factories providing hundreds of thousands of jobs could now absorb the large 
number of Tunisians who were out of work. The segment of the population of working age in 
1970 was estimated at 2.6 million out of 5.2 million.379 This posed potential economic and 
political sources of tension for Bourguiba's regime in the form of a politically restless 
organised labour movement. Economic reforms were needed to achieve modernisation and to 
bring political stability to a regime facing internal and external threats to its stability.  
 
In neighbouring Libya, the economy has relied heavily on oil exports. The economic policies 
adopted by Gaddafi were very different from those pursued in Tunisia. Local resources and 
conditions influenced the process of modernisation. Several projects involving heavy industry 
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and petroleum processing were launched. The choice of these two areas of industrial 
modernisation was due both to the fact that Libya was generating a large amount of revenue 
from oil380, and its relationship to Gaddafi's regional ambitions. The extreme ideology 
espoused by Gaddafi faced potential challenges which needed to be confronted.381 Heavy 
industries, such as petrochemicals and iron production, were to be developed.  
 
Libyan objectives were motivated by various goals. The achievement of self-sufficiency in 
the products of these sectors and the export of any surplus to the rest of the Maghreb was an 
aim.382 Additionally, the creation of a military industry was pursued by the Gaddafi regime, 
as demonstrated by Libyan policies and programmes.383 Colleges and institutes were to be 
established to generate the much needed personnel with the military production expertise to 
undertake the plans, and to oversee and implement this industry. Further, thousands of 
students were sent to eastern European countries during the 1970s and 1980s to study these 
subjects.384 
 
According to Tariq Ben Kabir, the different economic policies dominating Libya and Tunisia 
had a negative impact on the development of their economic relations during the 1970s and 
1980s.385 A similar view is suggested by Ali al-Thawadi concerning the limited nature of 
commercial ties, which nonetheless existed between the two nations. Tunisia was on the list 
of retail clothes exporting-nations to Libya in 1985. The Libyan government's General 
Company for Markets imported these goods and enjoyed a virtual monopoly in the 
commercial activities within the country.386 Although the public sector in Libya maintained 
limited economic transactions, the Tunisian private sector tried to stimulate activity in this 
area. However, the bitter political climate between the countries frustrated the efforts to raise 
the level of trade between them.387 One example of the link between the personal hostility of 
the leaders of Tunisia and Libya can be found in the 1985 Tripoli International Fair.388 Over 
                                                 
380Author’s interview with Mahmoud al-Fatisi, the former Minister of Industry in Libya. (Tripoli, Libya, 2013). 
381Ibid. 
382Author’s interview with al-Bashir al-Ajili, the Libyan economics expert. (Tripoli, Libya, 2013). 
383Jadallah Azzouzi Al-Talhi, 'Press Release by the Former Libyan Prime Minister', Al-Fajr newspaper, 1985. 
384Ibid.  
385Author’s interview with Tariq Ben Kabir,the former Tunisian Commercial Attaché. Op cit. 
386Ibid. 
387Author’s interview with Ali al-Thawadi, the former Chairman of the Tunisian-Libyan Economic Chamber 
and economics expert. Op cit. 
388 The Tripoli International Fair is one of the oldest exhibitions in Africa and the Arab World. Its first season 
was during the Italian occupation in 1927. It joined the Union of International Fairs in 1929 and Italian 
industrial and agricultural products were exhibited during that time. It opened constantly for 13 years until 1939, 
128 
 
130 Tunisian companies showcased their products, mainly clothes and shoes, at the fair. 
Strict security procedures were imposed on the delegation from Tunisia. The President of the 
Tunisian Chamber of Commerce noted that: 
 
When I was on my way to inaugurate the aforementioned exhibition, Libyan 
authorities detained me at the airport. As a pretext, their justification was that I 
was suspected of working for Tunisian Intelligence, so that I was summonsed for 
investigation on the matter, which lasted for 3 days before I was allowed to enter 
Libya.389 
 
Deliberate targeting of the head of a trade visit can be located in th broader context of the 
sour relations between Bourguiba and Gaddafi in the preceding years. Personal rivalry had 
been translated into politics and the economy. The humiliation of a senior official, a 
representative of businesses in Tunisia, was a message that they were unwelcome in 
neighbouring Libya. Further, public companies representing the Libyan government 
boycotted the products of the delegation.390 Melad al-Jalady, the then head of the General 
Company for Libyan Markets, reported that Libyan delegates, officials and companies had 
neither commercial ties with Tunisian joint companies, nor had they paid visits to the Gallery 
hosting the companies from Tunisia. Libyan authorities gave these orders with the aim of 
making the Tunisian exhibition a failure.391 The Gaddafi regime exercised a tight grip on 
Libya's economy, thereby closing down potential channels for greater co-operation. No 
independent private sector, examined in a previous chapter, existed within Libya which could 
challenge the formal or informal mechanisms of power. Gaddafi's socialist system, based on 
the nationalisation of Libya's economy, had the effect of shifting formerly private enterprises 
into the hands of his family and allies. 
 
In the early 1980s, the call for joint projects of economic integration was made during 
Gaddafi's visit to Tunisia. Politics took Gaddafi to Tunisia, but an agreement for economic 
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integration was signed. I will mention a few of the reason leading to the trip in order to show 
the complex and personal nature of bilateral relations between Libya and Tunisia. It was a 
chance to reconcile damaged relations between the Libyan and Tunisian leaders after the 
Gafsa incident, with Libya being accused by Bourguiba of having supported armed rebellion 
against him. Gaddafi wanted to urge his counterpart in Tunis not to allow the Libyan 
opposition to use Tunisian territory to undermine him. Libya wanted to keep Tunisia neutral 
after the Gulf of Sidra dispute, which saw two of its fighter jets shot down. In light of Libyan 
intentions behind the trip, Bourguiba himself took the visit to be an opportunity to contain 
Libya's radical ideological policies in the region.  
 
The agreement, signed in 1982, was seen to be an important step towards the improvement of 
the regimes’ bilateral relations. Importantly, the agreement launched the Libyan-Tunisian 
High Executive Committee and stipulated its structure and functions.392 However, the 1980s 
would continue to be a period of bitter relations, which witnessed a very low point between 
Tunisia and Libya, with diplomatic ties being broken by the former. Diplomatic ties were 
only restored after Bourguiba was ousted by his Prime Minister in 1987, which led to a 
drastic change in the inter-state relations and life was breathed into the Libyan-Tunisian High 
Executive Committee. 
 
Unorganised Libyan-Tunisian Economic Relations 
Weak ties had dominated from the 1970s until the middle of the 1980s. A complete break in 
trade took place between 1985 and 1987. The end of Bourguiba's reign ushered in a change in 
the relations between Tunisia and Libya after 1987, with a subsequent boost to their 
economies. Ben Ali had re-established relations and opened Tunisia's borders with Libya. To 
reciprocate in the new phase of Libyan-Tunisian relations, Muammar Gaddafi drove a tractor 
and destroyed a Libyan border crossing barrier in April, 1988, in a public show of integration. 
Subsequently, people and goods from Tunisia were allowed to enter Libya without passports 
or the imposition of custom duties, respectively.393 Such a public show of this new policy was 
also a pragmatic demonstration of the personal nature of power. It would appear that 
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Gaddafi's wish, based on his longstanding belief in Arabism, for the removal of borders 
among Arab states was being fulfilled. Arab unity demanded the erasure of colonial era 
boundaries separating a single Arab people.  
 
In the previous chapter, I discussed Gaddafi's failed attempts at political union with other 
Arab states, including the doomed Islamic Arab Republic in 1974. Removal of the obstacles 
to the free movement of people and goods was also a major element in the revolutionary 
ideas of the Libyan regime in this period. Interestingly, the cross-border activity between 
Tunisia and Libya was largely informal, even without the official stamp of Arab unity. 
Instead, it can be perceived to have been a radical turnaround from previous cold ties to warm 
relations. The formalisation of the free movement of goods and people, caused by Gaddafi's 
politically symbolic breaking of the border, would arrive later and will be discussed further in 
this chapter. 
 
A revival began in Libyan-Tunisian economic relations. However, Salah-eddin al-Jamali 
points out that these relations were neither organized nor subject to clear customs 
procedures.394 No precise regulation, such as monitoring or auditing these activities, could 
occur. A black market had flourished in the hands of cross-border smugglers.395 Markets 
labelled as 'the Tunisian Souk' emerged in the border cities of Libya. Libya's government 
imposed a policy of economic austerity creating a shortage of goods and products, thereby 
unintentionally aiding the growth of the black market in the mid-1980s.396 Individuals and 
private businesses had filled the economic vacuum. Increasing demand for Tunisian products 
in Libya had stimulated the expansion of such unorganised activities. No border control 
officials existed to monitor the flow of goods between Libya and Tunisia. This situation 
appears to reflect a deliberate move on the part of the Libyan regime.  
 
A new leadership in Tunis created the opportunity for Gaddafi to reverse Libya's hostile 
policy towards the fellow Maghrebi country. Instead, greater economic co-operation, 
motivated by pragmatic considerations, was being introduced in the region. There were clear 
benefits to be gained from such a change in relations. However, there were also unanticipated 
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consequences.397 Tunisian products of poor quality were brought into the Libyan economy. 
According to Ali al-Thawadi, the opening of the borders had a negative impact on the 
reputation of goods manufactured in Tunisia. As a result, the Chamber of Trade and 
Commerce and the Economic Ministry, and the customs service in Tunisia, intervened in an 
attempt to rehabilitate the reputation of Tunisian-made goods and Tunisian trade in general, 
and to protect long-term trading interests.398  
Effectiveness of the National Treatment Principle 
Better organisation of Libyan-Tunisian relations is believed to have emerged due to a number 
of joint agreements that were signed in the early 1990s.399 The regimes in both nations saw an 
advantage in the formalisation of the informal activities that were seemingly beyond their 
control. Centralisation aimed to introduce new regulations and procedures for cross-border 
trade. Improvement in the relations between Tunisia and Libya, according to the government 
official in charge of Libyan-Tunisian economic co-operation, was mainly a result of the 
implementation of the 'National Treatment Principle'.400 The Free-Trade Area agreement, 
signed in 2001, that came into force in the following year, only stipulated the free movement 
of goods, without the imposition of any customs duties. However, the official recognition of 
the free movement of people was not made. Instead, Libyan and Tunisian products were to be 
exempted from taxes and customs duties when crossing the border, according to this 
principle.401 Foreign and domestic goods were to receive identical treatment. In the first 
decade of the 21st century, economic ties between Tunisia and Libya developed considerably. 
The value of trade for Tunisia had increased from 1.455 billion Tunisian Dinars (TND) in 
2008 to 1.876 billion (TND) in 2009. Libya's exports to Tunisia were about 755 million TND 
of this total. Further, Tunisia's export value was 1.112 billion TND and reached 2.504 billion 
TND in 2010.402 While Tunisian exports contained a diversity of products, such as vegetable 
oil, milk and dairy products, tomato paste, tissue papers, construction materials, spare parts, 
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fertilisers, vegetables and packaging materials, exported by 1200 Tunisian companies,403 
Libyan exports were limited to petroleum-based products, sulphur, iron and steel.404 
 
Bilateral relations were intended to achieve certain goals. Government officials involved in 
this process, who were interviewed, articulated two objectives behind the free exchange of 
goods taking place between Tunisia and Libya. Short-term development of trade was the first 
important step towards better economic relations. As Libya became Tunisia's main Arab 
economic partner and occupied fifth position, following Germany, Italy, France and Spain, 
Tunisia also became its neighbour's fifth-ranked trading nation.405 Interdependence based on 
joint Libyan-Tunisian companies located on either side of the border, with export markets in 
the region and across the world, was a long-term aim.406 In recent years, a gradual realisation 
of this idea has led to the establishment of oil-based product factories in Libya and food 
factories in Tunisia that are owned by businessmen of both nationalities. These factors are a 
manifestation of the trend towards joint Libyan-Tunisian collaboration involving a large role 
for private enterprise.407 The pragmatic interest in lowering the barriers for mutual economic 
growth appears to be driving this co-operation across various levels of the societies of Tunisia 
and Libya. Aggressive ideological claims for Arab unity do not characterise these relations. 
Instead, the policy of Ben Ali, which aimed to direct Libya's vast oil wealth into his country's 
economy, was complemented by Gaddafi’s need for a nearby market for imports and exports. 
International sanctions, which I will examine later in this chapter, forced the Libyan regime 
to foster closer economic and political links in the Maghreb. 
 
A contrary position was expressed by another group of officials who have a conservative 
view on the free trade agreements. Two senior figures from Libya believed these agreements 
were not to the advantage of their nation. There was thus an urgent need for revision, singling 
out the consequences of the National Treatment Principle.408 Two reasons were cited. The 
first revolved around the fact that a number of Tunisian products competed against their local 
counterparts. This was a violation of the policy of protection being given to Libyan goods. As 
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a result, these goods would eventually disappear, due to the price and quality of Tunisian 
products.409 Further, the list of banned or restricted imports,410 intended to protect local 
products, did not concern Tunisian imports, as the latter were granted exemptions in regard to 
their export into Libya.411  
 
Formal exemptions through the General Secretary of the General People's Committees 
Decision No. 242 were issued in April, 2007, which removed customs service charges, 
normally 10% of an imported product's invoice. Up to 28 products from Tunisia were 
exempted.412 Another decision in 2007 determined an 18% upper limit for consumption taxes 
on Tunisian products, while imports from other countries reached 100%. The privileges 
enjoyed thus allowed Tunisian products to acquire a competitive edge in the Libyan 
economy.413 The second reason directly relates to the belief that Libya drew virtually no 
benefits from the free trade agreement. Libyan exports were mainly oil-based products from 
government-owned industries, which did not require exemption from customs duties, since 
they were regulated by the global market. 90% of Libya's exports to Tunisia were thus these 
oil-based products. Whereas Libya did not face any difficulties in finding export markets for 
these products, products from Tunisia suffered from this type of predicament.414  
 
A former Director of the Department of International Co-operation in the Libyan Economic 
Ministry perceived the implementation of the National Treatment Principle to be mainly in 
Tunisia's favour. A positive trade balance existed for Tunisia. Further, the economic policy of 
the Tunisian government sought to benefit from exemptions from import taxes and customs 
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duties in order to maintain a trade balance that was slanted in its favour.415 Tunisian imports 
experienced a fall from 754.2 million TND in 2009 to 406.3 million TND in 2010. Petroleum 
imports from Libya were reduced, with Tunisia diversifying its oil sources from other 
countries.416 A fear was entertained by Tunisia that there could be an interruption of much 
needed oil supplies, similar to the one later experienced during the Libyan revolution, when 
petroleum production effectively came to an abrupt end.417 A different view was expressed by 
a very senior government official involved in international co-operation that Tunisia's policy 
was directed at maintaining an advantage in the Libyan-Tunisian trade balance after Libya 
had rejected a suggestion of setting a preferential oil price for it. Libyan unwillingness to 
agree to this suggestion was that oil prices were regulated by the world market.418 Limits to 
the relations between Libya and Tunisia seem to have been present. Economic co-operation 
was largely dependent on the perceived interests of the nation and the political elite with both 
usually being interchangeable. 
The Tunisian-Libyan Economic Chamber 
The formalisation of trading ties between Tunisia and Libya can be seen in the formation of 
the Libyan-Tunisian Economic Chamber.419 This organisation sought to promote bilateral 
relations between the two Maghrebi countries through the expansion of economic 
opportunities for their companies. Co-ordination of activities in the present will guarantee the 
establishment of a complementary relationship paving the way for future integration.420 The 
former Libyan President of the Chamber recounts its successes thus far in several areas.421 
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The issuing of certificates of origin422falls within its remit. Certificates created by the 
Tunisian Union of Industry and Commerce and the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and 
Agriculture, for products from Tunisia and Libya, respectively, are subject to official 
approval through this mechanism. These certificates were to be ratified by the Libyan-
Tunisian Economic Chamber. The Protocol on the Rules of Origin423 stipulated the power of 
the national business chamber to approve these certificates, with a minimum integration rate 
of 40%.424 Local production processes and elements were thus required to contribute almost 
half to the finished products in order to be considered 'national' in origin and to qualify for an 
exemption. 
 
Pressure from the private sector and the national organisations which represent them 
preceded the Tunisian and Libyan authorities' recognition of the need to develop bilateral 
relations.425 A former President noted that the chamber was awarded perpetual membership 
in the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee due to its positive impact in developing 
co-operation between these two states. It has been able to contribute to the decision-making 
processes on important issues.426 Mutual recognition of a certificate of conformity to 
specifications, issued by either of the trading nations, suggested by the Chamber, became 
official policy.427 Formal acceptance of this rule was agreed in 2001.428 Imported products 
would no longer be subject to further examination after crossing the border. Exports and 
imports of goods between Tunisia and Libya accelerated as a result.  
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More extensive formalisation of the new stage of economic co-operation was underway. 
Accreditation of organisations in the area of issuing certificates of conformity led to Libyan 
recognition of this authority, based on the stated specifications for products by Tunisian 
institutions.429 These institutions were the National Institute for Standardisation and Industrial 
Property, the Tunisian Trade Office and the Ministry of Agriculture. Tunisia also awarded 
this power to issue certificates to the Libyan National Centre for Standardisation and 
Metrology, which was tasked with regulating all types of Libyan goods exported to 
Tunisia.430 A wide variety of products, particularly in the case of Tunisian agencies, were 
subjected to official intervention. Previously informal economic flows between Tunisia and 
Libya were transformed into formally defined trading transactions under the watchful eye of 
government officials or state-related organisations.  
 
Conflict mediation also fell within the sphere of the activities of the Chamber. Disputes 
between businessmen from Tunisia and Libya were to be managed through the resources of 
this joint organisation. Insurance and direct assistance in formulating resolutions are two 
examples of the available measures to deal with conflicts.431 Mohamed al-Reaid, Libyan 
President of the Chamber, supports this idea. Confidence in a secure environment in which to 
conduct business was created by the Chamber's existence and its activities. Several Libyan-
Tunisian companies were subsequently founded, with over 40 joint investment projects in the 
Libyan private sector.432  
 
Another explanation is offered by the former Libyan Chairman of the General Secretariat in 
the High Executive Committee for the emergence of Libyan-Tunisian companies. Despite the 
Chamber's achievements in creating a common ground for commercial interests, new laws in 
Libya that rolled back the ban against the private ownership of companies in the mid-1990s 
were the main factor.433 Libya's law for foreign investment sent a message of reassurance to 
businessmen in Tunisia encouraging them to invest in the nearby country. Previous laws 
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restricting the scope and nature of commercial transactions had discouraged Tunisian 
businesses.434  
 
In a report by the Chamber, radical changes to Libya's legal system are acknowledged to have 
stimulated Libyan-Tunisian economic relations: 
The commencement and persistence of economic reforms, and the gradual 
orientation towards a market economy through laws that Libya passed, led to the 
emergence of a Libyan effective private sector. The Tunisian-Libyan Economic 
Chamber therefore sought to make known those laws, especially the ones 
concerning foreign investment.435 
 
The Chamber appears to be committed to propagating the awareness that a new legal 
environment now existed. Foreign direct investment by Tunisia in Libya was a primary 
objective in the overall attempt to create and strengthen the private sector. A market economy 
protected by the law demonstrates a substantial transformation in the thinking of the Gaddafi 
regime towards the end of the 20th century. Socialism and Arabism no longer determined the 
project of political or economic integration. Instead, the economic trade between Tunisia and 
Libya was to be based on an opening up of both their economies through an alliance between 
the regime, composed of mainly family members, and an emerging private sector connected 
to international flows of capital.  
 
Active encouragement of joint projects was a major aspect of the Chamber's responsibilities. 
It was charged with fostering closer links between Tunisian and Libyan businesses. The 
creation of a shared interest in such a formal setting aimed to bring together previously weak 
or informal economic ties. An official in the Chamber stated that the collaboration of the 
Chambers of Commerce in both countries, together with other social organisations, was the 
right approach to pursue joint interests. Consideration of these interests by those directly 
involved in decision-making processes could avert a repeat of the expulsion of 30,000 
Tunisian workers from Libya in 1985.436 
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The above mentioned achievements of the Chamber have not provoked praise in some 
quarters. They are not believed to have met the expectations of the private sector as 
represented by the Chamber. No genuine integration of the interests of Tunisian and Libyan 
businesses took place. Instead, the activities of the Chamber have only led to an increase in 
the rate of trade between them.437 An official in charge of economic co-operation in Tunisia's 
embassy in Libya stated that: 
 
The shared interests required to move relationships at the level of the private 
sector from a matter of mere commercial exchanges to a real strategic partnership 
which guarantees entry to new markets, such as the African ones, after reaching 
self-sufficiency for both the Tunisian and Libyan Co-operation markets. The Joint 
Chamber did not propose to achieve this particular goal.438 
 
He identified an obvious weakness in the Chamber's explicit objectives. A higher level of co-
ordination, in the form of a genuine partnership, was needed between the private sectors of 
Tunisian and Libya. Co-operation leading to the maximising of economic opportunities in 
Libyan-Tunisian relations should then focus on opening up new markets. The official cited 
the economies in Africa as an example of the potential for the outward expansion of a 
deepening integration between Tunisia and Libya. However, the Chamber did not adopt a 
policy of joint commercial ties focusing on the creation of new overseas markets. A 
perception of short sightedness appears to have been an issue for the Chamber in its exclusive 
emphasis on the domestic economies of the two Maghrebi countries.  
 
The Chamber was merely one organisation of many which were charged with the 
responsibility to achieve an interdependence of interests. According to the Director of the 
Tunisian Department of Economic and Commercial Co-operation, interdependence could 
only occur if states and their agencies took action to create the conditions needed for it.439 
Amendment and facilitation of existing procedures, which impeded this goal, could work 
towards such a mutually beneficial situation. Liberalisation of industry, commerce and 
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agricultural activities was to be accompanied by an economic reform of services440 in Libya 
and Tunisia.441 Further obstacles existed to the freedom of business enterprises. The Tunisian 
Commercial Attaché in Libya noted the adoption of laws allowing only nationals to run 
businesses and services in the country. Such a position was a clear infringement of the Four 
Freedoms Agreement, in the areas of employment, ownership, residence and movement, 
which was intended to be the highest level of economic liberalisation to take place between 
Tunisia and Libya. Greater efforts should have been focused on the actual implementation of 
the clauses of the agreement.442 Greater trading ties would be created through allowing 
citizens of both countries to work, conduct business, live and travel without any restrictions.  
 
Seminars, exhibitions and meetings have been organised by the Chamber for investors from 
both countries in order to increase awareness of the investment possibilities in the private 
sector. However, the results of these actions were limited, with no noticeable impact on the 
volume of investments, which were limited to allowing commercial activities to be carried 
out by Tunisian and Libyan institutions.443 
 
Twinning agreements between the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, signed by seven out 
of eight Tunisian Chambers with their Libyan counterparts, achieved nothing. A former 
Director of the Libyan Chamber of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce observed, 
 
The twinning agreement, which was signed between most of the Tunisian 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, in a number of Tunisian cities, and their 
Libyan counterparts, did not culminate in real partnership between them. This 
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accounts for not organising forums and exhibitions on a regular basis. These co-
operation agreements have remained in the form of slogans and political bids.444 
 
Extensive efforts to formalise economic relations between national organisations in Tunisia 
and Libya indicate their importance. However, there was an absence of results in the creation 
of substantial partnerships between Tunisian and Libyan businesses. Rhetoric about co-
operation was not followed by action. Participation of these individual chambers and their 
representative institutions in trade fairs was limited.445 An official at the Tunisian Ministry of 
Commerce agreed with this assessment. The visible absence of the Chambers was 
compounded by the low number of fairs organised by government agencies. No real efforts 
were made to hold or support joint Libyan-Tunisian trade fairs. Broader attention, beyond 
international fairs hosted in Libya and Tunisia, should include initiatives exclusively for 
Tunisian and Libyan companies.446 The Tripoli International Fair is an example of exclusive 
Tunisian participation. However, there were no fairs for companies held in Tunisia or Libya. 
An opportunity existed for the Tunisian-Libyan Economic Chamber to run and supervise 
greatly needed trade fairs supported by the Tunisian and Libyan governments. It seems that 
attempts at formalisation were obstructed to some extent by the authoritarian nature of the 
regimes in the Maghreb. Power was exercised through informal ties of family or business 
acquaintances, where personal views could decisively shape the direction of inter-state 
policies. A lack of interest or knowledge on the part of Ben Ali or Gaddafi in the actual 
details of Libyan-Tunisian relations may thus explain why there was a lack of joint action 
based on trade fairs, or the opening up of new markets in Africa. 
Infrastructure and Joint Strategic Mega-Projects 
Domestic changes are closely linked to the emergence of strong inter-state ties in the 
economy. The public sector in Libya and Tunisia aims to realise two key goals. Firstly, the 
creation of a durable infrastructure would be able to accommodate a high density of trade. 
Secondly, strategic projects of mutual co-operation, to be carried out primarily by the public 
sector, with the required expertise and large capital expenditure. Consequently, a suitable 
climate for investment would be created for the development of economic co-operation. A 
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change in Tunisia's ruling elite in 1987 also brought a new political desire for economic 
integration. A number of agreements were signed for the implementation of joint projects 
aiming to develop national infrastructures and projects of integration.447 In the latter area, 
Tunisia and Libya co-operated on the Sfax-Tripoli Highway, the Electricity Linkage Project, 
the Unified Customs Port Project and the Skhira Petroleum Refinery Project. 
 
These projects, according to the former Commercial Attaché at the Tunisian Embassy in 
Libya, were motivated by the desire to develop infrastructures appropriate for the remarkable 
development in trade exchange between Libya and Tunisia. However, the situation appears 
completely at odds with this desire, as demonstrated by the lack of railways for the efficient 
and speedy transport of passengers and goods, and the complete lack of maritime links 
between the ports of both countries. The overland route used for the transportation of most of 
the goods in the cross-border trade, as well as for passengers, is not fit for the existing 
volume of traffic and has not been renewed since the 1970s.448 
  
Projects of integration which have been agreed in meetings between Libyan-Tunisian 
committees, complemented by scientific studies, have suffered from complications 
surrounding their implementation. Various obstacles have emerged in this push towards 
deepening economic co-operation. The electricity linkage project experienced technical 
complications in the process of its implementation. An integrated electricity grid between 
Tunisia and Libya was not eventually achieved. No technical conditions existed between the 
Tunisian and Libyan networks. Co-operation was thus limited to exchanging some of the 
power in areas close to the border.449 
 
Adequate amounts of money were not allocated from the general budgets of both countries to 
carry out some of the projects. Bilateral relations were highlighted as being the main reason 
why the neighbouring governments, especially Libya, did not commit to the schedules set for 
accomplishing mega-projects.450 The Sfax-Tripoli Highway is one such example, where 
Tunisia completed over 60% of its share and Libyan companies failed to complete more than 
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10% of theirs, due to the failure to receive payment.451 A more optimistic position was 
outlined by Karim al-Wlaherani as, while acknowledging the slow rate of completion of these 
projects, other projects were finished on time. The Omar al-Mukhtar Residential City was 
built by Libya and Tunisia, with houses distributed to Tunisian beneficiaries.452 Political 
would appear to be a determining factor in the signing of agreements and the completion of 
projects for integration. However, the weak state of the national infrastructure in Libya, 
compared to that in Tunisia, may explain the failure of the former to keep up with its 
neighbour. Although the Ben Ali regime was authoritarian, the principal focus of the 
Tunisian economy on tourism demanded an infrastructure that was able to cater for foreign 
tourists from Europe and other regions, which will be discussed in a later section. The Libyan 
regime eroded the state, with the result that the financial and natural resources were shifted 
into the hands of a small elite, made up of Gaddafi's relatives and cronies. No real incentive 
for a national infrastructure existed. Interestingly, the prospect of economic gain from 
bilateral relations created a context where regime-led infrastructure schemes could occur in 
order to reinforce the regime’s power.  
 
The Role of the Private Sector 
Tunisia's free market reforms have enabled the private sector to play an increasing role in the 
economy. Small and medium sized businesses, characterised by factories, projects and 
companies, have emerged as important players in the production and export processes.453 An 
industrial economy, initiated under Bourguiba's disorganised modernising reforms, gave 
Tunisia a skilled workforce in the manufacturing sectors of the economy. Two organisations 
were founded based on the objective of the development of the Tunisian economy. The 
Industry Promotion Agency454 and its policies have aided the development of the 
manufacturing industries. Overseas markets were to be targeted by the activities of the Export 
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Promotion Centre455, to help factories and companies. Representatives were sent abroad to 
seek new markets for Tunisian products.456 
 
Libya's private sector had no real presence from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s. Socialist-
inspired policies had outlawed the private ownership of factories and companies that were in 
opposition to the principles of social justice and equality.457 Despite the weakness and the 
rampant corruption within the public sector, it dominated all aspects of the economy.458 
International changes had created the conditions for a shift in ideology and policy in Libya 
and other countries. By the beginning of the 1990s, the USSR had collapsed. Communism's 
champion, in the form of one of the world's two superpowers, proved to be incapable of 
keeping up with the capitalist West. Political failure was also a sign of ideological failure. 
State-owned industries for the benefit of the masses fell out of favour with regimes that were 
staunchly socialist. Authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, and throughout other regions, 
began to rethink their economic policies. In the Maghreb, the Algerian military regime had 
already tried to roll back the socialist policies of previous decades in the 1980s, and this had 
threatened its stability.  
 
Libya, under the tight control of the Gaddafi regime, abandoned the ideas implemented from 
The Green Book which condemned the evils of the private sector, and praised the virtues of 
industries owned by the masses. Private enterprises were no longer banned. However, the 
Libyan private sector was to have a limited role in such significant industries as petroleum 
processing, even after the 1990s. Continued control and monopoly in this industry by the 
regime appears to have echoed with Gaddafi's ideas.459 One could instead argue that the 
Libyan regime, composed of Gaddafi and those close to him including family and allies, 
recognised the intimate relationship between oil and political power. Liberalising the former 
would lead to losing the latter. Any temptation to privatise the oil sector would lead to either 
foreign ownership or local and independent control.  
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As a result of the increased space made for the Libyan private sector in the early 1990s, 
micro-enterprises and individual commercial activities became more prominent. Moves 
towards this particular type of economic activity were motivated by Libya's experience of 
socialism. The public sector was unable to organise the economy according to the effective 
redistribution of wealth, self-sufficiency and modernisation. Corruption plagued the 
bureaucracy that was charged with running the nationalised industries. Despite proactive state 
intervention to support government-owned companies, their activities led to bankruptcy. The 
General Company for Markets, tasked with importing and selling basic essentials, such as 
goods and clothing, was ruined as a result of incompetence and corruption.460 Nationalisation 
of private factories and the restrictions on private property had led to the disappearance of 
certain domestic products after 1977. Local production, under the public sector, failed to 
replace these products. Self-sufficiency was not realised. As a result, Libya was forced to 
start importing to satisfy demand in the economy. When such products were available, they 
were incapable of competing against their imported equivalents in regard to quality and 
price.461  
 
State-imposed restrictions on the private sector created a distinct Libyan economy. Socialism, 
reinterpreted by Gaddafi, replaced the commercial sector with public companies. No room 
was made for the private sector in either the domestic economy or in bilateral Libyan-
Tunisian relations. However, changes in Libya created the conditions for its re-emergence as 
a driving force in both areas. Increases in trade exchange point to the presence of businesses. 
A former senior Libyan official of the Tunisian-Libyan Chamber or Trade and Commerce 
noted, 
 
In the mid-1990s, the positive role of the private sector in the development of the 
economic and commercial relations between the two countries became more 
prominent. The reason was that Libya had enacted a set of laws, according to 
which individuals were permitted to own private companies and factories. The 
latter imported products they needed from the neighbouring countries, and Tunisia 
was among them.462 
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New legislation created the space for Libyan citizens to form their own businesses without 
breaking any laws. Prior socialist policies were discarded for a relative withdrawal of direct 
state intervention in some sectors of the economy. Individual entrepreneurship was finally 
allowed to exist and was recognised by the government to have a positive role in relations 
between Tunisia and Libya. Businesses began importing from the Maghrebi states, including 
Tunisia. Ali al-Thawadi similarly believed that the private sector could play a positive role in 
developing bilateral economic relations and trade exchanges after the Libyan regime's 
revoking of  The Green Book's prohibition of private business.463 Space was created for the 
private sector to make a substantial contribution to fulfilling of the shared interests of Libya 
and Tunisia. Trade exchange thus increased due to co-operation between businesses on both 
sides of the border.  
 
Mutual confidence was built between Tunisian and Libyan businessmen. Further, complex 
procedures imposed by foreign countries encouraged Libyans to prefer to deal with Tunisians 
in business.464 The lowering of trading barriers greatly facilitated a formal and informal 
environment that was favourable to the creation of durable ties. However, recent events 
would test these ties. Saeeda Hashisha, a Tunisian government official, highlighted the 
financial crisis which many Libyan businessmen faced as a result of the Libyan Revolution in 
2011, and due to the Security Council Resolutions of 1970 and 1973 that were imposed in the 
same period.465 These resolutions had decreed the freezing of Libyans’ bank accounts, 
thereby inducing a liquidity crisis within Libya’s market. Interestingly, Tunisians continued 
to export their products to war ravaged Libya, confident in the belief that the crisis would end 
and they would receive payments in the future.466 A Tunisian official, who was in charge of 
trade and commerce co-operation, echoed this sentiment, derived from documents and first-
hand experience with Tunisian exporters, that they had exported goods without yet receiving 
payments. Nonetheless, these same exporters were certain of the compensation of money 
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which demonstrates the confidence built during long-term bilateral relations.467 The context 
of a war appears not to have diminished the informal nature of the ties binding the business 
community across Libya and Tunisia. Cross-border trade can continue without the imagined 
sense or physical presence of state institutions. 
 
Low transportation costs between Tunisia and Libya and the quick delivery of imported 
goods contributed to the promotion of trade. Movements of factory products from Tunisia to 
Libya or in the opposition were much cheaper than those from other countries.468 Geography 
thus played an important role in making these two Maghrebi countries natural trading 
partners in the absence of ideological, political or personal rivalry between their regimes. A 
competitive advantage was enjoyed by Tunisian and Libyan products over their counterparts 
from other countries, due to customs duty exemptions after the signing of the free trade 
agreement and the implementation of the National Treatment Principle.469 Formal privileges 
that were agreed to through bilateral relations, aimed to work towards a single economic zone 
where the free movement of goods could take place.  
 
The International Embargo and the Implications for Economic Relations 
Following the Lockerbie disaster, international sanctions between 1992 and 2004 targeted 
Libya’s economy. The value of the Libyan Dinar fell in relation to other currencies. In the 
domestic sphere, overall social conditions deteriorated. High public debt, external under-
investment and increasing unemployment, led to social problems and a rising level of 
violence.470 Isolation on the world stage encouraged Libya to look to its immediate 
neighbourhood. The Maghreb's strategic importance appeared at centre stage. Libya's 
political leadership had a greater interest in developing economic relations with countries in 
its region, especially Tunisia.471 According to the Chancellor of the Tunisian Embassy in 
Libya:  
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Fortunately for Libya, the sanctions were levied on it at a time when it had good 
relationships with its neighbouring countries, in general, and with Tunisia, in 
particular. That is to say, those sanctions were imposed after the political relations 
had been improved, as a result of the political change which took place in Tunisia 
in 1987. We could not imagine the situation had those sanctions been levied 
during the period of political tension between Libya and its surrounding countries, 
especially with Tunisia during the rule of Habib Bourguiba, and with Egypt 
during the rule of Anwar al-Sadat. It was a period of mutual hostility.472 
 
Although the geopolitical context of Libya had changed in its favour with the absence of 
hostile leaders. International sanctions forced it to rely on nearby states for relief more than in 
previous years. Indeed, this would not have been possible if Bourguiba or Anwar al-Sadat 
were in power. The assassinated Egyptian President had once described Gaddafi using the 
unkind phrase ‘al-walad al-majnun’ (the crazy boy). Ronald Reagan, former President of the 
USA, called the Libya leader a 'mad dog' at the lowest point of bitter Libyan-American 
relations in the 1980s. At the end of the 1980s, Gaddafi's Arab neighbours were less hostile, 
while the USA continued to regard him as a menace to its interests and world peace. A new 
context emerged allowing Gaddafi to foster friendly links with Tunisia or Egypt to mitigate 
the negative effects of the sanctions which sought to stifle his regime.  
 
Improved political relations inevitably impacted on the economic ties between Tunisia and 
Libya. While Tunisian investors and exporters displayed a great interest in the Libyan 
market, Libyan merchants preferred Tunisian goods over those coming from other foreign 
countries. Tunisian products were considered to be the primary import option in light of their 
good reputation and competitive edge in the Libyan economy.473 International sanctions, for 
the former President of the Tunisian-Libyan Economic Chamber, forced Libyans to use 
Tunisian airports which soon led to the importation of products from the neighbouring 
country as a close alternative.474 
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al-Habib al-Homami argues that the effects of the 1992 sanctions on the development of 
bilateral economic co-operation between Tunisia and Libya were generally exaggerated. No 
prohibition on the entry of foreign goods or ships to Libya was imposed. Maritime traffic still 
continued. Libyan traders were not prevented from travelling or dealing with global 
companies. Money exchanges between Libyan and international banks, including those in the 
USA, persisted.475 The blockade against Libya mainly targeted the regime through preventing 
Libyan government officials from travelling. In the economic sphere, air traffic from and to 
Libya was banned, as well as the selling of spare parts which could be used in the petroleum 
industry.476 
 
The indirect effects of sanctions were noted by the former Libyan President of the Executive 
Secretariat at the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee. Although these effects were 
positive, they were considered secondary in value. Instead, the integration-oriented policies 
of both regimes were instrumental in developing bilateral economic relations. Abandonment 
of state-ideologies, accompanied by other internal and external factors, such as the 
international embargo on Libya, sustained this development.477 A former Libyan Minister of 
the Economy also argued that the emphasis on improving commercial relations as a first step 
towards economic integration was a primary factor.478  
 
These interviewees also indicated that the Libyan regime found an opportunity, due to the 
new context created by sanctions, to pursue short-term economic projects and infrastructures. 
Spending on military armaments was one example based on the goal of guaranteeing Libya's 
military superiority in the region and for the support of rebel movements on the African 
continent.479 Petroleum revenues were stored as cash reserves for instances of emergency, 
such as the imposing of new sanctions by the UN or the West, namely the USA, Britain and 
France.480 
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Nour-Eddin al-Alawi argued the austerity experienced by Libya was deliberately produced by 
Gaddafi. He wanted to present to Libyans an image of himself as being besieged by the West. 
Several slogans were raised, such as “Life on bread and water alone”, that aimed to justify the 
absence of genuine plans in Libya.481 A former Libyan Economy Minister agrees with this 
view that: 
Decreasing the public expenditure and making no plans for development represent 
the policies which the Libyan ruling system had adopted, even before the 
international embargo. We still have recollections of the austerity which the 
country underwent in the 1980s, and which Libyan citizens called “The Lean 
Years”, because they had suffered significant shortages in staple goods. This was 
despite the fact that the country had not undergone a blockade.482 
 
Economic crises were already present during the 1980s prior to the sanctions. Previous 
socialist policies did not have the desired effect of development. The opposite had actually 
happened, with the Libyan economy suffering a shortage of essential goods due to an ill-
informed development plan and rampant corruption in the public sector, which took over the 
functions of private enterprise. Dwindling public expenditure indicated that the state was 
unable to pay for the ambitious projects conceived by Gaddafi in The Green Book and in his 
speeches.  
 
A different point of view was also expressed by officials and experts who were interviewed 
on the subject of the impact of international sanctions on Libya. These sanctions were very 
important in encouraging the development of economic relations between Tunisia and Libya. 
A marked increase in the volume of trading exchanges is cited as the strongest piece of 
evidence to support this position. Libyan businessmen were forced to rely more and more on 
Tunisian ports to import goods from abroad during the blockade. These ports acquired a 
crucial role in the absence of similar facilities in Libya. I mentioned earlier the inability of the 
public sector to function effectively, which also impacted on the administration and services 
present in Libyan ports. No government plans were made to develop the transport facilities 
on the country's coastline. A complicated process for goods arriving in Libya was subject to 
their storage for very long periods of time before coming into the possession of Libyan 
                                                 
481Author's Interview with with Nour-Eddin al-Alawi, the Tunisian thinker and University Professor of 
Sociology. (Tunis, Tunisia, 2012). Op cit. 
482Author’s Interview 'anonymous', the former Libyan Minister of the Economy. Op cit 
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importers. Instead, Tunisian ports were used to import overseas goods for the Libyan 
economy.483 
 
The high quality nature of Tunisian products gave them a competitive dimension in the 
Libyan economy over similar ones from other countries.484 Building materials were a large 
component of the increasing volume of trade between the two countries. Compliance with 
international standards and low costs for transportation, including their storage in Libya, 
stimulated a high demand for them. The storage depots are located in western Libya, which 
makes up 70% of the country's markets. Short distances between Tunisian ports and the 
factories of production, and Libyan storage depots, are additional factors enabling Tunisian 
goods to be delivered quickly and cheaply. Foreign goods are, in comparison, far more 
expensive. One challenge which presents itself is the need for the purchasing of a large 
quantity of a product, e.g., a full vessel load.485 Purchases of cement from Italy or Greece 
require the transportation of supplies using large ships, whose full load could reach 13,000 to 
25,000 tons. Small and medium-sized businesses in the building materials sector are unable 
to afford to make such purchases, and this is accompanied by the challenges of storage 
according to long-term storage standards. However, Libyan merchants could turn to the more 
accessible Tunisian economy for cheaper products in smaller quantities, using import land 
routes.486  
Unpredictability and Differences in Regulations 
National rules and regulations can be an obstacle to trade across countries. Smooth economic 
co-operation between states depends on enabling foreign companies to carry out their 
activities without bureaucratic red tape. Further, a harmonisation of rules can help in this 
area. Economic integration, in the medium and long terms, becomes a possibility when a 
standardisation of regulations is introduced. From the mid-1990s, Tunisia and Libya have 
begun such a process, with the formation of a joint committee for this purpose. However, the 
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drive towards the standardisation or harmonisation of regulations has not been realised.487 
The former Tunisian Commercial Attaché in Libya attributes this failure to the fact that: 
 
Despite the existence of a committee which specialises in long-term planning for 
the future of the relationships, and that attempts to standardise the rules and 
regulations, neither was a Bill introduced, nor was real action shown by official 
authorities who were in charge of bilateral relations. It was not possible to 
standardise rules which are based on the two conflicting ideological perspectives 
that are held by the two countries. The Libyan laws were based on the socialist 
economic system, which believed in the monopoly of the state overall economic 
activities. By contrast, the Tunisian laws were based on capitalism, which gives 
importance to the private sector in the country’s economic life.488 
 
No political will appears to have been present to implement a mutual process of 
harmonisation. As a result, there was a lack of legislation on the issue. A major challenge to 
integration appears to have emerged from the different ideologies espoused by the regimes in 
Tripoli and Tunis. Socialist Libya was at odds with capitalist Tunisia in the area of law. The 
gulf between the two different legal systems was not easily bridged. Indeed, there were 
efforts, especially in the formal spheres of politics and the economy, to reduce the continued 
influence of state-sponsored ideologies. Libya's difficulties can be located in the weakness of 
the state, with the Gaddafi regime in control mainly through an informal network of alliances 
among clans, tribes and businessmen. Socialism in Libya was simply the transfer of the 
country's resources to this network of individuals and groups, with Gaddafi at its head.  
 
The former President of the Co-operation department at the Libyan Foreign Ministry noted 
that a wide gulf separated the content of official meetings and the situation on the ground. 
Political will to initiate change was missing. Proposals for rules were suggested by officials 
and ministers. The national regulations for Libya and Tunisia continued to differ in a 
situation where Libyan rules only concerned Libyans, and Tunisian rules for Tunisians.489 
The expectations of importers and exporters in both countries of the joint customs directory 
were not met, according to the Director of the Ras Ajdir Customs Centre. Although it 
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stipulated their rights and duties, including the documents needed for the customs clearance 
procedures, differences remained in these rights and duties in Tunisia and Libya.490 Two 
sectors of the economy were badly affected due to the stark differences in national 
regulations. Tourism and banking did suffer from the lack of harmonisation undertaken by 
both the regimes and the government agencies that were concerned with the economy.  
Tourism and Unpredictability 
Tourism is a sector with potential cross-border growth. In recent decades, political instability 
has discouraged tourists from visiting. However, Tunisia has developed a state-backed tourist 
sector since the 1960s. Heavy investment in an infrastructure that is able to cater to foreign 
visitors in the country was initiated.491 Bourguiba's reign did not neglect this area of the 
economy. Tunisia's heritage was marketed to the West with successful results. A similar 
policy was pursued by Ben Ali in the years after Bourguiba fell from power. Authoritarian 
rules stifled opposition politics in an attempt to make Tunisia a stable society. Dissenting 
voices were either exiled or imprisoned, e.g., the members of the Islamist Renaissance 
Movements. Libya, under Gaddafi, acquired the reputation of being a pariah state. The 
country's tourist sector suffered as a result. The removal of sanctions in 2004 started a 
process of diplomatic acceptance of Libya on the world stage. An overall growth in tourism 
in the Maghreb also saw Libya's tourist sector grow by 8.4% in 2007.492  
 
State-sponsored infrastructure development, complemented by private enterprise in the 
region, continued in the first decade of the 20th century. Cross-border tourism received 
attention from governments in Tunisia and Libya. A series of agreements between the 
ministries of tourism in these two countries aimed to encourage tourist exchanges and 
eliminate all barriers. Tourist offices were subsequently opened and their responsibilities 
were the facilitation of participation in tourism exhibitions, the exchange of experts in this 
sector and lending of Tunisian expertise to the service of the Libyan tourist sector. The 
opposite effect had occurred. According to the Director of the International Co-operation 
Department at the Tunisian Tourist Ministry, officials and investors were obstructed from 
                                                 
490 Author’s Interview with al-Taher Futaisi, the Director of the Ras Al- Gader border crossing between Libya 
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implementing the agreements made due to a difference in, and clash of, domestic laws.493 The 
agreed creation of a tourist-cultural desert route, stretching from the south of Tunisia to the 
south of Libya, faced a major obstacle. Foreign tourists from outside the Maghreb needed 
visas, in compliance with the principle of Reciprocal Treatment, as European countries 
required a visa from Libyan nationals. In Tunisia, in light of the fact that tourism is one of the 
main sources of national income, overseas visitors could enter without a visa.494  
 
Political circumstances in Libya appear to have led to unstable results in the tourist industry. 
The Tunisian tourism representative in Libya pointed to the unpredictable application of its 
entry rules.495 Libya's President of the Libyan-Tunisian Sectoral Committee on Tourism 
shared this opinion. The unpredictability of the regulations was a major impediment to cross-
border tourist development at this stage.496 Libyan efforts to improve relations with France 
led to the cancellation of the visa requirement for French tourists. Trips to both Libya and 
Tunisia in organised tours could occur without the hindrance of needing to obtain entry 
documents. Libya soon, however, revoked this agreement without notice, to the shock of 
tourist operators organising flights from France to Libya. As a result, French tourists were 
prevented from entering Libya, and their planes were instead forced to arrive at Djerba 
International Airport in Tunisia.497 
 
An overnight reversal of rules governing entry requirements severely damaged the reputation 
of Libya's tourist companies. Political interference in the actual rules of the economy, 
supported by the security services, was clearly apparent. Bilateral relations and co-operation 
in tourism, in particular, received a heavy blow. In this respect, the former Director of the 
Department of Tourism Companies at the General People’s Committee for Tourism in Libya 
stated: 
Many of the companies which were licensed to work in the field of tourism and 
complementary activities are owned by Libyan Intelligence Agents, or by their 
collaborators. Among the conditions to meet in order to have the right to work in 
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tourism was the need to gain approval from some Libyan public administration 
organisations, including the Libyan Intelligence Agency.498 
 
The intrusion of the Libyan security services into tourism involved actual ownership of 
companies. Commercial interests and national security issues were intertwined. The security 
services appear to have had a prominent role in a growing sector in the economy, with the 
power to stifle it if deemed necessary. Surveillance also took place through the placing of 
intelligence agents as tourist guides or as drivers escorting foreign tourists on trips that were 
organised by security services’ owned companies.499 A key actor in Gaddafi's authoritarian 
regime was able to easily develop a commercial stake in the Libyan economy for financial 
profit and political control.  
Banking and Continuing Differences 
The banking sector in the Maghreb appears to be strongly influenced by national factors in a 
neo-liberal global context. The nationalisation of the banks in Libya after the coup d'état in 
1969, was primarily motivated by the elimination of the legacy of colonialism.500 Foreign 
control of this key sector of the economy was rejected. Gaddafi's socialism was also intensely 
anti-imperialist. The authoritarian practices adopted to modernise Libya contributed to an 
environment where private enterprise was legally banned. Tunisia's state played a leading 
role in the financial sector through the formation of a central bank and three developmental 
banks in the early years of Bourguiba's reign.501 The independence leader aimed to stimulate 
private enterprise through the financial muscle of the state. Libya's socialism was in direct 
contrast to Tunisia's capitalism in an extremely polarised global context. Important changes 
after the Cold War stimulated a change of policy within the regime. Towards the end of the 
20th century, the Tunisian financial sector continued to be largely controlled by the state, 
alongside recently privatised banks.502  
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Tripoli hosted a meeting in 1991 to discuss the establishment of a bank specifically for the 
Maghreb, which later became a reality in the form of the Maghreb Bank in 2010.503 A 
mixture of regimes with different ideologies was able to create a common financial institution 
dedicated to economic integration. This was followed by legal reforms in the banking sector 
by member-states such as Algeria, in 2003; Libya, in 2005; Morocco, in 2005, and Tunisia in 
2006, which aimed to strengthen their central banks.504 Bilateral relations were thus based on 
the establishment of departments which could provide financial support and advice to 
investors in Libyan banks in Tunisia, and the same was true for Tunisian banks in Libya. 
However, the development of banking services did not keep up with the growth of inter-state 
commercial trade.505 A former Governor of Libya's Central Bank observed that banks did not 
contribute to the standardisation of services and financial policies in the two countries when 
their trade exchange rose from 50 million TND in 1987, to 2.5 billion TND in 2010.506 
 
The harmonisation of rules by the Tunisian and Libyan central banks was not established. 
Mutual decision-making on fiscal and monetary policies, such as the unification of currencies 
or the use of national currencies between companies in the other country, did not take place. 
The preceding points could have contributed to the development of economic co-operation 
through a common ground of trade exchanges. Mechanisms for the transfer of money 
between companies, private or public, according to the Manager of the Commercial 
Department representing Tunisia in Libya, were not created by the two countries. The 
existence of specialised financial committees lacked actual implementation in this area, as 
they were only charged with studying and offering solutions to difficulties experienced in the 
banking sector.507 Numerous instances of the formalisation of bilateral relations between 
Tunisia and Libya indicate the ineffectiveness of such institutions in fostering economic 
integration. Their existence has not stimulated changes in the entrenched financial practices 
of two very different systems, with their own particular historical experiences. 
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Conclusion 
I have discussed various aspects of bilateral Libyan-Tunisian relations since 1987, in a 
changing political context. Ben Ali's regime undertook a remarkable reversal of official 
policy concerning its neighbour Libya. Political and economic links between the countries 
were a priority. Gaddafi reciprocated the moves towards greater co-operation, with a personal 
and public show of breaking down a Libyan-Tunisian border crossing in a tractor. His 
previous ideological positions seem to have been relegated to make way for good 
neighbourly associations that were based on mutual economic benefits. International 
sanctions appear to have influenced the Libyan regime to pursue better relations with 
bordering countries in order to bring relief to an economy that was badly hit by trading 
restrictions. Interestingly, a debate has emerged concerning whether these sanctions were a 
primary factor, or merely a secondary one, in initiating an improvement in bilateral ties. The 
black market had satisfied the bilateral economic relations of these two Maghrebi nations. In 
Libyan border towns, 'the Tunisian Souk' appeared when Gaddafi imposed a period of 
austerity in the 1980s. However, the formalisation of trading exchanges became an appealing 
prospect to both Tunisian and Libyan decision-makers.  
 
Private enterprise in Libya was, to an extent, revived after being illegal from the mid-1970s 
until the late 1980s. Although more freedom was granted to individuals to pursue economic 
activity in the Libyan economy, the lack of harmonisation of rules and procedures relating to 
commerce was an obstacle. Businessmen from both Tunisia and Libya had to experience two 
different legal systems in order to carry out cross-border trade. The National Treatment 
Principle and the Tunisian-Libyan Economic Chamber played a prominent role in fostering 
closer relations between the Tunisian and Libyan economies. Goods from both countries 
were to be treated equally, without the imposition of customs duties, thereby making them 
more competitive in relation to similar or identical goods from other countries. Nonetheless, 
the fairness of the National Treatment Principle was questioned in regard to its presumed 
negative impact on Libyan goods. Similarly, the belief in the mutual benefits to be generated 
from the existence of organisations that were dedicated to the promotion of bilateral relations, 
was not shared by all parties involved in improving bilateral relations. Fooad Abdel al-Karim, 
responsible for economic co-operation at the Tunisian embassy in Libya, had identified a 
glaring deficiency in the Tunisian-Libyan Economic Chamber's objectives. The Chamber did 
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not formulate a coherent strategy for the joint targeting of new markets while deepening the 
integration between Tunisia and Libya.  
 
In this chapter, other weaknesses were identified that indicate the arbitrary nature of the 
regimes in Tunis and Tripoli. The authoritarian structures which formulate and execute 
decisions were narrowly based on a political elite composed of family members and cronies. 
A lack of political will, or of interest in certain details of an agreement, may lead to the 
document being ignored. Further, a later dislike for a signed agreement between countries can 
also result in it being revoked without any prior warning, such as the exemption from the 
need for a visa for French tourists visiting Libya. The intrusion of the Libyan security 
services in key decision-making processes regarding the economy demonstrated the 
continuing authoritarian nature of the Gaddafi regime. Moreover, their presence was also 
seen in the ownership of tourist companies and in the surveillance of tourists. The 
unpredictability of Libyan-Tunisian relations in the economy was thus shaped by the political 
elite of both countries. Despite the shortfalls in the relations between Tunisia and Libya, 
much of which is related to the unfulfilled expectations of businessmen and government 
officials, the political context after 1987 created a new trend towards a substantial 
improvement in trading ties. A much larger volume of economic exchange was present under 
policies pursued by Ben Ali and Gaddafi, with an unprecedented degree of co-ordination 
between national organisations dedicated exclusively to trade and commerce. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND THE 
BINDING OF COMMERCIAL TIES 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter looked at how changes took place in inter-state relations between 
Tunisia and Libya. There were considerable efforts to co-operate, despite the existence of two 
very different histories, politics and economies in these neighbouring nations. Nonetheless, 
economic integration was a major objective for the regimes in Tunis and Tripoli. Chapter 6 
undertook a general overview of bilateral relations in a changing context, based on the 
information collected from interviews. A new period was ushered in after Zine El Abidine 
Ben Ali overthrew Habib Bourguiba in 1987, with the subsequent improvement in Libyan-
Tunisian ties which had previously been frozen since 1985. Various levels of co-operation 
were initiated between Libya and Tunisia that aimed to bring these two countries closer 
together. This chapter will examine how the formation of regional organisations coincided 
with an increased volume of cross-border trade between Tunisia and Libya. Investment in the 
two nations also became an area of joint activity. In the Maghreb, the bilateral relations 
between these two states stood as an example of the restoration of ties after decades of 
hostilities, complemented by economic co-operation. I will analyse official documents 
collected from state archives in order to establish the motivations behind the improvement in 
Libyan-Tunisian relations from 1987 until 2010. Further, I am interested in seeing to what 
extent the decline of ideology had an impact on this situation.  
 
I will carry out analysis of the official documents in five sections in this chapter. The first 
part examines the founding of regional organisations, such as the Arab Maghreb Union and 
the African Union. Libya and Tunisia were part of both organisations, but with different 
motivations driving their policies in the Maghreb and Africa. International sanctions had 
forced Libya to alleviate its political, diplomatic and economic isolation through the creation 
of closer links with Tunisia and other African countries. Tunisia's economy was based on 
foreign direct investment and the international flow of capital. Africa was home to potential 
and attractive export markets for its services and products. Tunisia and Libya co-operated in 
the Maghreb and Africa to achieve their mutual interests through joint organisations, such as 
the United Libyan-Tunisian Corporation.  
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The second part looks at joint commercial policies which involved tax exemptions on 
customs duties for Tunisian and Libyan goods. Free movement of capital and goods was 
pursued in both countries. Further, Libyan-Tunisian joint committees were established from 
the early 1990s in response to the increased volume of cross-border trade. The Maghreb 
Payment Agreement, signed in December 1991, was a demonstration of the improvement of 
bilateral relations in the context of the Maghreb and the attempt to formalise it. Institutions 
were founded for the exclusive function of co-ordinating bilateral relations.  
 
The third part focuses on the rise in the volume of joint commercial exchange between 
Tunisia and Libya. During the 1990s, Libya became Tunisia's main trading partner in the 
Arab world and its fifth globally. Laws were passed to formalise the economic ties between 
the countries, such as the Foreign Trade Company Law in Tunisia. A simple system of 
import-export was introduced, in an attempt to remove government-imposed customs duties 
to be paid when moving goods across the Libyan-Tunisian border. There was a marked 
increase in the volume of bilateral trade, from 1.5 billion Libyan Dinars in 2006, to 3 billion 
Libyan Dinars in 2009.508  
 
The fourth part continues the examination of the formalisation of trade relations between 
Tunisia and Libya. I examine the unsuccessful efforts to build a customs post in Ras Ajdir. 
Joint co-operation from the feasibility tests relating to the project to the signing of the 
agreement to its construction, demonstrated the potential for economic integration. However, 
setbacks to the project, due to Libya's failure to fulfil its end of the agreement, put the 
construction of the customs post to a stop. However, bilateral trade between the two nations 
still continued.  
 
The fifth part examines the drive to encourage economic co-operation through joint 
investments in both Libya and Tunisia. Government agencies, joint committees and 
businessmen worked together to explore the opportunities for investors. The Libyan regime 
perceived economic liberalisation in Tunisia to have been a success, and it sought to mimic 
its neighbour's economic model of development, with certain qualifications. Economic 
integration between Libya and Tunisia would lead to these two states looking for potential 
export markets and investment opportunities in Africa.  
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Regional integration in the Arab Maghreb Union and the African Union 
Regional integration in the Arab world has evolved in the last few decades. During the 
middle of the 20th century, pan-Arabism, influencing Nasser and Gaddafi, was a central 
feature of ideological politics. Although recent changes have led to new forms of co-
operation among Arab states in focusing on specific regions or sub-regions, the idea of 
integration exerts a strong influence. States generally attempt to acquire a strategic economic 
partner on a bilateral, group or bloc basis.509 The previous expansionist impulse, expressed 
through revolutions and coup d'états, was replaced by a more gradual and friendly 
agreements. Libya and Tunisia are two countries which have benefitted from a seeming 
decline in the impact of ideology in the decision-making processes of their regimes. The 
promotion of economic, social and political co-operation is a key part of Libyan-Tunisian 
efforts. In the previous chapter, I mentioned the formation of the Maghreb Bank in 2010, 
after a meeting of finance ministers of the Maghreb had taken place almost twenty years 
previously.  
 
Interestingly, the Arab Maghreb Union, preceding the establishment of the regional bank, 
demonstrated a new and changing, reality with Tunisia and Libya pursuing an improvement 
in their bilateral ties in a number of areas. Throughout their joint co-operation, Tunisia and 
Libya tried to present themselves as a political model for other countries in the Maghreb.510 
Joint development projects were implemented that aimed not to conflict with the policies of 
other Arab states. Libya and Tunisia also attempted to make the Arab Maghreb Union into an 
effective organisation with a certain degree of influence on member states. There were efforts 
to resolve the longstanding dispute between Algeria and Morocco, which posed a major 
stumbling block to co-ordination within the union. Further, the Union's joint institutions were 
launched by Tunisia and Libya, seeking to boost inter-state co-operation.511 
 
Various problems in the Arab world received the attention of Tunisia and Libya in co-
ordination with each other. Iraq's invasion and the occupation of Iraq, after the end of the 
Cold War, posed a challenge to the Arab states. The Arab Summit was convened in Cairo to 
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discuss this matter, but Tunisia did not attend. Refusal to take part in the Summit was 
motivated by Tunisian objections to Egypt's rejection of the suggestion to postpone it, and the 
desire to pursue more diplomatic initiatives to find a peaceful resolution, through the Arab 
League, of the Iraqi-Kuwait conflict. The summit's decisions, not accepted by Tunisia, paved 
the way for the American led military coalition against Iraq. Morocco was the only country in 
the Maghreb which supported the decisions agreed upon in Cairo with Libya, Tunisia and 
other countries in the region involved in a diplomatic co-ordination against the push for Arab 
backing for an armed conflict against Saddam Hussein's Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. 
Additionally, there was a call for the lifting of international sanctions and the ending of 
military attacks on Iraq. The besieged country's nuclear facilities were to be subject to checks 
and regulations, according to international law. Libya's regime perceived that the latter issue 
was used by the West as a pretext to carry out the occupation of Iraq in 2003.512 The Arab 
Maghreb Union provided Libya with a forum to influence its neighbours, especially Tunisia, 
to form a united front on issues considered to be important. Tunisia's presence within the 
union could thus be counted as a source of political support at a time when Libya's isolation 
on the world stage was yet to end.  
 
A shift towards other forms of collective organisations composed of like-minded states is 
evident in the Maghreb towards the end of the 20th century. Politics and economics were 
pivotal factors in identifying shared interests and the means to pursue them. The Arab 
Maghreb Union was only a manifestation of greater co-operation between Tunisia and Libya, 
on the one hand, and other states, on the other hand. In Africa, the possibilities for furthering 
the interests of the countries in the Maghreb become a reality with the formation of the 
African Union in 2001.513 One can argue that Libya saw the African Union as an alternative 
to the doomed and short-lived unions with Arab states, which had been based on a shared 
ideology, in the past. The Economic Community of the West African States514 and the 
Economic Community of Central African States515 are expressions of a broader trend towards 
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regionalism in the African continent. Such organisations, founded for the purpose of 
economic co-operation, have been unable to impact on the global capitalist system. Member 
states are mainly poor developing countries which also lack domestic stability in their politics 
and economies. Unfavourable conditions have caused the failure of economic unions to 
increase the volume of inter-state and world trade for their members. However, regional and 
transcontinental unions in Africa continue to play an important role in security issues.516 
Perceptions in Libya of Africa's position revolve around the political engagement through 
conflict mediation in a continent experiencing civil wars, tribal clashes and armed militias. 
 
Active participation by Tunisia and Libya in African regional groups can be understood as 
part of broader efforts in the continent as a whole. Although Tunisian relations with the 
European Union were a priority, the promotion of ties to African regional blocks and states 
was carried out through the development of joint institutions.517 The membership of Tunisia 
and Libya in the African Union and the Community of the Sahel-Saharan States, confirms the 
existence of a foreign policy that is not necessarily restricted to the Maghreb or Europe. 
Continent-wide engagement on various issues of concern included the resolution of civil wars 
and raging conflicts. The two Maghrebi countries appear to have had complementary foreign 
policies. Tunisian positions on the formation of the African Union and the Community of 
Sahel-Saharan States, echoed those of Libya. The Libyan regime took the lead in stressing the 
importance of African regional unions. Libyan-Tunisian relations also reflected the Ben Ali 
regime's policies and interests. Libya promoted a Tunisian conceived plan to establish a 
global funding scheme to support Africa.518 A restricted definition of Tunisian identity, 
examined in Chapter 5, now acknowledged the role of Islam and of Tunisia's place in the 
Arab world. The notion of the nation-state did not stop Ben Ali from pursuing greater co-
operation in the Maghreb, the Arab world and Africa.  
 
Cordial relations between the political elites of both nations were manifested in post-Cold 
War institutions, which no longer reflected the ideological rivalries of Arabism or socialism. 
The struggle for development was not understood to be based on revolutionary activities 
leading to regime change. Instead, foreign direct investment in the private sector, involving 
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an emerging class of commercial entrepreneurs backed by the ruling elite, was the solution to 
previous decades of underdevelopment and failed socialist policies. A foreign policy 
initiative from Tunisia, which received Libyan backing, was the hosting of an international 
conference to identify and formulate global policies that were intended to help Africa. 
Agreement of the existence of common interests in Africa, between Tunisia and Libya, was 
an essential move towards strengthening bilateral relations on issues outside the Maghreb. 
African markets were seen as potential export markets for the goods of these two states. 
There are thus a number of combined capital investment programmes in the continent. The 
United Libyan-Tunisian Corporation, which has played a leading role in this area, is 
considered to be a joint policy tool for the African goals of Libya and Tunisia.519 
 
Commercial Joint Policies 
Better political relations between Ben Ali and Gaddafi enabled a remarkable rise in 
commercial Libyan-Tunisian co-operation from the late 1980s and early 1990s. Combined 
efforts to overcome previous ideological and personal differences led to a friendly 
atmosphere in the Maghreb. The Maghreb Payment Agreement, signed by Algeria, Libya, 
Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia, on 12th December, 1991, was an expression of the trend 
towards co-ordinating the activities of the central banks of the Maghreb region. Mutually 
reinforcing policies were implemented that were favourable to cross-border trade. Many 
agreements were signed by Tripoli and Tunis on a wide range of commercial ties. New rules 
on customs duties for imported goods and import-export regulations aimed to facilitate a 
smooth expansion of trade exchange through the formalisation of bilateral relations. Produced 
and manufactured goods received tax exemptions, in order to encourage businesses from both 
countries to sell and buy from each other. Further, new policies were formulated to allow the 
free movement of capital and investment, with a 1973 agreement in this area renewed.520  
 
Since the early 1990s, Libyan-Tunisian joint committees have attempted to help small sized 
businesses to increase the trade volume between the nations. These committees produced a 
number of policies and measures that aimed to raise the level of joint consultation among 
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specialised institutions that were present in their countries. Export centres and integrated 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry were also a crucial part.521 A set of means for the 
expansion of bilateral trade was to be adopted, as stipulated in the Co-operation Agreement 
signed on 30th July, 1996, between the Libyan Export and Import Bureau and the Tunisian 
Centre for Export Promotion. This was followed by the Mutual Management Agreement of 
27th November, 1997, tackling customs-related offences. Extensive formalisation of the trade 
taking place between Tunisia and Libya focused on enabling the flow of goods across borders 
and the empowerment of government agencies, or those affiliated to them, to implement and 
punish according to official policy. Exemptions from the submission of financial guarantees 
on goods imported into Tunisia by Libyan public corporations were granted. Additionally, 
transport trucks moving between Libya and Tunisia received an exemption from paying 
customs duties. Positive encouragement of a two way free movement of goods was the stated 
aim.522 
 
The strengthening of bilateral ties happened while UN imposed sanctions on Libya were 
gathering pace. As a result, Libya's capacity for growth was hurt. Tunisia was able to 
alleviate some of the negative effects of international political and economic isolation on 
Libyan society. Several economic concessions by the Libyans were granted to Tunisian 
imports, in light of the closer associations being made. Many formerly banned goods from 
Tunisia were permitted to enter the Libya economy. This measure was a result of the 
activities of the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee.523 Such an approach to the 
issue of cross-border trade, seeking to remove legal constraints on imports from Tunisia, can 
be perceived to be a compromise with the Libyan regime's official policy for the economic 
protection of Libyan goods. However, it can also be understood as a response to the 
deterioration of the economy in Libya in an unmanageable context. Indeed, the system of 
international sanctions had made itself felt by both the Libyan regime and the wider 
population. Libyan companies became incapable of supplying enough goods to meet local 
demand. High prices for raw materials and other problems in the production process, 
emerged. Further, Libya's national currency was devalued on the global market. Interestingly, 
Tunisia was able to benefit from the critical situation Libya was going through. Its financial 
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returns increased, thanks to the expansion of commercial deals between the two Maghrebi 
nations. Tunisian products, and imported foreign goods using ports in Tunisia, were part of 
the general trend towards closer economic ties.  
 
Decisions from the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee had a vital impact on the 
promotion of trading activities. An increase in co-ordination between the Chambers of 
Commerce and businessmen was agreed in the 13th round of the meetings of this committee. 
Private enterprises were to be encouraged in the two countries. Approval of several twinning 
agreements between economic and commercial organisations resulted from the policy of state 
backed stimulation of the private sector. The Chambers of Commerce which established 
twinning arrangements were Tripoli and Tunis, Benghazi and Bizerte, Misrata and Sfax, and 
Zawya and Sousse. Goods and services were able to flow in both directions without 
hindrance from restrictive rules on imports. Bilateral initiatives, such as the ones discussed 
above, created the impetus for Libyan and Tunisian businessmen to urge the decision-makers 
in their countries to consider enacting more legal and economic legislation to support cross-
border trading opportunities.524 Official acknowledgement of the commercial interests points 
to the top-down management of economic reform, which was nonetheless trying to make 
Tunisia and Libya more responsive to private capital.  
 
Joint plans were formulated, underpinned by the aim to expand commercial activities. A free 
trade zone was the subject of a 2001 agreement between Tunisia and Libya. The formation of 
joint projects without the imposition of customs duties and burdensome bureaucratic 
procedures, would allow the mutual and easy flow of goods and services.525 I will now quote 
a passage from the agreement to show its aims: 
 
The two parties will fully exempt all of the goods from customs and duties, 
similar to those applied in other countries. This includes all of the goods and 
products, as prescribed in Article Three of the Agreement.526 
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An atmosphere of free trade was the intended result, with the unhindered traffic of goods to 
and from Tunisia and Libya. Elimination of customs duties was a necessary step for 
economic integration. This agreement accepted that products made or manufactured in the 
neighbouring nations were to be regarded as national products in both territories, in line with 
the National Treatment Principle.527 At least 40% of the percentage of the value added to a 
product had to be from the national country in order to qualify for an exemption of customs 
duties. In contrast, they agreed to a percentage of 60% for products from other Arab Maghreb 
countries. Products would have to gain a certificate of origin528 from an authoritative body, 
such as the Chambers of Commerce and Quality Standards. Facilitation of the trade of goods 
between Tunisia and Libya according to the system based on the certificate of origin, implied 
a mutual recognition of the authority of the certificate-producing power of the other country's 
national organisations.529 There were also moves towards the unification of technical 
standards and laws, through the use of relevant information and packaging systems.  
 
Participation in regional and international exhibitions was an area of joint concern for Tunisia 
and Libya. The introduction of their national products to other potential economic parties was 
the key objective.530 Consequently, exhibitions were held in these two countries, 
accompanied by the plan to host more in other parts of the African continent.531 
Establishment of the Libyan-Tunisian Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry532 
was a direct result of the joint efforts of the Libyan Union of Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry and the Tunisian Union of Commerce and Industry. Development of economic 
activities in their countries was a goal of this federation, seeking to co-ordinate institutions 
devoted to commerce, and to work towards their future integration. The federation was 
charged with administrative tasks in support of economic co-operation between Libya and 
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Tunisia.533 Growing awareness of the common interests of Libya and Tunisia led to changes 
in the area of rules governing imports and exports. Bilateral economic co-operation through 
the formulation of joint policies was influenced by organisations formed exclusively for this 
purpose. A top-down approach that focused on the formalisation of trading exchanges 
appears not to have been subject to the ideology of the political elites of Libya and Tunisia. 
Other sectors of the economy experienced similar moves to shift economic co-operation from 
the informal sector to the formal sphere of joint projects. 
 
The Volume of Joint Commercial Transactions 
In the period prior to the 1990s, the trade exchange between Tunisia and Libya did not reflect 
the geographical proximity of the two nations, in comparison with other countries or 
regions.534 However, a relatively larger volume of commercial transactions prevailed after 
Ben Ali ousted Bourguiba in a bloodless coup. Gaddafi was fully aware of the potential of a 
transformation in Libyan-Tunisian relations in the political sphere, with widespread 
implications for his oil-based economy. As a result of a mutual building of confidence, Libya 
became Tunisia's chief Arab trading nation. And it is its fifth global partner, after France, 
Italy, Germany and Spain.535 Tunisian exports to Libya until 1993 appear not to have 
exceeded 3.4% of total Libyan imports. By 2003, however, it had increased to 51% of 
Tunisian exports to Arab countries. Imports from Libya reached a figure of 47% from 
countries of the Arab world.536 
 
The expansion of cross-border trade demonstrated in the previous import and export statistics 
can be attributed to the low cost of transportation between Libya and Tunisia. Simpler 
frameworks of rules, approved by Tunisia, seeking to encourage Libyan businessmen to 
invest, may also explain the rise in trade volume. The Foreign Trade Company Law is an 
example of the formalisation of bilateral relations targeting private capital from neighbouring 
Libya, by the state. It is estimated that 35% of Tunisian exports are from companies 
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registered under this law.537 In light of the aforementioned discussion, I argue that the general 
expansion of economic ties between Libya and Tunisia is a product of several interlinked 
policies. The removal of the regulations previously hindering bilateral trade activities was 
one such key policy. Further, the implementation of the Joint Economic Agreement in 2003, 
followed by other similar agreements in 2007, opened up opportunities for the rise in the 
trade volume. The policy of generating mutual benefits from economic co-operation appears 
to have relegated ideology, whether Arabism or socialism, from the calculations of inter-state 
relations by the political elites in Tripoli or Tunis. The previous personal rivalry, perhaps a 
product of ideology, too, was absent. Ben Ali and Gaddafi displayed a cordial relationship, 
based on the development of their countries through foreign direct investment and 
commercial exchange. The high volume of trade after the 1990s can thus be seen to 
demonstrate the decline of ideology in a context different from that of the period between 
1969 and 1987.  
 
The value of the volume of the cross-border trade increased from 1.5 billion Libyan Dinars in 
2006, to 3 billion in 2009.538 However, the volume of economic activity with other countries 
in the Maghreb did not exceed 800 million Libyan Dinars.539 In the Maghreb, the growth of 
bilateral relations between Tunisia and Libya was accompanied by greater financial 
incentives. A doubling of the value of commercial transactions in 2009, after 2006 confirms 
the existence of a favourable political climate that was not largely affected by instability 
generated by ideologically-motivated policies. Economic growth appears to have had a 
stronger influence in shaping the direction of Libyan-Tunisian ties than does the dogged 
pursuing of the regime's official ideology. Most of the Libyan exports to Tunisia were oil-
based products, such as diesel, petrol, gas and gasoline. Exports from Tunisia, however, were 
markedly different. Diverse goods, such as foodstuffs, electrical and mechanical devices, 
building supplies, crossed into Libya. A complementary import-export relationship existed 
between the two countries. Imported goods from both countries were not necessarily 
competing against their local counterparts. Moreover, this mutual advantage allowed the 
products of both countries to compete from a position of strength against foreign goods. A 
protectionist policy for their joint interests was put in place. Moves towards economic 
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integration were based on maintaining a simple system of import-export rules, which reduced 
the costs of moving goods from one country to another that, was generated by government-
imposed duties.  
 
Two observations can be made about the weaknesses generated by the joint policy on 
boosting inter-state commercial exchange. The first observation concerns specific products 
that were exclusively for the Libyan economy. Continued Tunisian exports will suffer if its 
economy suffers from fluctuations in demand. The second observation relates to the fact that 
Tunisian companies which export, directly or indirectly, their products to Libya, constitute 
only 16% of the total number of national export companies. A large number of them export 
more than 50% of their products to Libya. At the same time, the share of these companies in 
the total amount of Tunisian exports to other countries is just 5%.540 There thus exists a large 
potential to develop Tunisia's stake in the Libyan economy through encouraging companies 
to invest in their production capacities. State-led initiative could focus on improving the 
transportation of infrastructure between Tunisia and Libya through the building and 
maintaining of road, railway lines and ports. However, political events can very easily 
unsettle a cross-border trade that is dependent on a high level of security. In post-Gaddafi 
Libya, after the Libyan Revolution of 2011, concerns were raised about the future of Libyan-
Tunisian relations. The Tunisian Trade Office in Tripoli underlined these concerns in a 
special report in June, 2011. It highlighted that the new economic, political and security 
status in Libya after the 2011 Revolution would inevitably affect economic relations between 
the two counties. Accordingly, the Tunisian public and private sectors would need to address 
these developments. A plan would have to be formulated for the short and long-term 
maintenance of Tunisian economic interests in Libya.541 
 
Additionally, the report concluded that Tunisian exports to Libya would be adversely affected 
in the near future, especially in light of the prevailing political instability in Libya. Tunisian 
exports had declined by 22.5% during January and February, 2011, compared to the same 
period in 2010. Most export sectors, excepting foodstuffs, to Libya would be impacted on in 
the near future. These sectors, including electrical and mechanical goods, form about 75% of 
total Tunisian exports. Medicines and foodstuffs became the mainstay of exports to 
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neighbouring Libya during this period.542 Despite the disruption, generated by the conflict in 
Libya, to the volume of economic exchange, common ground exists between post-Ben Ali 
regime Tunisia and a post-Gaddafi Libya. The fledgling democratic regime in Tunisia 
supported the revolution against Gaddafi which saw the end of his reign. A high level of 
political goodwill has thus been created between the two countries. Favourable conditions are 
present for the continuing expansion of the cross-border trade in a region where political 
stability has not yet been achieved. In 2012, the Libyan Interim Government and the Tunisian 
Government agreed a Memorandum of Understanding on the economic co-operation between 
the two parties. Article One of the Memorandum demonstrated the political will of the two 
nations to increase the volume of commercial activities between them. The private sector is to 
receive support in order to play a key part in economic development.543 
 
Project for Joint Customs Arrangements 
I examined earlier the factors pushing up the volume of cross-border trade between Tunisia 
and Libya, and the various sectors benefitting from this increase. International sanctions on 
Libya between 1992 and 2004 had forced many Libyans to turn to Tunisia to ease the 
economic conditions of their country. Heavy Libyan reliance on Tunisian ports for the 
movement of goods and people, was apparent. In this period, Tunisia and Libya focused on 
formalising the increasing volume of trade relations through the creation of institutions and 
the signing of agreements. Simpler rules regulating and easing the cross-border traffic were 
pursued by the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee. Exemptions were introduced 
from the required financial guarantees for goods entering the Tunisian seaport of Zarzis and 
the Djerba International Airport on their way to Libya.544 Transport trucks also received 
exemptions from customs duties once they crossed the Libyan-Tunisian borders.545 
 
Feasibility studies were conducted by Tunisia and Libya on the impact of a customs post on 
their borders. As a result, an agreement was made in 2000 to establish the post, and Ras Ajdir 
                                                 
542Ibid. p.2. 
543 The Libyan and Tunisian Governments,'Memorandum of Understanding of Economic Co-operation between 
the Libyan Interim Government and the Tunisian Government'. (Tunisia ,2012). 
544 The Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee, 'Minutes of the 11th Session of Meetings of the Libyan-
Tunisian High Executive Committee', (Tunis, Tunisia, 1998). 
545Ibid.  
171 
 
was chosen as the location for its construction.546 Both countries were to contribute half of 
the total cost for the project, which was estimated at 11 million Libyan Dinars.547 Elaboration 
of the organisational and practical aspects of the post was made in a separate protocol in 
Tripoli in February, 2003.548 Easier movement of goods between Tunisia and Libya was the 
stated goal for this joint project, thanks to less time and effort being wasted without the 
double burden of conforming to two separate national regulations. A joint committee of 
experts was formed to supervise the implementation process of this Agreement.549 However, 
an obvious delay in the construction of the project was highlighted in official documents. 
Libya was blamed for this setback by the Libyan-Tunisian expert committee. Although it was 
projected that the project would be completed by the end of 2003, Libya did not implement 
its commitments according to the Agreement. Allocation of the funds for the project was the 
source of the delay. In contrast, Tunisia fulfilled about 90% of its obligations towards the 
joint customs ports by April, 2005.550  
 
Political will within the Libyan regime appeared to be lacking in taking forward an important 
step towards economic integration. Authoritarian practices in Libya could have taken the 
necessary steps to complete the project. Further, I think that the end of the international 
embargo on Libya in 2004 was also a primary factor which lessened the enthusiasm of the 
Gaddafi regime in regard to the Ras Ajdir customs post. Libya was now able to import and 
export directly from other countries, without going through Tunisian middlemen. In the 
Tunisian case, the Ben Ali regime, perhaps no less authoritarian, was consistent in its efforts 
to create a customs post. Tunisia had a more sustained experience than Libya of the creation 
of a national infrastructure, demonstrated by its tourism industry, which allowed it to be more 
enthusiastic about investing money and resources into developing the capacity of its cross-
border trade with Libya. The Gaddafi regime systematically eroded Libya's national 
infrastructure in an economy that was largely dependent on oil revenues. No previous 
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experience existed around the investment and maintenance of an infrastructure responding to 
the demands of local independent business interests, or international capital.  
 
Joint efforts concerning the cross-border trade have nonetheless continued, despite the failure 
to complete the customs post at Ras Ajdir. Co-operation on the exemption from customs 
duties of transported goods has been in force since February, 2003. A team of customs 
experts was formed by Libya to monitor and facilitate the movement of goods across the 
border. This helped the movement of products and people in both directions.551 Customs 
authorities had also co-operated on the matter of legislation regulating custom duties. This 
matter received the attention of a team of experts, which produced a united directory for 
custom duties consisting of the movement of people and goods between Libya and Tunisia. 
Libyan-Tunisian joint co-operation was also present in the training of customs staff, business 
studies, information exchange, and the confronting of drugs and smuggling.552  
 
Joint Investments 
Investments in joint projects in Tunisia and Libya were encouraged by the remarkable 
increase in the volume of cross-border economic trade that was mentioned earlier. Many 
wealthy Libyan investors turned their attention to the various financial opportunities in 
neighbouring Tunisia in order to increase their capital investments in its economy. Other 
factors also contributed to the economic co-operation in this area. Political stability and an 
investment-friendly environment in Tunisia encouraged Libyan businessmen to view it as a 
promising financial opportunity. An economic agreement between Tunisia and Libya was 
agreed in 2005. These factors helped to increase the volume of private investments.553 Similar 
moves to promote joint investment in Libya and Tunisia also took place.  
 
Educational and technical workshops for Libyan and Tunisian businessmen on the means and 
benefits of investment took place. Tripoli hosted one of these workshops, in February, 2002, 
which focused on the prospects for investment in the two countries' food industry. A similar 
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workshop was held in mid-2002, on potential investments in textile, timber, furniture, 
tourism, farming, and other industries. These workshops attracted a number of Libyan and 
Tunisian businessmen who were interested in the prospects for investment in the two 
countries.554 
 
Further sessions, alternating between the two countries, were recommended by the Libyan-
Tunisian High Executive Committee to supplement the activities of these workshops. The 
promotion of legal and financial frameworks among investors was to be the intended goal.555 
The Joint Chambers of Commerce and Industry also played an important role in advocating 
economic investments in Tunisia and Libya. Cities in both countries hosted, under the Joint 
Chambers, several activities for investors during 2006 and 2007. The contributions made by 
the Libyan Chamber of Commerce to these joint efforts persuaded the Libyan government to 
pass legal regulations on investment. Investment Law No. 5556 gave Tunisian investors a set 
of rights to encourage them to invest in Libya. A reduction in the minimum investment of 
capital, from one million Libyan Dinars to half a million, was accompanied by a tax 
exemption of 8 years.557 Less burdensome rules allowed Tunisian investment in the Libyan 
economy through attractive incentives that aimed to stimulate greater capital flows into the 
country as well as economic growth.  
 
Commercial exhibitions were organised in Libya and Tunisia that sought to exchange 
information and experience of investments. Many companies from different sectors 
participated. In the annual exhibition held in Tripoli, about 65 Tunisian companies, including 
industrial, agriculture, tourism and services, have a permanent exhibition stand. Such events 
allow businessmen from both countries to develop and sustain trading contacts. The prospects 
for economic co-operation and investment can be explored. Full partnership between 
individuals, and deeper integration between economies, are interlinked objectives. Africa is a 
potential area for new investments of private capital from Tunisia and Libya. Many African 
countries not only need such investments, but also have huge investment prospects, especially 
in the service sectors.558 Increased co-operation in the Maghreb can open doors to the push 
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for business opportunities further south in the African continent. The requirements for 
development can be satisfied by joint policies on investment which deepen economic 
integration between Libya and Tunisia and create new export markets in other countries.  
 
The Libyan Investment Authority559 and the Foreign Investment Promotion Agency560 
organised Libyan investment in Tunisia. Exploring and directing the prospects for investment 
was complemented by the development of regulations on investment. Further, the generation 
of information and expertise was also a necessary part of supporting the activities of investors 
in the two nations. Particular attention to small-sized businesses aimed to provide them with 
the opportunities to flourish and participate in a struggle for economic growth.561 A joint 
team of investment experts was formed to co-ordinate the views of Libyan and Tunisian 
official investment bodies concerning the regulations and incentives present in their 
countries. Identifying potential projects, such as rebuilding and operating factories, farming 
and fishing, fell within the scope of its activities.562  
 
An effort by Libyan and Tunisian investment authorities, co-ordinated with businessmen 
from both countries, produced a detailed agreement in February, 2003, to pursue investment 
programmes.563 Two directions can be observed in this agreement. Libyan investment in 
Tunisia made a huge leap during the first decade of the 21st century, making up about 44% of 
the country's capital investment in the Arab world, which is estimated at 5 billion Dollars.564 
In 2008, Libyan capital investments in the Tunisian economy were about $1 billion.565 
Investments between Libya and Tunisia were motivated by a variety of factors. Economic 
liberalisation in Tunisia, in response to global financial crises, was mimicked by the Libyan 
                                                 
559 The Libyan Investment Authority was established in 2006 to run Libyan foreign investments that resulted 
from reserves in oil revenues and other Libyan assets. This authority includes the assets of the Libyan Arab 
Foreign Investment Company, the Libyan African Investment Portfolio and Oil Investment Company. 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Insitute, 'Libyan Investment Authority ', <http://www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/libyan-
investment-authority/>, accessed 14/04/ 2014. 
560The Foreign Investment Promotion Agency 'FIPA-Tunisia is a public institution set up in 1995 under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. See The Foreign Investment Promotion Agency.' 
Information ', <http://www.investintunisia.tn/site/en/article.php?id_article=820>, accessed 12/01/ 2013. 
561Committee, 'Minutes of the 16th Session of Meetings of the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee. 'op 
cit. 
562Committee, 'Minutes of the 15th Session of Meetings of the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee'. op 
cit. 
563Ibid. 
564Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'The Libyan Investments in Tunisia', Official Report. Department of 
Foreign Co-operation (ed.),(Tripoli, Libya, 2011). p.6. 
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Tunisian High Executive Committee.' (Tripoli, 2007). 
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regimes. Foreign direct investment was the major source of growth for the Tunisian 
economy. When European capital investments declined, from mid-2002, Libya filled in the 
shortfall.566 Libya thus emerged as Tunisia's part-economic partner. Investments and 
economic agreements were concluded in an attempt to revive the weak economy in 
neighbouring Tunisia. Industrial and tourist projects received the attention of Libyan 
investors. The Libyan-African Investment Fund bought several five stars hotels and acquired 
the Tunisian oil company Exxon Mobil.567  
 
Particular emphasis on tourism in Tunisia attracted 1.5 billion Libyan Dinars to fund over 33 
projects. High profits, worth 20% of total tourist investments, were generated.568 Further, 
Libya invested in 20 chemical factories and 20 building supplies factories. More investments 
were made in 3 textile factories, 17 factories for foodstuffs, 4 metal industry and 4 
engineering projects.569 Since 2002, agricultural projects have caught the notice of Libyan 
investment, in the form of 6 farming initiatives, along with a few pharmaceutical factories 
and 9 other projects.570 Libya's, narrowly oil-based, vast economic wealth has allowed it to 
diversify into a financial portfolio covering different economic sectors in Tunisia. 
Interdependency was driven by finding profitable outlets for the continuous revenue from oil, 
which would expand the Libyan regime's influence through foreign direct investment in 
Tunisia and other countries. Promotion of private sector investments between Tunisia and 
Libya was a key aspect of future economic integration. The privatisation of public sector 
companies took place in Tunisia with private investors having been invited to buy and run 
these companies. Similarly, Libya permitted joint Libyan-Tunisian private companies to 
establish foodstuffs and building supplies factories.571  
 
State-backed efforts to bring private enterprise into formerly government-run sectors were 
underpinned by the neo-liberal philosophy that was increasingly being adopted by Arab 
elites, not just in the Maghreb but throughout the Arab world. Reducing the role of the state, 
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through subsidies or health provisions, was a necessary stage in the development of the 
economy. International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank experts advised Arab elites, 
mainly unelected rulers, to implement a policy of economic liberalisation, which would 
remove subsidies while not pursuing the issue of political reform. The primary philosophy of 
economic liberalisation is to deliver the services or goods from the reputedly inefficient 
public sector to the dynamic and better prepared private sector.572 While Libya's oil revenues 
had shielded it from turning to the IMF, in order not to concede any control to external actors 
in the decision-making process of the country,573 it implemented a selective strategy of 
privatisation.  
 
Discussions within the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee, on the Tunisian proposal 
to privatise some public projects, would benefit Libyan private investors.574 Among the 
privatised projects were the Tawfiq Health Centre, the Sfax Furniture Company, the Desert 
Plus Company, and the Shore Mechanical Factories. Bilateral discussions about these 
projects showed that the Libyan side had already carried out cost-benefit studies into the 
profitability of these projects.575 Interestingly, Libyan investors appear to have been reluctant 
to participate in the privatisation process. Past negative experience of the Libyan private 
sector, involving the Libyan regime and its tight control of the economy, could explain this 
reluctance.576 As a result, the demand for joint Libyan-Tunisian acquisition of proposed 
projects was made. More extensive studies into proposed projects needed to be carried out in 
order to supply Libyan investors with the information about the economic advantages of 
them. A few Libyan investments had been made with no profitable returns, but the Libyan 
regime prized their political value in the fostering of long-term bilateral relations. A 
restructuring of the labour force for the proposed project was a prerequisite before starting the 
talks on privatisation.577 The aforementioned demands were driven by Libyan regime’s 
destructive effects on private enterprise in the past, and the need to safeguard potential 
investments. However, the experience of their Tunisian counterparts was different. Frequent 
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interaction and joint activities between Tunisian private capital and foreign companies is 
rooted in recent history.  
 
The policy of Libyan-Tunisian joint involvement in private sector investments was largely 
due to Tunisian plans to introduce economic reforms in Tunisia. Privatisation of a few public 
sector organisations and companies that were perceived to be a burden on the public purse, 
was a major aim for the Ben Ali regime. Financial and administrative difficulties did plague 
these companies. Local and foreign investors also influenced the government-led efforts to 
push forward economic liberation for their benefit. The 'Tunisian model' persuaded the 
Libyan regime to follow its neighbour's footsteps, thereby permitting Libyan private investors 
to contribute in shaping economic relations with Tunisia. A marked change took place at the 
beginning of the 21st century on the issue of economic liberalisation in Libya. Two aspects of 
this phenomenon can be observed. Firstly, the reformist views expressed by Saif Al-Islam 
Gaddafi, the son of Muammar Gaddafi, who proposed a larger role for the Libyan private 
sector in the process of economic growth. The apparent liberalising tendencies of Saif Al-
Islam were perceived by his critics as merely part of a wider public relations campaign to 
prepare him to succeed his father in power. Secondly, increasing discontent generated from 
economic policies in Libya was subject to the Libyan regime's strategy of containment. A 
deterioration in the quality of life among Libyans was a cause for concern in the decision-
makers. Encouragement of private investors to participate in the economy was a solution 
pursued by the regime to create a sense of having a stake in the status quo.  
 
Africa's rising economic importance was recognised by Libya and Tunisia in their joint 
relations in the areas of investment and export markets. A consistent effort was made to 
create connections with regional and global economic networks, especially on the African 
continent.578 New markets were to be found in which nationally-produced goods could be 
sold. The Libyan-African Investment Company and the Tunisian Group of Studies and 
Engineering jointly took charge of economic investments in the African continent.579 Most of 
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the joint investments were in the foodstuff and beverage industries. Detailed studies were 
made to explore the investment prospects in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Guinea.580  
 
Investment, for Tunisia, was viewed as a tool for the marketing of its products and services in 
African countries, with medical tourism being an important example. However, Libyan 
motivations differed from those of its border nation. Economic investments in Africa were 
based on a definite political agenda whereby the Libyan regime wanted to reward African 
countries for support during the diplomatic controversy generated by the Lockerbie disaster. 
Foreign policy coincided with an economic agenda revolving around Libya's strategic role in 
Africa. Oil and financial investments were tools in its economic activities. Private enterprise 
was encouraged to look for, and explore, African investment opportunities. The creation of 
the presence of an economic lobby in African countries which received Libyan investment 
was part of Libyan foreign policy. The flow of private capital from Libya into Africa was not 
only urged by the Libyan regime, who was seeking to widen the scope of its country's foreign 
direct investment, but was also political. Pan-Arabism had failed to obtain for Gaddafi his 
ideological goal of uniting the Arabs under a single state. Instead, greater collaboration with 
African countries could empower him on the world stage through a political and economic 
alliance with loosely organised sovereign states. Gaddafi's personal participation in forming 
the African Union is a clear example of the shift from the Arab world to Africa. The 
authoritarian nature of his regime allowed him to focus Libyan efforts on economic 
integration with Tunisia and other African nations, instead of on Arab states. 
 
Conclusion 
Official documents from state archives were analysed in this chapter in order to identify the 
trend towards economic integration between Tunisia and Libya from 1987 until 2010. Several 
changes had taken place which provided a suitable environment for Tunisia's new President, 
Ben Ali, to improve previously hostile ties between his country and Libya, after he took to 
power. Top-down changes were introduced by authoritarian regimes. The leaders of Libya 
and Tunisia still exerted tight control over their countries, with no political dissent being 
allowed and a pace of economic liberalisation according to a specific agenda: the survival of 
the regime. Ben Ali and Gaddafi co-operated in various areas, including the formation of the 
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Arab Maghreb Union and membership in the African Union. These two regional 
organisations enabled the two leaders to pursue their economic and political objectives in a 
wider sphere. In the Maghreb, Gaddafi found Ben Ali to be a willing partner in opposition to 
the American-led coalition against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that led to the First Gulf War. 
The 1991 Maghreb Payment Agreement, signed by Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and 
Tunisia, sought to strengthen financial co-ordination on a region-wide basis. The African 
continent was the location for joint investment initiatives between Tunisia and Libya, through 
the United Libyan-Tunisian Corporation, seeking new markets for state-financed or private 
capital. Both countries pursued co-ordinated policies that were underpinned by different 
objectives. Libya's foreign policy appears to have abandoned its goal of political union with 
its Arab sister-states. It instead focused on strengthening ties with African countries, as a 
reward for their diplomatic and political support during the Western-imposed isolation of the 
country. Tunisian foreign direct investment in Africa was seen to be a marketing campaign to 
promote its goods and services, such as medical tourism.  
International sanctions also led to an increase in the level of trade between Libya and Tunisia. 
Libyans were forced to use airports in Tunisia in order to travel, and imported products had to 
pass through the country before arriving in Libya. Laws aimed at encouraging bilateral 
relations were passed, and joint committees were established exclusively for the purpose of 
co-ordinating these relations from the early 1990s. Customs duty exemptions for Tunisian 
and Libyan goods were introduced. The formalisation of the cross-border trade implied 
greater attention from the regimes in Tripoli and Tunis on an important matter binding their 
countries together. During Ben Ali's rule, Libya was elevated to the position of Tunisia's 
primary Arab trading partner. The volume of bilateral economic exchange rose from 1.5 
billion Libyan Dinars in 2006, to 3 billion Dinars in 2009. This is evidence of the increasing 
interdependence of relations between Tunisia and Libya.  
However, there were limits to the joint policy of economic co-operation in cross-border trade. 
Formalisation of these relations did not always lead to economic integration. The 
unsuccessful project of constructing a customs post in Ras Ajdir following feasibility tests 
indicates the weaknesses of bilateral relations between different regimes and national 
infrastructures. Libya was unable or unwilling to fulfil its part of the agreement. I think this 
was mainly due to the lack of experience in creating and sustaining an infrastructure in Libya 
during Gaddafi's reign. No pressure was exerted on the Libyan regime to respond to the 
demands of a non-existent private sector, or of international capital, for an adequate national 
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infrastructure that was capable of fostering economic growth. Libya's dependency on oil had 
effectively allowed Gaddafi to concentrate power within restricted and unaccountable elite. 
Authoritarian politics in Tunisia was different, as its diversified economy was tied to 
international capital through the visits of foreign tourists. Political stability was achieved 
through the stifling of opposition or dissent, for the purpose of economic growth in the 
country. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: JOINT LIBYAN-TUNISIAN POLICIES IN THE 
THREE SECTORS OF THE ECONOMY  
 
Introduction 
This chapter continues the examination of bilateral relations from the previous chapter, with a 
special focus on specific projects of joint policies through an analysis of official documents 
and agreements. Extensive efforts to initiate co-operation in various areas of the economy 
were carried out by committees founded solely for the purpose of bilateral relations between 
Tunisia and Libya. Politics was instrumental in leading the process of integration between 
their economies. There was a realisation of the mutual benefits to Tunisia and Libya, which 
led to a change of behaviour in the political elites of both countries. In Tunisia, the new Ben 
Ali regime had, as I noted in previous chapters, sought better relations with the Gaddafi 
regime, which also pursued a less antagonistic policy towards its neighbours that was 
motivated by Arabism or socialism. Instead, the large space for changes in an authoritarian 
regime, such as the one in Tripoli, allowed Gaddafi to radically change his country's foreign 
policy agenda. The decision-making process was largely immune from bottom-up pressures.  
 
I will divide my discussion of the official documents analysed in this chapter into three parts, 
which are also subdivided into sections. The first part examines co-operation in the primary 
sector of the economy, defined by the agriculture and natural resources. Developing countries 
like Libya and Tunisia have been dependent on farming, or the extraction of oil and natural 
gas, to provide a national income. The second part looks at the secondary sector, which saw 
the implementation of joint industrial projects between Tunisia and Libya. Attracting 
investment from Tunisian private capital to develop Libya's manufacturing base was one 
attempt to boost co-operation in this sector. The third part examines the service sector of the 
economy, which is interlinked with the sectors to be analysed in the other sections. Tourism, 
health, transport, education and power supply, were all areas that witnessed initiatives at co-
operation through the formalising of the bilateral relations. Joint policies in all three sectors 
of the economy were driven by authoritarian elites. The Libyan-Tunisian High Executive 
Committee played an important role in recommending policies, undertaking studies into the 
feasibility of projects and other activities. The primary, secondary and tertiary sectors of the 
Tunisian and Libyan economies were dissimilar, and they required a complex strategy that 
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was underpinned by the effective exercise of power, not only by regimes, but also other 
actors, such as the private sector and international capital.  
 
Primary Sector 
Joint Policies in Agriculture and Fishing  
Agriculture and fishing witnessed co-operation between Tunisia and Libya that was 
underpinned by the complementing of functions. Tunisian experience and Libyan capital 
were brought together in these fields. Agreements were made to cultivate land and exploit 
fishing stocks. The Libyan and Tunisian regimes were interested in achieving self-sufficiency 
in basic foodstuffs, such as livestock and meat, in order not to be dependent on other 
countries. Co-operation was carried out by the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee. 
Formalisation was accompanied by the formation of scientific teams that were charged with 
the planning and implementation of collaborative projects. These projects varied from water 
supplies to agriculture to fishing. Studies on the Ghadamis Aquifer, located on the border 
between Algeria, Libya and Tunisia, began in 1999 and were backed by the three 
governments in the region.581 Discussions revolved around the possibility of developing the 
aquifer in order to create a water supply to the immediate, surrounding water-poor area.582 
Joint participation by Algeria, Libya and Tunisia took place in the scientific, ecological and 
social studies, focusing on the potential effects of developing the aquifer.583 Complete 
implementation of the project did not occur. There were two obstacles that stood in the way 
of the realisation of this trilateral initiative: the high costs of the project -- leading to 
stakeholders not fulfilling their financial commitments after 2009; and Algeria’s reluctance to 
take part.584 
 
The al-Wa'rah585 Pasture was to be the home of a development project jointly run by Libya 
and Tunisia. Preservation of the natural environment in a territory shared by the two nations 
                                                 
581 The Ghadamis Aquifer, also known as the North Desert Aquifer, is a huge underwater basin. It is near the 
Libyan city of Ghadamis, which is close to the joint borders of the three countries.   
582Committee, 'Minutes of the 16th Session of Meetings of the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee'.  op 
cit. 
583Committee, 'Minutes of the 20th Session of Meetings of the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee'. 
.opcit. 
584The Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee, 'Minutes of the 21st Session of Meetings of the Libyan-
Tunisian High Executive Committee.' (Tripoli, 2008). 
585This is a natural reserve area, located on the joint Libyan-Tunisian borders. It is mainly owned by some 
Tunisian tribes who live in the area.  
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drove this project. A joint team of experts was established to undertake studies into the 
proposed project in al-Wa'rah Pasture.586 Recommendations suggested that each country 
should implement the requirements for development inside its own borders. Further meetings 
on the project were also recommended.587 Concerns were highlighted by the Libyan-Tunisian 
High Executive Committee about the financial costs of the project. A full report into the 
proposal for the development project was to be carried out and submitted to the recently 
formed New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).588 This move on the part of 
committee aimed to gain much needed funding from an African development-oriented 
regional organisation.589 However, the proposal for funds was rejected. As a result, its 
implementation suffered delays, in light of the lack of financial support. Different sources 
were to be looked for in the attempt to establish the joint development project. The Libyan-
Tunisian High Executive Committee revisited the project and recommended the raising of 
money through other channels, such as international funds.590 
 
In the field of agriculture, several teams of specialists were established to increase the level of 
co-operation in pest control and to facilitate an exchange of knowledge. A joint workshop 
was held in 1998 to evaluate the recently initiated Libyan and Tunisian activities concerning 
the protection of plant life. Rules, and the prospects of upgrading and integrating these rules, 
were subject to a review. Additional efforts in this area saw Tunisia and Libya carry out 
scientific studies into how to effectively tackle plant diseases.591 Knowledge exchange also 
took place on the state of marine and animal life.592 Earlier proposals that had been agreed 
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were the focus of implementation of Libyan and Tunisian efforts in the fishing industry. 
Regular meetings of the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee over 20 years led to 
several decisions inviting interested parties to increase investments in this area.593 An 
agreement was concluded on the breeding of tuna fish.594 Joint efforts were limited to the 
creation of sub-committees, which were to study the prospects of a shared marine zone 
between Tunisia and Libya, and to define fishing regulations.595 
 
General co-operation occurred in the areas of environmental protection, plant and seed 
breeding, and the regulation of water salinity.596 The formation of the Libyan-Tunisian 
Company for Agricultural Equipment, in 1993, aimed to foster bilateral co-operation in 
developing and providing seeds and equipment. It stood at the heart of the increasing co-
operation and investment in the agricultural sector.597 The financial capital of the company 
was increased by the Libyan and Tunisian regimes for the purpose of implementing a joint 
plan for agricultural development and production.598 A detailed policy on the expansion of 
plant, marine and animal production was deliberated over by a joint team of specialists. 
Private investors were invited to participate in the marketing of agricultural products in 
Tunisia, Libya, and other countries.599 
 
The Committee was interested in developing a strategy of long-term bilateral agricultural co-
operation. Potential investors were urged by this organisation to have a simple administrative 
and technical system to aid the marketing of products inside and outside Libya and 
Tunisia.600 An agreement on agricultural development was reached by the Libyan Investment 
Agency and the Tunisian Agricultural Promotion Agency. Private investors were encouraged 
to be involved in agribusiness in Tunisia and Libya.601 Specialist teams were formed by the 
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Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee to examine the prospects of utilising water 
resources from 'the Great River', which is located in Libya. It also invited investors from 
Tunisia to set up agricultural projects in Libya for the purpose of strengthening the process of 
bilateral integration.602  
 
Generally, the existence of joint Libyan-Tunisian specialised committees contributed to a 
level of co-ordination not previously present between Libyan and Tunisian officials. 
However, the effects of the bilateral agreements signed on agricultural co-operation remained 
limited.603 Both private and public sector companies were unable to fulfil the administrative, 
legal and financial commitments that were stipulated by these agreements. The Libyan-
Tunisian Company for Seeds and Agricultural Equipment suffered from this problem, which 
subsequently led to its dissolution in 2008.604 Interestingly, this company was founded during 
Libyan political and economic isolation from the world, and it served the function of 
providing desperately needed agricultural equipment, which was also used in the UN-targeted 
oil industry. The committees and sub-committees which emerged after 1987 were given the 
task of looking at various ways to create and sustain bilateral relations. However, their 
functions appear to have been generally advisory, with real power still located in the Gaddafi 
and Ben Ali regimes. The interests of these regimes defined the direction and scope of 
economic co-operation in agriculture and fishing and in other areas of the economy. The 
formalisation of joint economic ties thus served political objectives, rather than the financial 
considerations of independent investors in agribusiness.  
Integration Projects for Oil and Gas    
Territorial disputes over the continental shelf have plagued Tunisian and Libyan relations. 
During the period of Bourguiba's rule, tensions were generated about which countries own 
the continental shelf, thereby hindering the growth of joint ties for nearly 20 years. Arab 
League efforts to mediate an amicable agreement between Bourguiba and Gaddafi 
concerning the territory, failed. The dispute was subsequently referred to the International 
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Court of Justice, which settled the question of ownership in favour of Libya in 1985.605 
However, economic co-operation would have to wait until 1987, when Bourguiba was 
ousted, which was complemented by a complete change in the mood of Libyan-Tunisian ties, 
with both states recognising the decision of the International Court of Justice.606 Better 
relations were due to the actions of the new Ben Ali regime in various areas, especially the 
continental shelf, which were welcomed by Libya. Consequently, Gaddafi renamed the oil 
field, changing its name from the ‘Bouri Field’ to the ‘7th November’, in honour of Ben Ali's 
successful coup d'état against Bourguiba in 1987. Moves towards a thaw in relations were 
reinforced by Libya agreeing to carry out joint investments with Tunisia. Libya pledged to 
allocate 10% of its oil revenues from the continental shelf to the financing of a number of 
collaborative economic projects on the border.607 The agreement between Gaddafi and Ben 
Ali in Djerba in May, 1988, was publicised through a joint press statement from both leaders, 
highlighting the projects to be implemented. These projects were part of a broader policy 
which would include efforts in this area by the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive 
Committee.608 The Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee, at its 1993 meetings, formed 
a sub-committee to follow up on the joint border economic projects.609 In a further session, 
this Committee also identified some of the aspects of co-operation on the issue of oil and gas 
production.  
 
Libyan and Tunisian co-operation in exploitation of natural resources was led by the initiative 
of the former. Oil discoveries and sharing were to be conducted by a specialised company 
based in both countries, called the Oil Joint Company.610 Work on the 7th November Oil 
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Field led to the opening of the first oil well in 2000.611 At the beginning of 2001, the drilling 
of two more wells followed.612 More legal rights were granted to expand the scope of the 
activities of the oil company in the areas of the discovery and production of crude oil on an 
individual or collaborative basis with other companies.613 Modifications were also made to 
the company's agreement, allowing it to work not only in Libya and Tunisia, but also in other 
countries.614 Tax on oil revenues and customs duties on imported work equipment were 
exempted.615 These modifications allowed the Oil Joint Company to participate in new areas 
and without the extra cost imposed by state regulations. A number of incentives were thus put 
in place in the oil industry to encourage joint Libyan-Tunisian co-operation. Libyan exports 
of oil products experienced an increase in this period. A pipeline to transfer oil products from 
Libya to Tunisia was part of a wider co-operation in the oil industry.616 There were bilateral 
examinations of the construction of an oil refinery in the Skhira area of Tunisia. A project 
was also initiated to increase the storage capacity for the refined oil products in the same 
area. In March, 2003, an agreement was made on the building of two oil pipelines, with the 
first running from Zawya, in Libya, to Skhira, and the second to transfer crude oil to the 
refinery in the latter area.617 
 
Natural gas from Libya to Tunisia also received attention from both regimes. The generation 
of power and energy supplies provided both countries with an opportunity to work towards 
integration. A team of experts was appointed to plan and quickly implement a project on the 
construction of gas pipelines in this sector of the economy. Although an agreement was 
concluded in the early 1980s, the setting up of a decision-making procedure for the 
implementation of this project began only in 2001. This agreement provided the legal outline 
organising the flow of Libyan gas to Tunisia.618 Practical steps to realising the agreement 
were undertaken by the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee. Potential funding 
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sources were contacted by the Committee and they provided the technical and economic 
studies on the proposed joint project. Financial plans for the project were first examined by 
the Committee in 1993. Subsequently, in 2002, it authorised the Libya Oil Company and the 
Tunisian Company for Electricity to formulate a joint framework to manage the project on 
the integration of power.619 The Joint Gas Company was then established by Libya and 
Tunisia, with both countries delineating the legal, organisational, financial and technical 
structures of the company.620 In 2004, the company was officially launched.621 The first 
activity of the Joint Gas Company included the building of a pipeline, about 275 KMs. in 
length, to annually transfer 2 billion cubic meters of Libyan gas to Tunisia.  
 
Major decisions on natural resources were still made by Libya's political elite. The 
formalisation of the natural resources sector, based on the creation of bilateral ties between 
Tunisia and Libya, was undertaken through the setting up of agreements, committees and 
joint companies. However, the private sector was kept out of this area of the economy, which 
generated a vast amount of national income for the Libyan economy. Interestingly, the 
relationship between the regime's control of oil and its ability to remain above formal politics 
can be seen in the titles Gaddafi gave to himself, such as 'Guide of the Revolution' or 
'Brother-Leader'. The formal office of President was not part of Libya's political language. 
The perceived freedom of Gaddafi from the government in its decision-making processes was 
contradicted by his absolute control of the source of political power: oil. 
 
Secondary Sector 
Industrial Joint Policies 
Libya and Tunisia do not possess a highly developed industrial sector. Most advanced 
products in the areas of science and healthcare had to be imported. The two Maghrebi 
countries nonetheless sought to develop their industrial capacities. While the light 
manufacturing and construction sectors were established in Tunisia, with exports going to 
Libya, the Libyan economy exported oil-based goods to its neighbour. Joint co-operation in 
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the industrial sector was led by the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee, the Joint 
Committee for Industrial Co-operation and other experts keen to promote this goal. The 
regimes in both countries worked with these official bodies to produce rules to aid Libyan 
and Tunisian manufacturers. Investors in the industrial sector, from both nations, were invited 
to participate and  co-operate in the manufacturing sector.622  
 
The Maghreb Joint Stock Company is a Libyan-Tunisian industrial organisation, established 
in 1988, and it has taken the lead in joint projects. National shares were divided between 
Libya, having 70%, and Tunisia with 30%. Subsequently, the Libyan share increased to 95% 
of the company. Several industrial businesses fell under its umbrella. These included the Saif 
Medicine Company, the Jeel Textile Company, and the Real Estate Investment Company. 
Contributions to, and the financing of, a number of Tunisian industrial projects have taken 
place.623 Prospects for industrial co-operation have been explored by the Libyan-Tunisian 
High Executive Committee. Agreements have been signed to encourage and implement joint 
projects. The Libyan Iron and Steel Company and the Tunisian Steel Company concluded an 
agreement to work together. Formal Co-operation in the field of chemical fertilisers was also 
made. Marble extraction, especially from the Mizdah quarries, was subject to a joint 
agreement in order to meet the Libyan and Tunisian demand for the raw material.624 A 
twinning agreement was made between the Libyan Bureau of Handicrafts and the Tunisian 
Bureau of Traditional Crafts in January, 2003. Joint co-operation in the extraction of raw 
material for traditional handicrafts was the main topic of interest.625 
 
Study of joint co-operation between Tunisia and Libya was part of the wider strategy of 
formulating policies to encourage industrial co-operation. Information and regulations were 
needed to drive this bilateral effort. Research into these areas would be very useful to enable 
national industries to make informed decisions and sustain joint projects. Activities to meet 
these goals took place, such as a workshop on the exhibition of mechanical and engineering 
industries, which was hosted in Tunis between 17th and 19th February, 2000.626 Technical 
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studies to survey the potential resources available for joint industrial projects were called for 
by the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee. Quality standards, technical 
specifications and certificates for the conformity of manufactured products in Tunisia and 
Libya, were to be the main focus of the studies.627 Teams of industrial experts were 
established in order to formulate financial and technical policies for the promotion of co-
operation in various industrial sectors.628 The Libyan Iron and Steel Company and the 
Tunisian Steel Company concluded a co-operation arrangement to increase the capacity of 
the Misrata Steel Complex in Libya. Self-sufficiency in steel production was the primary aim 
for both countries.629 A co-ordination of the activities of their technological research centres 
was also agreed. Modernisation of the national industries of Libya and Tunisia was pursued 
in terms of quality standards and competitiveness.630 Information gathering and sharing were 
necessary stages in the plan for actual co-operation in industrial activities.  
 
The knowledge exchange facilitated through industrial workshops and information 
contributed to the establishment of joint factories in Tunisia and Libya. Previously agreed 
projects were now in the process of implementation.631 The Tunisian public sector and private 
investors were invited by the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee to visit a few sites 
housing industrial firms in Libya. This visit was aimed at increasing the profile of firms in 
this sector for the purpose of attracting investment and to encourage participation in their 
management. The Zawya Footwear Factory, the Tajora Tannery, the Benghazi Textile 
Company and the al-Marj Blanket Factory were examples of ventures driven by developing 
bilateral relations between Tunisia and Libya.632 Subsequently, a Libyan-Tunisian committee 
was charged with the task of evaluating potential investments in the Tunisian private 
sector.633 
 
Libyan initiatives to bring Tunisian investment were motivated by past and present factors. 
The public sector, which ran companies nationalised after 1969, was characterised by 
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incompetence and corruption. Libya's own private enterprise was banned by Gaddafi for 
nearly a decade and a half. Capitalism was condemned by the Libyan regime, accompanied 
by socialist-inspired, system targeted businessmen. Private investors were thus wary of 
putting money into projects. Gaddafi's ideology, contained in The Green Book, had created a 
political and economic environment that was not favourable to independent or enterprising 
organisations. The authoritarian character of Gaddafi's rule had effectively shut down most of 
the alternative associations and activities in Libya. Socialist rhetoric, such as 'Partners Not 
Workers', had echoed throughout the country. Reliable feasibility studies were not carried out 
in the establishment of public sector factories. As a result, locally produced goods, expensive 
and of poor quality, were incapable of competing against imported products of a superior 
quality. Tunisian businessmen were very aware of the political and economic conditions in 
Libya, including the obstacles which would be facing their prospective investments. 
Concerns revolved around the ownership of Libyan factories, which produced goods also 
manufactured in Tunisia.634 Fears were also raised about the inaccessibility of raw materials 
from abroad for these factories. 
 
In the course of surveying the documents analysed in this chapter, I have found that no actual 
steps were taken to implement the agreement on the reselling of these factories to Tunisia. 
Instead, Tunisia suggested the establishment of new joint industrial projects manufacturing 
other types of products. New projects were also agreed in the electrical and mechanical 
industries, such as hydraulic and bus equipment.635 However, these projects were not 
implemented. Subsequent meetings of the Joint Committees, discussed in this section, do not 
mention these proposed projects. I think the failure to realise the joint Libyan-Tunisian 
industrial co-operation stipulated in signed agreements was due to the weaknesses, lack of 
qualified human resources and advanced technology, of the industrial sector in both nations, 
and their divergent economic policies. Further, no harmonisation took place between Tunisia 
and Libya. The absence of the co-ordination of the legal systems, national infrastructures, 
labour forces and expertise, may have been obstacles to bilateral investment. Efforts to 
formalise inter-state relations did not bring about institutions or mechanisms which could 
effectively realise the stated objectives or plans.  
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Tertiary Sector 
Joint Policies in Tourism  
Tourism in the Maghreb has a great potential for further development, to include a cross-
border dimension. Rich and diverse tourist attractions in Tunisia and Libya would generate a 
national source of income. I highlighted in Chapter 6 some of the challenges which existed to 
co-operation, with reference to the unpredictability posed by the Gaddafi regime. In this 
section, I will explore further the impact on the tourism industry of joint policies between 
Tunisia and Libya. Tunisia has worked towards developing its national tourism since 
Bourguiba was President. The economy depends on this industry as a source of employment 
and for an inflow of hard currency. Tourism generates the second largest number of jobs, 
behind the agricultural sector, and its revenue covers about 56% of the Tunisian trade deficit. 
The Ben Ali regime has thus paid considerable attention to continuous development of 
tourism in the country.636 
 
Libya's largely unexploited potential in this sector can be seen in the number of 
archaeological sites from ancient civilisations, such as the Romans, in the desert and on the 
coastline. Similar attractions in the Maghreb, such as those in Tunisia and in the 
Mediterranean, are visited by foreign visitors, thereby generating a long-term and large 
source of national income. However, the infrastructure, discussed in Chapter 6, to sustain 
such a service-based industry as tourism lacks supported through little investment. The 
Libyan regime has neglected the service sector, with most attention being focused on either 
the primary or secondary sectors of the economy. Private enterprise was banned from 
participating in Libya, thereby excluding the possibility of an alternative engine for the 
diversification of the economy, in general, and the growth of tourism, in particular. The 
Gaddafi regime exerted a tight grip on Libya's economy and tourism through the security 
services.637 Tourism was perceived to offer a potential threat to the national security of the 
country from unfriendly foreign intelligence services. Authoritarian structures of power, 
largely informal, continued to dominate the economy. Gaddafi's network of allies was made 
up not only of his clan and the tribes, but also the security service establishment, including 
family members, such as the intelligence chief, Abdullah al-Senoussi, who was his brother-
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in-law, who worked closely to maintain the status quo. Any moves in the direction of 
economic liberalisation were thus quickly pulled back by the risk of political liberalisation.  
 
However, the arrival of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi in the public arena began to introduce changes 
to Libyan politics. A new vision was articulated, which he described as 'Tomorrow's Libya'. 
Saif Al-Islam presented himself as a passionate advocate of economic and political reform in 
the country. Further, he aimed to transform Libya's image abroad. New policies were 
introduced for the economy, including the development of the tourism sector. Oil revenues 
had sharply declined during the years of the UN-imposed sanctions. Domestic challenges, as 
a result of the ineffective policies of the past, also contributed to the need for modification of 
the Libyan regime's agenda. In this domestic and international situation, tourism was viewed 
as an appealing area of economic growth. The regime thus sought to co-operate with Tunisia 
and to develop its own national industry in tourism.  
 
Libyan contributions to bilateral ties concerning tourism saw a rapid increase in the number 
of tourists from the country visiting Tunisia, and the number overtook the number of French 
nationals, who previously made up the largest number of tourists. The Libyan tourists formed 
about 22% of the total number of tourists who visited the country in 2005. However, the rate 
of room occupancy by Libyan tourists in Tunisian hotels was about 8.8%. Some observers 
link this low rate to the tendency for Libyan tourists to rent private flats and houses during 
their holidays.638 Such a remarkable rise in the number of Libyan visitors motivated the 
regimes of both countries to begin to co-operate in this area. Senior figures in the government 
met in order to discuss how to develop and improve the necessary facilities and services for 
the movement of tourists to both countries. Joint agreements were concluded, aiming to 
organise and boost activity in this economic sector. The formalising of bilateral relations took 
place in a top-down manner, with the formation of a joint committee, to follow up co-
operation in tourism, and the Libyan-Tunisian Tourist Holding Company.639 
 
Relevant authorities and organisations involved in tourism were urged by the Libyan-
Tunisian High Executive Committee to follow up these acts through increasing their efforts 
and plans to promote joint initiatives. An exchange of expertise was also called for, alongside 
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the need to pass laws for the marketing of tourist services in both countries and also 
abroad.640 Subsequently, a joint agreement was reached between Tunisia and Libya. Various 
aspects of co-operation in the promotion of bilateral tourism were detailed. In the areas of 
hotel management, training and the construction of facilities, the input of Tunisian experience 
and expertise in Libya was stipulated.641 Long-established Tunisian experience and 
knowledge would greatly benefit Libya in this field. There were obvious mutual benefits to 
their economies from joint Libyan-Tunisian efforts in tourism. The process of the 
diversification of the Libyan economy required Tunisian expertise in the services catering for 
the needs of tourists.  
 
Investment in tourism also received the notice of the Libyan authorities. The development of 
an environment in Tunisia and Libya that was conducive for investment was agreed on. 
Mutual visits by officials and experts were intensified, complemented by workshops and 
shows displaying tourist services and traditional handicrafts.642 Events such as the 'Libyan-
Tunisian Tourist Week' during February, 2002, were held regularly. Opportunities were 
created to promote joint activities in tourism between Tunisia and Libya. Several exhibitions 
were held for hotel services, local fine arts, handicrafts, archaeological attractions, festivals 
and tourist facilities, in both countries. Twinning proposals between organisations were 
approved, similarly to the case of the High Institute of Tourism in Misrata, Libya, and its 
Tunisian counterpart in Sidi Zarif, in order that the former should provide staff training in the 
various areas of tourism.643  
 
A cross-border initiative was studied by Libya and Tunisia, exploring the success of a 'tourist 
town'.644 The generation of employment in an area containing communities afflicted by 
poverty, was an objective of the decision-makers in the proposal of the project. The 
construction of a national infrastructure, in Libya's case, and the extension of an existing one, 
in Tunisia’s case, would be able to address the socio-economic problems that were located on 
their borders. Careful planning and effective implementation can serve the goal of alleviating 
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these problems. Although the agreements signed between Tunisia and Libya on joint projects 
were bold and ambitious, they remained inactive. I arrived at this conclusion through a 
review of the contents of the official documents and the number of projects that had either 
been begun or were completed. No concrete actions were taken to execute many of the 
agreements and projects. The Minutes of the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee 
proved to be useful in confirming my conclusion. After the 20th round of meetings of the 
committee, no mention is made of the 'tourist town', which occurs frequently in the previous 
minutes. In this case, security issues and obstacles concerning the Libyan-Tunisian border 
can be cited to explain the reluctance to implement the project. A lack of funding for this and 
other projects may also point to inconsistency between the earlier and later Minutes, or 
between signed agreements and reality. I think the hastiness of decision-makers led to 
inadequate and ill-informed planning leading to the proposal of unworkable projects.  
 
Libyan investments in Tunisia consist of a collection of companies and hotels. The 
Touqrannas Company is the oldest of these companies, established in 1970 as part of a joint 
tourism agreement between Tunisia and Libya. About 99.98% of the company is owned by 
the government-run Libyan Company for Foreign Investment. It also owns and manages a 
number of tourist resorts and other business in the same area. The Touqrannas Company 
owns 100% and 99.5% of the Vessel of Dar Djerba and of the Real Estate and Hotel Group in 
Tabarka, respectively.645 Other assets include 5 hotels in Djerba, 1 hotel in Kebili, 1 hotel in 
Tozeur and the Zahra Hotel in Tunis. A group of Libyan professionals based in the 
headquarters in Djerba and complemented by an office in Tunis, run these business interests. 
Furthermore, the Libyan Company for Foreign Investment owns the Cornina Hotel Group 
and the Cornina Gammarth. The latter group has the second largest 5 Star hotel in Tunis.646 
Overall, the impact of the Libyan tourist businesses in Tunisia has been beneficial to the two 
countries. Certain economic and social objectives were achieved, based on the knowledge 
exchange of Tunisian expertise and Libyan foreign direct investment into its neighbour's 
already developed tourist infrastructure. They have provided employment for several 
thousands of Tunisian workers in a country where tourism is the second largest sector in the 
economy.647 The Libyan economy was able to diversify its sources of wealth through a 
service-based sector, but without challenging the dominance of oil revenues.  
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Joint Policies in the Health Sector 
An immense opportunity existed for knowledge exchange in the area of the provision of 
health services between Tunisia and Libya. Many decades of growth in this area separated 
these two countries. Libya's national health system has suffered from a severe deterioration in 
quality. Policies pursued by the Gaddafi regime failed to develop the monarchy-era system. 
Prior to 1969, King Idris, in Libya, adopted a policy of development. State-building, under 
the Senoussi monarch, was dependent on external expertise. It aimed to respond to the 
problem of the absence of a skilled labour force which could work in hospitals, construction 
projects, or in the new oil industry.648 It appears this problem continues to persist despite 
Gaddafi's grand projects of socialism. Socialist policies that were intended to create a more 
egalitarian society in Libya were unable to introduce a welfare state similar to those present 
in communist Cuba and the 'from the cradle to the grave' system in post-war Great Britain. 
Instead, socialism weakened the ability of social groups to provide alternative services, in a 
country under an authoritarian regime. The Gaddafi regime was the only real political actor 
with the financial and organisational resources to implement a nation-wide agenda. The lacks 
of properly qualified medical staff and an adequate infrastructure have dominated for the last 
few decades. A feeble educational syllabus in higher education institutions and medical 
schools was unable to produce the qualified doctors, nurses and other practitioners that were 
needed for an adequate health system. Financial and managerial corruption had also affected 
medical care institutions in Libya. Increasingly, Libyans lost confidence in the institutions 
that were intended to provide them with medical care and support.  
 
The Tunisian health system is in direct contrast to that of its neighbour. It is one of the most 
advanced systems in the Arab world and Africa. High standards exist for medical staff and 
management. Instruction and learning in medical schools are inspired by the French 
curriculum, thanks to the continuation of the policy of the colonial era by Habib Bourguiba 
when he was President. The Tunisian regime has aimed to supply the national health sector 
with qualified medical professionals. Tunisia has become a hub for medical tourism from 
Libya and from other countries in the Maghreb, due to the positive reputation it has acquired.  
 
Bilateral initiatives have taken place in the medical services. Tunisia and Libya have made 
joint decisions to pursue policies of co-operation in this vital sector. In 1993, a joint 
                                                 
648 Ruth Nora Cyr, Twentieth Century Africa (Lincoln, NE: Writers Club Press, 2001), p.297. 
197 
 
committee of medical experts and professionals was set up to plan and monitor the progress 
made in medical co-operation.649 The Committee was tasked with promoting medical training 
and education, policy formulation and public health awareness, between the two nations. 
Further, it focused on bilateral co-operation in the areas of drug manufacturing, the 
assignment of Tunisian medical teams to Libya, the exchange of visits and medical and 
pharmaceutical information, joint medical research with the Tunisian-based 'Pasteur Institute', 
and disease prevention and road accidents.650 Increased joint medical co-operation, during the 
last decade of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century, can be observed. The 
UN sanctions on Libya restricted the overseas movement of Libyans through its national 
airports. A deterioration in health conditions during this period encouraged Libyan-Tunisian 
co-operation in the field of medical services. High quality provision of health care, closer ties 
with Tunisia, and its close proximity, through accessible land transport, led many Libyan 
patients to seek medical treatment in the nearby country. These factors made it necessary for 
Libya and Tunisia to increase co-operation in the area of health.651  
 
The Joint Committee on Health played a key role in formulating and implementing plans for 
medical co-operation. Hospitals in Tunisia and Libya were to exchange the knowledge 
learned from experience in the field of medical provision, and to take part in twinning 
agreements.652 The development of expertise in the drugs and vaccine industry and in 
administration was also part of the strengthening bilateral ties. Subsequently, Tunisian 
medical experts trained their Libyan counterparts in this field with a special emphasis on drug 
control expertise.653 Frequent visits by medical professionals to medical institutions were to 
take place. Medical co-operation included various aspects, such as knowledge exchange and 
infrastructure reforms. Training in drug control654 and the exchange of medical expertise and 
specialist consultants655 were highlighted. Co-ordination of disease prevention and treatment 
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at the shared borders of the countries was a key area of action.656 Joint Libyan-Tunisian 
hospitals and health centres were to be established.657 Further, there were to be plans for the 
creation of management mechanisms for these joint hospitals.658 Medical teams were to be 
assigned in both countries.659 A joint arrangement for the purchase of drugs was to be 
introduced, accompanied by giving priority to nationally-produced drugs on the basis of 
quality and competitiveness.660 Libya and Tunisia had made some joint investments in the 
endeavour to deepen their ties in this area. The Libyan National Medicine Company and the 
Tunisian Pharmaceutical and Medical Equipment Centre agreed to produce drugs. In this 
respect, from 1974, Libya participated in establishing the 'Medicine Company', which aimed 
to manufacture medical equipment in Tunisia. However, the heightening of political tension 
between the regimes of Gaddafi and Bourguiba adversely affected the functioning of this 
company for about 20 years. In 2004, Libya bought all the shares in the company and 
relocated its headquarters to the city of Grombalia. The company markets its pharmaceutical 
products in Libya, Tunisia and Algeria.661 
Joint Policies in the Transport Sector 
Road networks and transport services are essential components for the facilitation of 
economic integration. Agreements or co-operation were thus signed between Libya and 
Tunisia, seeking to improve the infrastructure connecting their two territories. The movement 
of goods experienced a remarkable increase in volume after Ben Ali became President, with 
the leaders of both countries pushing for greater integration. Cross-border trade created an 
interdependent relationship involving the travel of people. Sub-committees have been 
established since 1994 to make plans for the creation of effective transport networks. The 
Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee focused its efforts on implementing the Joint 
Agreement that was concluded in meetings in Tripoli on 30th and 31st July, 1996.662 Easing 
the facilitation of the flow of goods and people was a key aspect of the Agreement, with its 
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emphasis on the unification of the import tariffs of Tunisia and Libya. Vehicles crossing the 
border were required to have the correctly imposed insurance. Additionally, the agreement 
allowed for the transfer of transport revenues, in accordance with the accepted regulations in 
each of the two countries. Finally, Libya and Tunisia agreed that the terms of the transport 
agreement should be for 5 years and could automatically be renewed.663 
 
Joint teams of specialists were founded to explore the opportunities for maritime transport 
between Libya and Tunisia. All available resources and mechanisms were to be deployed to 
develop this area of co-operation. A maritime route linking Libya's capital to Sfax was to be 
established.664 An agreement concerning maritime transport, made in 2001, was then 
implemented in 2003, which involved the training of maritime staff, maintenance of ships 
and the opening of a sea route for passengers and goods. Further, this route was to facilitate 
the traffic for trade between Libya and Tunisia, and to other Arab and African countries. 
Interestingly, the bilateral relations between these two Maghrebi countries expanded its scope 
of activity in the import and export sector of the economy. Foreign markets for Tunisian and 
Libyan goods could now be targeted. Maritime transport, investment and manufacturing were 
brought together in the joint policy between Tunisia and Libya in the African continent, and 
other regions. In the aforementioned agreement on maritime transport, the Libyan National 
Fleet Company participated in moving goods from Tunisian ports to neighbouring countries.  
 
This agreement was considered to be a step forward in promoting economic co-operation 
between Libyan and Tunisian companies. It appeared at a crucial time for the company, 
which was charged with the task of transporting Tunisian goods. Major technical, financial 
and management difficulties were faced by the Libyan public sector, including the maritime 
services. The maritime company used outdated transport ships which were incapable of 
coping with the requirements of the Joint Agreement. Government subsidies were ended by 
the Libyan regime, thereby increasing the problems of the company after 2002. The 
combination of a lack of work and a large work force contributed to the making of losses. A 
number of vessels, such as the Toalitla, the Granata and the Hana, were thus sold in order to 
cover debts and other financial obligations. Financial and administrative corruption in the 
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company further added to its inability to survive. The problems just mentioned finally led to 
the dissolution of the Libyan Maritime Fleet Company.665  
Joint Policies in Social Welfare 
Domestic affairs, in the form of policies and rules on pensions and the welfare of the labour 
force in Tunisia and Libya, were the focus of co-operation and integration.666 The facilitation 
of the movement of workers between countries and their employment in the two countries 
was also subject to these joint policies.667 Thousands of Tunisians had migrated to Libya to 
find work and they were residing there on a semi-permanent basis. The presence of a large 
number of nationals working abroad brought tangible benefits to Tunisia, allowing it to 
defuse the prospect of many social problems. Lower levels of unemployment, especially 
among the youth, was complemented by a reduction in the number of people living in poverty 
and resorting to crime. World Bank figures show the number of people living below the 
national poverty line in Tunisia dropped from 32.4% in 2000, to 15.5% in 2010.668 The lack 
of a qualified national labour force in Libya was compensated by the influx of Tunisian 
expertise. Libyan-Tunisian joint policies were influenced by these social and economic 
factors. The free movement of citizens between the Maghrebi countries was thus encouraged 
for the purpose of employment or private enterprise.669 
 
Social welfare targeting the needs of disabled people was also an area of co-operation 
between Tunisia and Libya. Efforts were made to co-ordinate policies in both countries, 
supported by the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee. It had recommended that a 
wide range of activities to plan and implement projects of co-operation, such as: collecting 
information in a database through studies in the social welfare of the disabled, which was 
intended to help the formulation of appropriate policies; the use of financial and human 
resources for the purpose of providing equipment, qualified experts and training for future 
professionals in social care; regular workshops were to be planned and held to raise social 
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awareness of disability in Tunisia and Libya; the funding of scholarships to study the social 
factors directly relating to disability; and the pursuing of twinning agreements between social 
and training organisations involved in working with disabled people, and exchange visits for 
the disabled and the centres looking after them.670 In Tunisia and Libya, the question of social 
welfare was broadly defined to include disability. The regimes in both countries created the 
conditions for the formation of joint committees to study and put forward policies with the 
objective of improving the quality of life of their citizens. However, the shared policies 
adopted by the Ben Ali and Gaddafi regimes were based on alleviating poverty or social 
problems through agreements formalising the ability of citizens to cross the border for 
employment.  
Educational Joint Policies 
Major differences existed between the Libyan and Tunisian educational systems whereby the 
establishment of genuine co-operation was often complicated. Previous socialist and populist 
policies in Libya had eroded the quality of education at all levels. It appears that from the 
1990s extensive oil wealth did not contribute to the development of education in the areas of 
policy, infrastructure and curriculum.671 Gaddafi's populist ideology was present in the 
academic syllabus. The education of young Libyans was to incorporate political 
indoctrination of Gaddafi's ideas and beliefs. Elementary schools, high schools, colleges and 
universities were part of a wider system of authoritarianism which ensured the regime's 
official ideology was disseminated to all Libyans. This populist ideology proposed that 
students were to run academic institutions. Notions such as 'Student Revolutionary 
Management' and 'Student Movement Participation' demonstrated the involvement of politics, 
from the top-down, in defining Libyan society. Like-minded students were thus given the 
opportunity to manage institutions of study and to learn, at the expense of the university 
administration and staff. However, those students who did not adopt the official ideology, or 
who fell out of favour with the regime, were subsequently punished. A number of university 
students who were followers of Libyan opposition groups were executed in 1976, and 
academics were targeted in public executions. 
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I will briefly mention the following aspects of Libya's educational system in order to better 
discuss the joint co-operation between Tunisia and Libya: its institutions of education were 
restricted to the vision of Gaddafi's ideology, with a marked absence of alternative 
intellectual orientations for the enrichment of the critical thinking of students; the national 
curriculum, largely based on traditional methods of teaching and learning, did not keep up 
with global standards; educational policies were not continuously adapted to changing 
national or global socio-economic needs; and the criterion for competence was not used in the 
recruitment of teachers and staff in academic institutions, with political affiliation being the 
main criterion for employment.672 Further, Libyans were forced to suffer from low standards 
of teaching and learning, which did not equip them with the skills needed to have a 
meaningful collaboration with academics or educational systems from other nations. The 
authoritarian regime exercised power through rigid control of various social organisations in 
Libya, and it created relationships of dependency for those wishing to progress in education, 
both as students and teachers. Any form of dissent was not allowed in schools or on 
campuses.  
 
The educational system of Tunisia is markedly more advanced if compared to its Libyan 
neighbour. The academic curriculum is different in both content and objectives. 
Contemporary Tunisia inherited the model of French education from the colonial period. 
Under Habib Bourguiba, with his Francophile beliefs which were discussed in Chapter 5, the 
new regime did not reject the cultural values of the former colonial authorities. Instead, the 
independence period witnessed the continued domination of French culture in government 
policies including education. There were also modifications to the provision of education 
involving greater space for the instruction of the Arabic language. Post-colonial Tunisia 
experienced a jump in student numbers in primary and secondary schools, from 226,736 and 
32,900 for 1956-57, to 898,464 and 178,997 for 1974-75, respectively.673 I think Tunisia's 
educational system has been better able to respond to the changes in the country's national 
economy than Libya’s due to particular factors. A French-inspired academic syllabus was 
implemented by Tunisian educationalists seeking to create an effective labour force with 
suitable skills and the knowledge needed in a developing economy. A changing system of 
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education allowed it to be more responsive to socio-economic changes in Tunisia.674 Political 
affiliations did not impede the teaching and learning process, where teachers, staff and 
students adhere to a formally defined sphere. The politicisation of educational institutions did 
not occur at the same level as was found in Libyan institutions. A huge gap between Libya 
and Tunisia appeared to have demonstrated the poor prospects of joint co-operation in the 
provision of education in these two states. 
 
Nonetheless, there were some activities undertaken to co-operate in this sector. The Libyan-
Tunisian High Executive Committee, founded in 1995, and other committees, led a few 
initiatives to co-ordinate the sphere of Tunisian and Libyan academic curricula. Educational 
specialists were urged to help improve all aspects of pre-higher education levels. Further, the 
promotion of universities was a priority, with a focus on the scientific research undertaken in 
these institutions.675 Stubborn limits to co-operation between the two countries emerged. 
Only a few twinning agreements were made between the universities and research centres. 
Agreements specifying the organising of scientific workshops, scholarly exchanges and the 
joint supervision of academic research were not implemented.676 Mutual recognition of 
higher education certificates of qualification, in accordance with a 1989 agreement,677 
indicated the absence of any real integration in the education systems of Tunisia and Libya. 
While the educational system of Tunisia was directed at the generation of school leavers and 
university graduates able to join the employed labour force, largely free of ideological 
constraints, the Libyan system was still a mechanism of control for the authoritarian regime. 
Further, the politicisation of the syllabus and university campuses put severe limits on what 
could be taught, in accordance with the wishes of the Gaddafi regime, despite the decline of 
ideology in foreign policy.  
Joint Electricity Networks 
The demands of a modern economy are tied to the generation and supply of electricity. 
Economic integration between Tunisia and Libya was thus also dependent on fostering links 
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in their national electricity grids. The planning and implementation of a shared electricity 
framework was to be jointly undertaken by the Libyan Electricity Public Company and the 
Tunisian Electricity and Gas Company, authorised by the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive 
Committee. In May, 1997, the two companies carried out a cost-benefit analysis and a 
feasibility study for the proposed project, followed by an agreement to construct and finance 
it. Preparation of the legal, organisation and financial arrangements for the joint electricity 
grid took place between 1997 and 2001. Work on the project was expected to begin in July, 
2001.678 A delay in the implementation of a few aspects of the necessary technical work also 
led to a delay in the start date, which was to be at the end of 2003.679  
 
Strategic benefits from the project for both Libya and Tunisia motivated co-operation in this 
sector of the economy. Both countries were co-operating in other sectors of the economy, 
including shared projects in the exploitation of energy sources and Libyan investment in 
Tunisian tourism. Political elites in Tunis and Tripoli were firmly in charge of the process of 
co-operation, based on the shared goal of development. Libyan oil and gas were greatly 
needed in Tunisia. The joint project on the electricity grid can be perceived to have fallen in a 
linked process that fell between driving the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy, on 
the one hand, and extracting natural resources for energy, on the other. Further economic and 
technical studies were undertaken by Libya and Tunisia in order to raise the voltage of the 
electrical connection between them to 400 kilovolt (KV). The findings of these studies 
pointed to the project's high prospects of success in a number of areas.680 Its objectives were: 
to cover the deficit in electricity supplies in Libya and Tunisia and to avoid power cuts in 
case of emergencies and technical faults in the electricity grid;681 to use natural resources, 
namely oil and natural gas, for the efficient generation and supply of power to serve their 
needs and plans;682 and to be part of a wider regional electricity grid, with the potential to 
incorporate other countries in the Maghreb and Egypt, Syria and Iraq.683 Self-sufficiency in 
the supply of power seems to have been a major aim of the Libyan and Tunisian regimes. 
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Regime-led efforts in economic integration through the construction of electrical cables and 
power stations leading to a single electricity grid, could achieve this objective.  
 
The proposed project of an integrated electricity grid focused on upgrading existing power 
stations and distribution networks. Power stations at Abu-Kammash and Al-Ruwais were 
upgraded and developed to the higher capacity 220 KV. Similarly, the extension of the 
capacity electrical cable, 220 KV, in western Libya, was completed in order to be connected 
to Tunisian cables. Tunisia upgraded the necessary technical work for the joint project in its 
territory. A power station was built in Midinina, accompanied by the development of other 
power stations, such as Abu-Shama, Sidi Mansour, Tataouine and Zarzis in the southern parts 
of the country. Electricity cables covering a distance of 370 KMs. were built in order to link 
the power stations with Tunisian urban and rural areas. Finally, the connection was 
completed between Tataouine Power Station and the Al-Ruwais Power Station in Libya.684  
 
Integration of energy supply and electricity was to be achieved through the project focusing 
on the electricity grids of Tunisia and Libya. The Libyan-Tunisian High Executive 
Committee paid considerable attention to the step-by-step implementation of this project. It 
has conducted studies and made recommendations on the bilateral co-operation so as to boost 
the electricity supply of both Maghrebi countries, based on a joint grid. Problems have 
emerged at various stages of the project. A lack of funding from the companies, namely, the 
Libyan Electricity Public Company and the Tunisian Electricity and Gas Company, which are 
in charge, has delayed the integration process. A number of obstacles in the finalisation of the 
integrated electricity grid have emerged. Technical experts, after carrying out the first 
practical test on the joint project in 2003, which was followed by another test in 2008, 
pointed to the existence of problems. They were recorded in documents from the meetings of 
the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee.685 Integration efforts in the area of 
electricity links between Libya and Tunisia were only intended to provide a maximum of 220 
KV. The two countries aimed to increase this capacity to 400 KV.. However, this target was 
not met by the Ben Ali and Gaddafi regimes. It was still subject to technical studies and it 
also needed more negotiations within the ELTAM group, which includes Egypt, Libya, 
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Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.686 The formalising of the policy agenda for economic 
integration through a single electricity grid between Tunisia and Libya was partly based on 
studies into its impact on these countries. However, the political will of the regime of both 
countries is the important driving force, as shown in previous sections and chapters, for the 
effectiveness of the projects of bilateral co-operation. The committees formed exclusively for 
various aspects of Libyan-Tunisian integration were part of a process which included the 
companies running the proposed projects. Reluctance on the part of the regime could hinder, 
or stop completely, the implementation of joint projects.  
 
Conclusion 
The attempt to maintain bilateral relations between Tunisia and Libya has depended on the 
existence of joint committees, such as the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee. 
These committees have generated information and advised on policy. Increased co-operation 
in various industries and sectors has been the main motivating factor. This chapter has 
analysed official documents from government archives and other sources under three 
sections. Economic integration has been uneven, varying from industry to industry. Section 
One examined the bilateral agreements in the primary sector of the economy, with attention 
to the areas of agriculture and fishing, oil and natural gas. Knowledge exchange and long 
experience of agriculture in Tunisia, was needed in Libya. Agreements made thus encouraged 
Tunisian investments in the Libyan farming industry. The Libyan-Tunisian Company for 
Agricultural Equipment was founded in 1993 in order to provide the resources needed to 
strengthen co-operation between the Maghrebi neighbours. However, failures in the form of a 
lack of funding for projects such as the al-Wa'rah Pasture and the reluctance of Algeria to 
take part in inter-state initiatives in the Maghreb were obstacles to the implementation of 
agricultural-related projects. Oil and natural gas saw co-operation between Tunisia and Libya 
after the resolution of the continental plate dispute, an area which contained the Bouri Oil 
Field, renamed the 7th November Oil Field in tribute to the ousting of Bourguiba. Libya led 
the push for greater collaboration in oil exploitation and the gas pipelines that were to be built 
between Libya and Tunisia. Formalisation through committees, such as the Libyan-Tunisian 
High Executive Committee, and signed agreements, kept the private sector from participating 
in the exploitation of the lucrative area of natural resources. In Libya, the control of the oil 
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industry was essential in order to maintain the authoritarian character of the regime, which 
continued this control.  
The second section examined the projects of co-operation in the industrial policies of Tunisia 
and Libya. Investment was to play a large role in stimulating bilateral relations between both 
countries in the attempt to benefit their economies. Studies and agreements were made to 
identify the areas which needed attention. Libyan efforts to attract Tunisian investment in 
manufacturing were motivated by the fact that local businessmen in Libya were wary of 
financing projects, due to the previous experience of socialism, and the public sector was 
victim to incompetence and corruption. However, most of the joint projects proposed were 
not implemented in a context that was defined by the absence of harmonisation in the 
following areas, e.g., legal systems, national infrastructures, labour forces and expertise. 
Formalisation did not bring about integration. Instead, it showed the limits of co-operation 
between authoritarian regimes with no popular base in two dissimilar economies, especially 
in Gaddafi's Libya, with its history of excluding private enterprise.  
 
Section Three examined the tertiary sector of the economy through analysis of official 
documents from Tunisia and Libya. Tourism, health, transport, education and electricity 
formed key aspects of co-operation between the regimes of these states. The progress of 
integration and co-operation differed in each of these industries. While Tunisian expertise 
was badly needed in Libya in order to create a national tourism industry, Libyan investments 
were made in Tunisia's tourist businesses. The latter was a lucrative source of revenue for 
Libyan-backed companies working in the country, with Libyans making up the largest 
number of visitors. However, attempts to stimulate tourism in Libya were undermined, as 
noted in the previous chapter, by the intrusion of the security services. A potential threat to 
the political regime required the security services not only to monitor foreign visitors, but to 
own tourist companies to ensure the tight control of the industry.  
Socialist policies in Libya had failed to create an adequate health service that was able to 
respond to the needs of Libyans. Instead, many went to neighbouring Tunisia, which had an 
established reputation for providing medical facilities and for being a centre for medical 
tourism in the region. Educating medical professionals was a major problem in Libya 
,thereby requiring Tunisian expertise in the form of knowledge exchange between the two 
nations and the creation of joint hospitals and medical centres. The pharmaceutical industry 
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also witnessed joint collaboration. This chapter, and the previous one, noted the marked 
increase in the volume of cross-border trade between Tunisia and Libya. An interdependent 
trading relationship was growing which needed a joint infrastructure able to cope and sustain 
it. Since 1994, committees and sub-committees had discussed and recommended an 
agreement, with plans for effective transport links. A formalising of the accreditation of 
vehicles crossing the border was introduced in the form of correctly imposed insurance. A sea 
route was also to be created between Tripoli and Sfax. Bilateral relations in maritime 
transport were to involve the training of staff, maintenance of ships and the opening of a sea 
route for passengers and goods, with the latter connecting Tunisia and Libya to other Arab 
and African countries. However, the Libyan Maritime Fleet Company was incapable of 
coping with the conditions of the agreement as it had outdated ships and was ruined by 
corruption, which eventually led its closure.  
The welfare of Tunisians and Libyans was pursued in a joint policy of facilitating the 
movement of workers across the border of their nations. Thousands of Tunisians were 
working in Libya on a semi-permanent basis. The Tunisian regime was thus able to defuse 
many social problems, such as youth unemployment, poverty and crime. As a result, the 
number of those living under the national poverty line in Tunisia dropped from 32.4% in 
2000, to 15.5% in 2010. In the area of caring for disabled people, Libya and Tunisia co-
operated to improve their quality of life. Correct information, suitable policies, equipment, 
qualified experts, the training of social care professionals, were all to be achieved jointly. 
While Libya's populist and socialist policies had undermined the creation of an adequate 
labour force through its schools and universities, Tunisia's colonial era education system 
responded to changes in the country's socio-economic situation. Agreements to co-operate to 
improve the school system and higher education in both countries, through the sharing of 
knowledge and expertise, did not occur. However, each country's certificates of higher 
education were recognised.  
Libyan-Tunisian bilateral relations in electricity were relatively more successful than co-
operation in their educational systems. Formalisation of these relations was based on the 
creation of a single electricity grid. The Libyan Electricity Public Company and the Tunisian 
Electricity and Gas Company played a prominent role in planning and implementing this 
project, which was backed by the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee. The 
construction of new power stations and the updating of older stations were complemented by 
the building of electricity cables connecting Tunisia and Libya, as a step on the path to 
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integration. Committees were formed to study and formulate policy. However, the 
authoritarian regimes of Tripoli and Tunis imposed limits on the formalising of Libyan-
Tunisian ties. Potential pressure from businessmen on the need for an infrastructure 
supplying the energy needs for factories and other industries was effectively silenced in 
Libya. A monopoly on the oil industry and the distribution of its revenues by the Gaddafi 
regime meant that the country's political elite could ignore the demands from the private 
sector for a national infrastructure that was based on a shared electricity grid in the area of 
joint economic co-operation. The direction and pace of integration could be changed or 
slowed, respectively, by these regimes in a personal and, at times, random fashion. 
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CONCLUSION: 
 REFLECTIONS, STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
 
Introduction 
The modern history of the Maghreb does not indicate a strong trend towards integration, with 
political actors pursuing goals that are motivated by different interests and ideologies. I have 
tried in this thesis to investigate the impact of ideology in the region, with a special focus on 
Libyan-Tunisian bilateral relations from the date of their independence until the first ten 
years of the 20th century. Tunisia and Libya provide an interesting case of two states that 
were created by different colonial powers, the French and the Italians, respectively, in a 
period which also saw the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Independence, for Tunisia and 
Libya, brought many opportunities for change and continuity. The emergence of political 
elites, rather than the presence of the state, appears to have had an influential role in shaping 
inter-state relations in the Maghreb. The ideology, or lack of ideology, adopted by political 
elites could thus decisively improve or damage ties between countries, such as the situation 
involving Tunisia and Libya. I proposed a hypothesis in this thesis in order to explore 
Libyan-Tunisian inter-state relations from 1969 to 2010. In Chapter 1, I stated that two key 
periods divide these relations. The first highlighted the dominance of ideology and the 
generally bitter relations between Libya and Tunisia. The rise of Muammar Gaddafi after the 
coup d'état against King Idris I in 1969, installed a new revolutionary regime in Tripoli and 
also created another threat to Bourguiba's position in Tunisia as 'President-for-life'. Twenty 
years of hostilities dominated the political and personal relationships between Bourguiba and 
Gaddafi, except for during the short-lived Islamic Arab Republic in 1974. Nonetheless, I 
suggested the ideology adopted by these two leaders led to bitter and difficult relations.  
The second period witnessed a remarkable reversal of the mood in the relations between 
Libya and Tunisia after 1987. Zine El Abidine Ben Ali ousted the man, Bourguiba, who had 
appointed him Prime Minister, and became President with a new agenda on the issue of 
Tunisian-Libyan ties. Various factors can help to explain why this change happened. 
Economic reforms in Tunisia were complemented by the international embargo on Libya, 
which forced it to trade with its immediate neighbours. I proposed that Gaddafi reduced the 
influence of ideology on his foreign policy for the purpose of defusing the hardships facing 
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his regime and country. Ben Ali and Gaddafi thus fostered closer ties to gain political security 
for their regimes through projects of economic co-operation with mutual benefits. The 
decline of ideology, marking a change from the period between 1969 and 1987, led to 
developments in economic and political relations with a number of pragmatic joint policies 
that were adopted to achieve what were perceived to be Tunisian and Libyan shared interests. 
I formulated a set of research questions with the aim of exploring the hypothesis outlined 
above. They were divided into two categories. The first category contains a question that 
asks: 'How has the decline of the role of ideology in Tunisian-Libya relations led to greater 
co-operation between the two countries?'. The second category asked the following 
questions: 'What is the context within which Libyan-Tunisian relations have developed?'; 
'What were the motivations behind the inter-state policies pursued by Tunisian and Libyan 
statesmen?'; 'How were Libyan-Tunisian relations manifested?' and 'What are the challenges 
and obstacles hindering co-operation between Libya and Tunisia?’ Category one focuses on 
the general implications of the hypothesis, and the second category was interested in 
exploring it in greater detail. 
The combination of the hypothesis and the research questions was an important element in 
the grounded theory approach that is adopted in this thesis, in light of the particular aspects of 
the case study. Libyan-Tunisian relations are located in a historical context which has 
produced a set of political, economic and social factors requiring categories of analysis or 
interpretation that can put forward a persuasive account of these relations. Broader 
international and regional factors create the context for local actors to shape processes and 
events. Opportunities and limitations are thus created so political elites can govern with, or 
without, public participation. In the Maghreb, under Bourguiba, Ben Ali and Gaddafi, 
regimes restricted the ability of citizens to take part in the decision-making process of their 
countries. Authoritarian regimes were created and maintained through the nationalisation and 
control of national resources and companies, which was supported by the existence of 
security services. Formal state institutions, such as the ruling party or popular committees, 
concealed the real location of power. Informal ties between individuals and groups shaped the 
policies of Libya and Tunisia. The informal sphere was able to undermine the formal sphere 
through the personal nature of power within the Bourguiba, Ben Ali and Gaddafi regimes. 
The ability of authoritarianism to marginalise or manipulate the formal institutions of the 
state reinforced the informal sphere of power which exists in kinship ties, or in the personal 
relationships between a ruler and his cronies. Vast amounts of wealth were concentrated in 
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the hands of a few individuals who were family members and cronies. Economic motivations 
were part of the calculations of these narrowly defined elites. Privatisation or socialism still 
served to reinforce the informal power of regimes, such as Ben Ali's or Gaddafi's. Various 
levels of analysis are contained in this grounded theory, consisting of the international and 
regional contexts which allow political actors to behave in certain ways in the formal and 
informal areas of power that are supplemented by material factors, such as the generation of 
wealth. Existing theories, such as neo-functionalism, are Eurocentric and ignore the specific 
characteristics of the Maghreb and other regions, which have histories entirely different from 
the history of Europe in the 20th century. I have examined this weakness in the first chapter 
and I will also revisit it in a later section in the conclusion. My contribution to the existing 
literature on Libyan-Tunisian relations is primarily based on the lack of attention, observed in 
Chapter 2, on this subject. Most of the publications focused on EU-Maghreb relations and the 
scope for integration between these two regions. Security based concerns about limiting 
immigration and other potential threats from the southern Mediterranean are key themes in 
the secondary sources. However, bilateral relations between Tunisia and Libya appear to have 
been generally ignored. I have thus chosen to apply grounded theory to the exploration of 
Libyan-Tunisian relations between 1969 and 2010. The primary sources collected in this 
thesis have been used to formulate a set of categories for analysis that are outlined below in 
the form of reflections. These are international and regional factors, the durability of 
authoritarianism, the dynamics between the informal and formal spheres, and economic 
motivations. 
 
Reflections and Theory 
International and Regional Factors 
Inter-state relations between Tunisia and Libya appear to have been a product of domestic 
factors, on the one hand, and regional and international factors, on the other. Changes in 
global affairs affected the behaviour of the political elites and regimes in the Maghreb and in 
other regions. The Cold War, during the 20th century, was a very significant period for Arab 
politics, with the major economic ideologies of socialism and capitalism competing against 
each other. Nationalism was a strong force and was adopted in various forms by established 
or new regimes. In the Arab world, the division of regimes between 'radical' and 
'conservative' produced bitter rivalries among the member states of the Arab League. Chapter 
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5 examined the effects of this split on Tunisian-Libyan ties. The presence of Jamal Abdul 
Nasser, later to be joined by Ahmed Ben Bella and Muammar Gaddafi, isolated Bourguiba in 
the politics of the Maghreb and the Arab world. Nasserism, named after Nasser, dreamed of a 
single Arab state uniting the colonially divided Arabs in an age of imperialism. Gaddafi, after 
1969, quickly adopted this point of view, which was completely at odds with Bourguiba's 
conservative ideology of Tunisian nationalism and Tunisia's role in geopolitics. The idea of 
the 'Tunisian nation' was defined according to the specific dialect spoken by Tunisians, and 
the dominance of the Maliki School of Islamic jurisprudence. This view was advocated by 
Bourguiba and Bashir Ben Salama in their attempt to distinguish Tunisia from Maghrebi and 
Arab countries that were inspired by the French idea of the nationalism. Tunisia was thus a 
nation in her own right, without reference to other identities. Such a view generated tensions 
and conflicts between Bourguiba's Tunisia and pan-Arab interpretations of identity. The 
ideology of Gaddafi was forcefully pan-Arab and rejected the borders dividing his country 
from those of other Arab states. Tunisia's regime, under Bourguiba, was worried about the 
threat to the country's sovereignty.  
However, the Tunisian President ignored his fears of being swallowed up by oil-rich and 
revolutionary Libya in 1974, in the ill-fated Islamic Arab Republic. The new state was to be 
led by Bourguiba as the President, and Gaddafi would be both Prime Minister and Defence 
Minister, as stipulated in the Djerba Agreement. Strong opposition to this political union 
came from Bourguiba's own supporters, his wife and his Prime Minister, Hedi Nouira, and 
Algeria's Houari Boumediene put an end to the joint agreement between Bourguiba and 
Gaddafi. Although Bourguiba disliked pan-Arabism, especially Nasserism, he was more 
inclined towards a pan-Maghrebi vision in North Africa. If Tunisia would join a project for 
integration, whether political or economic, then the Maghreb was the best possible candidate. 
The domination of Nasser in the Mashreq, and Bourguiba's dislike of military dictatorships 
after the attempted coup against him in 1963, ruled out union with the Arab world's eastern 
states. The Gafsa crisis further worsened relations between Tunisia and Libya in the context 
of the hostility between radical and conservative regimes in the Maghreb region. Libyan-
trained Tunisian militants attempted to capture the town of Gafsa in Tunisia in order to 
overthrow Bourguiba. Interestingly, according to Nour -Eddin al-Alawi, a Tunisian thinker, 
the Algerian intelligence services had supported these militants. The inter-state relations 
dominating the Maghreb created an atmosphere of fear for Bourguiba, who was worried 
about the stability of his regime against plans to oust him that came from radical ideological 
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states. Force and agreements were both used by Gaddafi to implement, in practice, his 
ideology of pan-Arabism with the member-states of the Arab League. Actual or proposed 
political unions between Libya and other states, such as with Egypt and Sudan in 1970, show 
both Gaddafi's enthusiasm for pan-Arabism as a unitary state, and the failure of instant 
unification. Gaddafi's ideological vision of Arab integration failed to realise any long-term 
benefits and actually alienated him from his neighbours, such as Bourguiba to his west, and 
Nasser's successor in Egypt, Anwar al-Sadat, who once described him as ‘al-walad al-
majnun’ (the crazy boy).  
Suspension of diplomatic ties between Libya and Tunisia from 1985-1987, in the last decade 
of the Cold War, preceded a radical transformation in these two countries' relations. In 1987, 
Ben Ali removed Bourguiba and pursued better relations with Gaddafi in Libya. The Arab 
world witnessed the gradual end of socialism, with economic liberalisation being introduced 
in Egypt, Jordan, Algeria and Tunisia. Libya's oil-based economy, together with a small 
population, could ignore the International Monetary Fund's strict neo-liberal reform strategy 
in the region. Chapter 7 observed that Libya also rejected the advice of the IMF because it did 
not want any external or foreign intrusion in the decision-making process of the Gaddafi 
regime. The Ben Ali regime introduced domestic reforms which aimed to build bridges in the 
Maghreb and to benefit from foreign direct investment coming from both inside and outside 
the region. I will elaborate further on the role of economic motivations underlying the 
improvement in bilateral ties between Tunisia and Libya in a later section. Additionally, Ben 
Ali revised the idea of Tunisian nationalism to include Islam and the Arab world. At the 
beginning of his reign, he advocated a greater engagement with other Muslim and Arab states 
in what appeared to be a complete reversal from the Bourguiba era’s policies. Tunisia would 
no longer stand by itself, and it would work with others in the Arab world. The responses of 
the Gaddafi regime to this change in rhetoric and actions were mutual. Arabism's 
revolutionary agenda began to disappear, with ideology playing an increasingly weaker role 
in defining Libya's foreign policy in the Arab world and in Africa.  
The end of the Cold War and the defeat of Libya's superpower ally, the USSR, sent the 
message that socialism and communism were no longer viable ideologies. Gaddafi's ideology 
combined Arabism, populism and socialism in an authoritarian mix. Previous divisions 
between radical and conservative regimes in the Arab world were weakening, with Egypt's 
peace treaty with Israel, followed by Jordan and the recognition by the PLO of the state of 
Israel. Egypt, no longer led by Nasser, had joined the conservative camp of Arab states with 
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Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Under Hosni Mubarak, Egyptian troops took part in the 
American-led coalition against Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, while a co-ordinated Libyan-
Tunisian effort was made to stop the First Gulf War. However, Libya found itself alone in the 
region, which was made worse by the international sanctions imposed on the country between 
1992 and 2004. The global context of Libya's revolutionary politics had led to the damaging 
of the regime's reputation and also to punishment for acts of terrorism of which it was 
accused, such as the Lockerbie disaster. Libya was thus forced to look closer to home for 
economic and political support.  
Tunisia and other African states proved to be reliable allies in getting around the UN-imposed 
embargo. Imported goods arrived through Tunisia, and Libyans were able to travel abroad 
from Tunisian airports. In the Maghreb, ideological conflicts had generated a civil war in 
Algeria between radical Islamists and the military regime. Populist ideologies could no 
longer guarantee the support of a regime from its citizens nor could it buy legitimacy. A shift 
from the Arab world to Africa in Libya's foreign policy was complemented by Tunisia 
focusing its attention on the continent. Bilateral relations between Libya and Tunisia occurred 
through joint investment opportunities and membership in regional organisations, such as the 
African Union and the Arab Maghreb Union. The motivations of Libya differed from Tunisia 
motivations in various ways. Libya needed strategic support during the diplomatic crisis 
arising from the Lockerbie disaster, and it rewarded the African states for their loyalty, since 
it encouraged private Libyan investors to make investments in those countries. Tunisia used 
its joint investment policy with Libya for the marketing of the nation's goods and services. 
While the Ben Ali regime aimed to open new export markets as a result of Libyan-Tunisian 
joint policy in Africa, Gaddafi wanted to strengthen his political, diplomatic and economic 
links with his African allies. Generally, Tunisian open economic policies were inspired by a 
neo-liberal agenda. Hamid Karoui's, Ben Ali's second Prime Minister, position on the draft 
budget for 1999 was based on the argument that "the protection of Tunisian products, and the 
national economy would be by winning competition and exportation bids, as well as by 
transferring competition outside Tunisia. Besides, foreigners will inevitably bring their 
products into Tunisia, and it is impossible to close the doors against them".687 The 
international context during the 1990s appears to have created the conditions for open 
borders, particularly for goods, not just in the Maghreb, but throughout the world.  
                                                 
687 Hamid Karoui, 'Speech by Tunisian Prime Minister, Hamid Karoui, at the closure of the deliberations of the 
Tunisian Parliament debate on the financial budget bill for 1999.(Tunis, Tunisia 28/12/1998).  
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Authoritarianism: New Regimes or the Reinvention of an Old Era 
Despite the republican or populist expression of the politics of Tunisia and Libya, most 
citizens were excluded from the decision-making processes of power. The rise of 
authoritarian regimes in these two countries, part of a broader trend in the Arab world, 
introduced a type of politics that was based on a narrow social foundation, but with a wide 
economic base. Post-colonial states in the Maghreb concentrated power in the hands of anti-
colonial elites. The National Liberation Front (FLN), the Neo-Constitutionalist Party and the 
Senoussiyya monarchy claimed legitimacy through their leadership of the struggle to free 
their countries from colonialism. However, independence did not bring democracy. Instead, 
Tunisia became a one-party state led by Bourguiba and King Idris I, who exercised absolute 
power and was overthrown by a group of young military officers, and Libya was transformed 
into a republic without a democratic character. Authoritarianism, in the Arab context, is 
influenced by different factors that vary from country to country. History, politics, 
economics, society and culture have played instrumental parts in creating and sustaining 
political elites, which appear to be autonomous from their societies. A wide economic base 
under the domination of the Libyan and Tunisian regimes, from banking to natural resources 
to public companies, meant that they could ignore their citizens and the opposition 
movements. No political compromises were sought to obtain the economic co-operation of 
citizens, since a representative system based on tax-paying individuals was not present. This 
is how the personal power exercised by Bourguiba was dissimilar from the mechanisms of 
authority used by Gaddafi in Libya. Bourguiba's Neo-Constitutionalist Party was the ruling 
party in Tunisia, with no real competitors. The opposition was kept under rigid control. Other 
political parties in the country were banned. The Tunisian leader and his inner circle, family 
members and like-minded colleagues, in the Neo-Constitutionalist party, were able to 
determine public policies.  
Similarly, Gaddafi was surrounded by his close allies and supporters. Although I will discuss 
the informal dimension of Libyan-Tunisian bilateral relations, it is also relevant to the 
examination of the existence of authoritarianism in the Libyan and Tunisian contexts. 
Chapters 3 and 4 identified the tribal nature of King Idris I's political authority. His authority 
was also a product of being the head of the Senoussiyya Sufi Brotherhood, which had resisted 
Italian colonialism. Tribal and religious dimensions were thus present in the legitimacy 
claimed by Idris in order to rule over Libya. The founder of the Senoussiyya Order, Idris's 
grandfather, wanted to reform Islam and purify it from un-Islamic elements. However, 
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change was to be gradual and without revolution. Post-colonial Libya under the monarchy 
interpreted Islam to support the new state's conservative agenda. Gaddafi soon changed the 
relationship between religion and politics. Islam was going to be a revolutionary set of beliefs 
complementing socialism, Arabism and populism. Nonetheless, Gaddafi was forced to rely 
on the tribes in the same way as his royal predecessor, and he created an informal network of 
supporters, mainly the Gaddafi tribe, to reinforce his power. Tribal alliances continued to 
dominate revolutionary Libya. The self-proclaimed leader of Arabism was indebted to the 
tribes for power through traditional kinship ties that led to a concentration of power in the 
regime and the erosion of the fledging Libyan state. This helps to explain how Gaddafi was 
able to drive public policies in a personal way, without the involvement of citizens or even 
his appointed ministers.  
Popular committees were founded to look after the affairs of citizens throughout Libya and to 
include the voices of citizens. However, the leaders of these committees were members or 
supporters of the political elite and they subscribed to the ideology of the regime. Further, 
any alternative views were looked at with suspicion, and individuals were punished. This was 
also the case in higher education, in the example I cited in Chapter 8 concerning the 
execution of students in 1976. The official ideology of the state in Libya was to be spread 
throughout society. Libyan foreign policy also showed hostility to different ideas in political 
and economic relations. The rivalry between Bourguiba and Gaddafi was motivated by their 
personal disagreements on ideology and personality. Tunisia's 'President-for-Life' rejected 
Arabism, and Gaddafi's policies in particular, and this led to tensions between their nations. 
The Gafsa crisis, mentioned in the previous section, demonstrates the personal nature of 
bilateral relations with Gaddafi's radical pan-Arab ideology, backing an attempt to overthrow 
Bourguiba through Tunisian militants. Populist discourses from the state hid the reality of 
power in Libyan politics. Bourguiba and Gaddafi were also personally in charge of the 
decision-making processes of their countries' foreign policy. Decisions could be made and 
unmade at any moment by the leaders of Tunisia and Libya, without consultation involving 
close allies, as in the case of Bourguiba and Gaddafi signing the Djerba agreement on the 
political union of Libya and Tunisia, or the revoking of tourist visas for French nationals in 
Libya. Bilateral relations between these two nations were determined by the personalities and 
beliefs of their heads of state: although I note that Gaddafi did not give himself a formal 
office, such as President or Prime Minister.  
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The succession of Ben Ali in Tunisia also indicates the personal nature of power and how it 
can make radical changes to public policies in a short space of time. Political regimes in 
Tunis and Tripoli were the driving forces for better relations between their two states, after 
almost twenty years of tensions. A change in personality, along with a change in ideology in 
Tunisia, was accompanied by a transformation in Libya too. The regime in the country 
reduced the influence of Arabism and socialism in its foreign policies. Top-down and 
selective economic liberalisation of the Libyan economy created opportunities for Tunisian 
businessmen to set up factories and make investments. Similarly, the Libyan regime set up an 
overseas investment fund to create financial interests. Tunisia also benefited from Libya's 
new focus on the outside world. Joint policies were based on co-operation between Tunisia 
and Libya in various areas, from membership in the African Union to investment in tourism. I 
think the Ben Ali and Gaddafi regimes were able to participate in regional organisations with 
other regimes, in a context of loosely organised sovereign states, without losing their 
autonomy of action. The decision-making processes in Tunis and Tripoli was still located in 
the hands of unaccountable authoritarian elites. The example of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, 
Muammar Gaddafi's son, shows the marriage between authoritarianism and the informal 
sector of power. In the first ten years of the 21st century, Saif Al-Islam presented himself as a 
reformer in the political and economic spheres. Despite not holding formal office, like his 
father, he was able to exercise influence in Libya and lead national organisations, thanks to 
Gaddafi's own power.688  
From Informal to Formal 
Formal state-building efforts in Libya and Tunisia took place against the background of 
colonialism. Interestingly, the forms of resistance against the French in Tunisia and the 
Italians in Libya were expressed through informal social structures. In Chapter 3, I observed 
that anti-colonial activities rejected the colonially-imposed borders separating the two 
territories, with fighters such as Khalifah Ben Asker, in Libya, and Mohammad Daghbaji, in 
Tunisia, crossing these borders. The colonial subjects of the French and Italians were very 
uncomfortable with the rigid boundaries which they perceived to have little or no legitimacy. 
An informal dimension to the modern Maghreb existed before independence. The tribal and 
social systems of the region combined the informal and formal spheres of power and 
authority. Colonial states were imposed from above, and they were based upon coercion, 
                                                 
688 Larbi Sadiki, "Like Father, Like Son: Dynastic Republicanism in the Middle East," Policy Outlook no. 52 
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), p. 7-9. 
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rather than the mass participation of their inhabitants. Independence brought high 
expectations for the formalisation of the rights and activities of Tunisians and Libyans. Libya 
and Tunisia were ruled by monarchs. However, Bourguiba had abolished the monarchy, and 
he became President instead. The head of the Senoussiyya brotherhood was appointed King 
of Libya, enjoying wide powers. The institutions of the modern state had not yet acquired 
legitimacy, to the extent that King Idris I had to rely on his religious and tribal authority to 
rule. Informal social networks underpinned the emerging Libyan nation-state. Similarly, 
Gaddafi's acquisition and maintenance of political power, despite the modern rhetoric of 
populism he depended on tribal support. Family members and cronies formed the political 
elite of Libya and Tunisia. However, the Tunisian elite was also made up of like-minded 
Francophile politicians, with the Youssefists, noted in chapters 3 and 5, excluded from 
politics in the independence period.  
The state, ruling party or popular committees, was not the exclusive sources of political 
activity. As the authoritarian regimes of Libya and Tunisia became more and more 
entrenched, the informal sphere replaced formal organisations. Top-down control under a 
one-party state in Tunisia had concentrated power within political elite that was headed by 
Bourguiba, accompanied by his supporters. Formal policies were shaped by informal 
relationships involving a small group of individuals. The example of Ahmed Ben Saleh 
demonstrates the personal and informal nature of politics. Ben Saleh, a trade unionist within 
the ruling party, urged Bourguiba to adopt socialist policies to achieve a rapid modernisation 
of Tunisia in order to generate jobs for the country's large number of individuals of working 
age: exactly half of the population in 1970. However, the failure of these policies led to Ben 
Saleh falling foul of Bourguiba, being punished by the judiciary and, subsequently, 
imprisoned.  
Populism in Libya had effectively eroded the state's ability to govern. Interestingly, Gaddafi 
attempted to raise himself above formal politics, similarly to Idris I, as the strongest leader 
among the Libyan tribes. It is in this context that he held the titles of ‘Guide of the 
Revolution' or 'Brother-Leader', as I mentioned in Chapter 8. However, the appearance of 
freedom from the state or politics was undermined by the fact Gaddafi and his regime were in 
complete control of the oil industry. As with Idris I, a distance was put between Gaddafi and 
the everyday running of the country. Popular committees were intended to bring together the 
informal, ordinary citizens, and the formal, executive decision-making powers, in the 
empowerment of the masses. Nonetheless, real executive power was exercised by Gaddafi, in 
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a personal fashion which reduced the effectiveness of the formal sphere. Increasingly, 
healthcare and education fell victim to the corruption and incompetence of the public sector. 
Chapter 8 discussed the deterioration of both these areas of Libyan life during Gaddafi's 
reign. Socialism failed to realise the promises of equality and social justice. Instead, 
inequalities widened between the political elite, which became enclosed in an informal 
universe of nepotism and surveillance, and the rest of society. Inter-state relations could 
benefit or suffer from the weakness of the formal institutions of the state. Public policies were 
thus shaped by personal decisions, rather than by a collective and accountable process. This 
explains how Bourguiba and Gaddafi could, as I observed earlier; quickly agree to a political 
union in 1974, only to dissolve it a few days later.  
Bilateral ties between Tunisia and Libya, under Ben Ali and Gaddafi, underwent a sudden 
improvement. Former hostilities were abandoned, with a new emphasis on co-operation in the 
Maghreb. The Libyan-Tunisian border, which dated from the colonial period, became subject 
to the informal traffic of goods and people. No policing of the border, at least on the Libyan 
side, was enforced in the early years of Gaddafi-Ben Ali relations. In a symbolic act, Gaddafi 
drove a tractor and destroyed a border crossing in 1988, to send the message that a new era 
had been born after the border had been closed for two years between 1985 and 1987. The 
informal sphere was dominated by the rapid rise in smuggling and the black market economy. 
Libyan border towns now contained 'the Tunisian Souk', where goods from Tunisia were 
brought into Libya without any regulations or the imposition of customs duty taxes. Although 
Gaddafi's dream of integration with an Arab neighbour could be understood to have become a 
limited reality in the free flow of people and goods, attempts soon followed to formalise this 
cross-border activity. Joint committees were founded only for this purpose, backed by the 
Ben Ali and Gaddafi regimes. The formalising of bilateral ties in the form of committees that 
were made up of both Tunisians and Libyans was underpinned by the ultimate authority of 
the regimes. The preamble to documents produced by the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive 
Committee begins: 
Under the guidance of the two countries’ leaders, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the 
leader of the Al-Fateh Revolution, and his brother, President Zine El Abidine Ben 
Ali, President of Tunisia.689 
                                                 
689 This preamble appeared in most of the Minutes of the Libyan-Tunisian Joint Committee’s meetings. This 
means that the decisions of these committees are subject to the instructions of the political leadership, which, 
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Previous attempts to institutionalise the ideologies of the regimes in Tunisia and Libya were 
replaced by the formalisation of economic co-operation. Neo-liberal economics, after the 
USSR's collapse, in the last decade of the 20th century, had weakened the ideologies of pan-
Arabism and socialism. New emphasis was placed on the ideas of economic growth, foreign 
direct investment and the private sector. The National Treatment Principle, rather than Arab 
unity, defined the new relationship between Tunisia and Libya through the activities of 
formal organisations. Goods from both these countries were to be regarded as equal and 
exempt from customs duties.  
The Tunisian-Libyan Economic Chamber was established and it participated in regulating 
bilateral relations between Tunisia and Libya through recommendations and the 
implementation of agreements. Extensive co-ordination of commercial activities by the 
Chamber and the Libyan-Tunisian High Executive Committee, sought to create opportunities 
for both publicly-owned and private companies. Rules and mechanisms were imposed, such 
as the issuing of certificates of conformity for goods produced in Tunisia and Libya, in order 
to harmonise the cross-border trade. Further, the Protocol on the Rules of Origin stipulated 
that 40% of a product must have local elements of the country in order to be considered a 
'national' good, and thus escape customs taxes. Reports and recommendations by the /high 
Committee were also part of the process of determining the framework of behaviour and the 
activity of other social actors: especially a previously illegal private sector in Libya. Signed 
agreements aimed to formalise and regulate the inter-state economic exchange after the 
period of informal trade that had led to the growth of the black market. Control of trade 
between Tunisia and Libya was carried out through bilateral efforts and in an authoritarian 
context. The formal sphere could be used to strengthen political elites who had previously 
relied on informal kinship networks and the security services in order to stay in power. 
Economic Motivations 
While the first period mentioned in the hypothesis, between 1969 and 1987, was dominated 
by bilateral relations that were influenced by ideology, the second period, from 1987 until 
2010, was marked by economic concerns. In Chapter 8, I divided my discussion according to 
the key areas of the economy, beginning with the primary sector, followed by the secondary 
sector, and, finally, ending my analysis on the tertiary sector. These three sectors were 
                                                                                                                                                        
after 1987, became more willing to achieve co-operation that would lead to integration in the medium or long 
term. 
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interdependent to a large degree, and the strengths of industries within and across them 
differed. There were also differences between Tunisia and Libya in the level of development 
of the sectors and industries in their economies. Organisations, such as the Tunisian-Libyan 
Economic Chamber, participated in the co-ordination of economic interests between their 
Libyan and Tunisian counterparts, including companies and businessmen. Saeeda Hashisha 
pointed out, in an interview, that interdependence between Tunisia and Libya could only 
become a reality if the regimes in power actively produced the context for it. I mentioned 
above that the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s was accompanied by the ideological 
bankruptcy of socialism. Arab states abandoned many of the policies that were originally 
aimed at redistributing wealth through the nationalisation of the private sector.  
Among Arabs, post-colonial politics was strongly influenced by socialist ideals in the mid-
20th century. In the first section, I examined the divide between radical and conservative 
regimes, which also demonstrated the division between socialist and pro-capitalist economies 
in the Arab world. Tunisia and Libya were members of both camps for some time after 
independence. King Idris I had moved Libya onto a path of capitalist development, alongside 
an emerging welfare system. Tunisia experienced state-led development in partnership with 
the private sector, the traditional bourgeoisie, under the Bourguiba regime. Industrialisation 
was pursued, at first without the nationalisation of industry or land, as had occurred in Libya 
or further east in Egypt under the Nasserist regime. The largely unsuccessful socialist policies 
implemented during the 1960s were replaced by liberal policies. The Bourguiba regime 
wanted to quickly modernise through either a liberal or a socialist agenda. Pragmatic 
concerns guided the Tunisian leadership in the economy. A light industrial sector, mainly 
manufacturing goods, was created alongside the growth of tourism in the country. Exports to 
overseas markets and attracting foreign visitors made Tunisia dependent on international 
capital flows needed to stimulate economic growth and generate employment for an 
increasingly youthful population. These two factors would encourage Tunisia, after the 
ousting of Bourguiba, to foster better relations with the Libyan regime in order to benefit 
from its oil revenues. During Ben Ali's rule, a neo-liberal policy was implemented in Tunisia, 
indicating the priority of economic motivations in the calculations of his regime. He is 
reported to have said that: 
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The globalisation which we have chosen to engage in with confidence and 
determination puts major challenges before us. We have to rise to them because 
they provide us with opportunities which we have to seize.690 
Globalisation was understood in economic terms, with the political implications of an open 
society rejected by Ben Ali. Foreign direct investment was thus a crucial dimension to 
generate a national income, to generate jobs for Tunisians and to secure the stability of the 
regime of Ben Ali. Tourism in Tunisia was subject to heavy Libyan investment. It is 
important to note that tourism generated the second largest number of jobs in the Tunisian 
economy. Further, tourists from Libya became the highest number of visitors from a foreign 
country. The Gaddafi regime's efforts to diversify its sources of income can be seen in the 
government-run Libyan Company for Foreign Investment's ownership of the Touqrannas 
Company. Resorts and hotels were run by this company, which generated jobs for Tunisians. 
Mutual investment opportunities in various sectors of the economy appear to have changed 
the Gaddafi regime's deep dislike for private enterprise from the mid-1970s until the late 
1980s. In Libya, socialism had, as I noted earlier, removed the private sector from the 
economy. The Gaddafi regime had no competitors in society and managed to tighten its 
control on all economic sectors. Oil was the key prize which enabled it to depend less and 
less on the state. Further, the pressure to create a national infrastructure that was partly 
funded by the regime and driven by private enterprise was absent. Gaddafi's The Green Book 
had, as cited in Chapter 4, described capitalism in negative terms. Economic exploitation of 
the masses was to be confronted through banning private capital. The phrase 'Partners not 
Workers' was repeated in an appeal to the egalitarian nature of the socialist and populist 
ideology of the Libyan regime. However, this was an attempt to eliminate autonomous 
sources of activity in Libya which could pose a political threat to Gaddafi's authoritarian 
political and ideological position, as I argued further in Chapter 4.  
Libya's public sector ran the economy with disastrous effects for the country's society. 
Manufacturing was weak and other areas of industry, except oil-related products, did not 
receive the attention of the regime's development plans, or they failed to develop. A lack of 
competence that was made worse by corruption had eroded Libya's economy. Thus many 
Libyans turned to neighbouring countries for goods, and even for healthcare. Ben Ali's 
Tunisia was an obvious choice for many, with the Libyan-Tunisian bilateral relations 
                                                 
690Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, 'Speech by Tunisian President at the Tenth Symposium of the Constitutional 
Democratic Rally. Tunisian Al-Sabah Newspaper. 15/11/1998. P. 2. 
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attempting to facilitate the movement of people and goods. The international embargo 
imposed on Libya was also a key factor which led many Libyans to go to Tunisia as a link to 
the outside world. As a result, Libya moved away from socialism and was motivated by an 
agenda of economic reform. Misbah Fakroun observed that: 
The effect of the ideological factor is no longer as strong as it was before the mid-
1990s. Very often, we took decisions that we could not have taken because they 
conflicted with some of the principles of the ideology that applied in Libya. For 
instance, Libya gave licenses to Tunisian business agencies, although they were 
inconsistent with Libyan socialist thoughts, which considered these activities to be 
exploitative and not to establish social justice.691 
The liberalisation of the economy was selective and was managed from the top-down. While 
ideology, after 1987, appears to have declined in Gaddafi's Libya, the authoritarian 
dominating the country remained unchanged. Arabism and socialism were ignored, and there 
was an increased emphasis on reviving private enterprise under restricted conditions. The oil 
industry was still held by the regime and was not affected by the privatisation of foreign 
investment in other areas of Libya's economy. Mahmoud al-Fatisi stated, in an interview I 
conducted with him, cited in Chapter 6, that the continued domination of oil by Gaddafi was 
motivated by his ideas. I would argue instead that this area of the economy was primary and 
was the largest source of national income which, if relinquished, would lead to the demise of 
the authoritarian system which had been in place since 1969.  
Libyan-Tunisian bilateral relations were beginning to be based on economic growth, with 
important consequences. The Tunisian leadership, led by Ben Ali, was less interested in 
fighting the battles of Bourguiba and was keen on attracting foreign direct investment. 
Libya's petrodollars were thus a very important source of external funding for a Tunisian 
economy dependent on international capital. Interestingly, Libyan incentives to open up the 
economy were not based on Tunisia's links to global capitalism, which allowed it ignore the 
advice of international organisations such as the IMF, which might have  led to an intrusion 
into Gaddafi's control of Libyan politics. Nonetheless, Tunisian investment was welcomed in 
Libya in the areas of manufacturing and agriculture, as I pointed out in Chapter 8, with 
Tunisian experience being utilised. Further, bilateral relations took place in Africa, led by 
                                                 
691Author’s interview with Misbah Fakroun, a former member of The Libyan-Tunisian High Executive 
Committee, and the Head of the Arab Co-operation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Libya. (Tripoli, 
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Libya's growing influence in the continent. Investment by Tunisia and Libya, on a joint basis, 
occurred through the United Libyan-Tunisian Corporation. Although Ben Ali saw greater co-
operation with Libya as a means to secure his rule and achieve economic growth, Gaddafi 
wanted to get around the sanctions against his regime. Political interests and the weakening 
of ideology motivated both regimes to work together. The authoritarian nature of power in 
Tunisia and Libya could still be an obstacle in their economic ties. In Chapters 6 and 8, I 
mentioned the involvement of the intelligence services in the economy, through the 
ownership of tourist companies. Further, foreign visitors were subject to surveillance in an 
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Collaboration on joint projects between Tunisia and 
Libya failed to change the attitude of the Libyan regime in this area. The unpredictability of 
the Libyan regime in bilateral relations also negatively impacted on the integration of the 
Libyan-Tunisian tourist industry. French tourists, forming a large number of tourists visiting 
Tunisia, had their visas for Libya revoked, under an agreement allowing them entrance to 
both Maghrebi countries. Libya's national tourism thus suffered a blow alongside the 
previous co-ordination of the Libyan and Tunisian regime on an issue that remained 
politically sensitive for Tripoli.  
 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Study 
The research I have carried out that is contained in this thesis aimed to answer and explore 
the hypothesis outlined above through the collection and analysis of primary sources. I used a 
grounded theory approach to generate the categories of analysis which have been discussed in 
the previous sections of this chapter. My choice of grounded theory, complemented by 
discourse analysis, was based on the specific historical context that gave rise to Libyan-
Tunisian bilateral relations. Other theories, such as neo-functionalism, were unsuitable due to 
their Eurocentric ideas about integration among nation-states and the existence of supra-
national institutions, such as the European Union.  
Europe's historical experience is unique to the continent, after experiencing two world wars, 
the Cold War and the formation of the EU in 1957. Further, the colonial powers dominating 
the Arab World and the Maghreb were located in Europe. Different cultural, economic, 
political and social factors distinguish Europe from the Maghreb. In North Africa, the nation-
state is still in a process of maturing. I conducted this research with the awareness that a 
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theory that was able to explain the specific aspects of Libyan-Tunisian bilateral relations 
from 1969 to 2010 needed to be formulated. Integration in the Maghreb did not follow a 
'European model' nor did it show a potential for an Arab or a pan-Maghrebi unitary state. 
Instead, I wanted to identify the key aspects of the relations through the influence of ideology 
and its subsequent decline. Discourse analysis was applied to the primary sources, which 
were collected from interviews and official documents. I focused my analysis on the language 
contained in the interview answers and documents. Key words and phrases were identified, as 
well as their repetition. Further, terms relating to these words and phrases were subject to 
examination. I aimed to generate a set of categories that was based on the content of the 
primary sources. In the following subsections, I will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of 
my research in an attempt to examine Libyan-Tunisian relations with reference to the primary 
sources that I collected.  
Data Collection 
The first stage of collecting information for my thesis required that I formulate a number of 
questions reflecting the hypothesis and research questions. At the same time, I identified 
possible interviewees who would agree to take part in interviews. All the participants were 
from either Libya or Tunisia. I was aware of the need to formulate questions which could 
both identify the key themes of interest in this thesis and give interviewees the freedom to 
answer according to their experiences, memories and opinions. Semi-structured interviews 
were used throughout this research. However, a major weakness emerging from this type of 
interview questioning is the constraining of the interviewee, who may feel pressurised to 
answer questions in a particular way. A balance between prepared questions and open-ended 
answers was very important to achieve in an attempt to develop the preliminary hypothesis.692 
The process of formulating the hypothesis and the research questions acted as reference 
points for me as I reformulated their focus in the light of the research gathered from primary 
and secondary sources. Both the hypothesis and the research questions, in the early stage of 
research, highlighted the potential themes to be asked in interviews. I wanted to give my 
interviewees the space to identify and explore various aspects of Libyan-Tunisian relations 
without imposing on them a fixed set of agendas. Interviewees were able to make links 
between past events and changes in the present.  
                                                 
692 Stephen L. Schensul et al, Essential Ethnographic Methods: Observations, Interviews, and Questionnaires 
(Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 1999), p. 149-150. 
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Additionally, the collection of information from the various participants helped the process of 
identifying shared assumptions and opinions. Structured interviews would not have allowed 
me to obtain data from which to generate a theory of analysis and interpretation based on 
grounded theory. Despite the apparent flexibility in the use of unstructured interviews, the 
differences among the interviews were unable to allow a systematic comparison of the 
answers collected, which was needed in my thesis.693 Instability in the Maghreb during the 
Arab Spring made the interviewing of participants difficult. The political and security 
conditions delayed the conducting of interviews as I contacted potential interviewees. Some 
refused to talk about the Gaddafi-Ben Ali era. In many cases, initial agreements to be 
interviewed were withdrawn. Collection of first-hand accounts of Libyan-Tunisian relations 
from 1969 until 2010 also required the identifying and obtaining of official documents from 
state or government archives. Politically sensitive information was contained in these 
documents in a context that was not favourable to the free activity of carrying out research. I 
thus used personal contacts to obtain them, and I also requested official papers from 
individuals who were connected to the particular research areas. The interview questions and 
answers and the official documents that I analysed were mostly in Arabic. As this thesis has 
been written in English, I was required to undertake translations from Arabic to English, 
using various Arabic-English dictionaries. This process required being able to translate key 
words and phrases from one language to another without losing the original meaning. 
However, I am very aware of the specific cultural context of languages such as Arabic and 
English, and I tried to avoid errors in the process of translation. Secondary sources on Tunisia 
and the Arab world, written in in English, were very helpful finding suitable corresponding 
words with the same or similar meanings.  
Analysis and Interpretation of Data 
Application of discourse analysis to the above mentioned sources was based on the 
importance of language in revealing the motivations for, and aspects of, bilateral relations 
between Tunisia and Libya from 1969 to 2010. The existence of a repetitive pattern of key 
words and phrases in the primary sources allowed me to identify a set of themes that 
interviewees and the authors of official government documents considered essential. 
Inconsistency in the information collected from the primary sources may appear to be a 
weakness. Differences of opinion are to be expected on such a polarised subject as Libyan-
                                                 
693 C. R. Kothari, Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques (New Delhi: New Age International, 2004), 
p. 98. 
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Tunisian relations. The personalities of Gaddafi and Bourguiba provoke a variety of reactions 
from supporters and foes alike. However, I was able to obtain a level of consistency through 
the frequent comparison of information gathered from interviews and documents. Secondary 
sources also played a key part in supplying a context to primary sources. Grounded theory 
complemented the set of themes identified from the primary sources, which later led to the 
formulation of a theory suitable to the case study under investigation. I examined in detail the 
various aspects of the theory which were generated from the interpretation of primary sources 
throughout my research. These aspects were divided according to the following headings: 
international and regional factors, durability of authoritarianism, the dynamics between the 
informal and formal spheres, and economic motivations.  
As a result of the limited focus of the research I conducted on Libyan-Tunisian relations 
between 1969 and 2010, I had to be selective of the areas I investigated. My research was 
restricted to two countries during a specific period, on a particular area with political, 
economic and social implications. My findings and the theory generated from applying 
discourse analysis will thus have a limited applicability to other case studies. The level of 
generalisation has been restricted, as I have focused on a case study concerning inter-state 
relations between Tunisia and Libya. At the same time, I have also identified broader trends 
within these relations that may lead to de-emphasising exceptions in the analysis and findings 
that are present in this thesis. However, I have sought to frequently cite evidence to support 
arguments and positions. The accumulation of quotations and citations in this thesis was 
aimed at strengthening the analysis of Libyan-Tunisian ties.  
I identified Gaddafi's rise to power after 1969 as the key period which began a tension-filled 
relationship between Libya and Tunisia. Previously, King Idris I had maintained cordial ties 
with Bourguiba, and had shared a conservative outlook on the geopolitics of the Middle East. 
However, the establishment of socialism and Arabism as the ideologies of the Libyan regime, 
and the Tunisian nationalism espoused by the Bourguiba regime, contributed to a negative 
political environment in the Maghreb. My research finished its examination of Libyan-
Tunisian ties from 1987 to 2010. Improved relations in this period were preceded by a decline 
in ideology, revolutionary Arabism and Tunisian nationalism, in the late 1980s. I deliberately 
chose not to continue my study after 2010, due to the outbreak of the Arab Spring and the fall 
of Ben Ali. Similar protests broke out in Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen and Libya. Other 
authoritarian heads of state were brought down, such as Hosni Mubarak, Ali Abdullah Saleh 
and Gaddafi. To include the period after 2010 would have introduced an entirely new 
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dimension to my thesis, and perhaps a new hypothesis and set of research questions. Further, 
the Arab Spring has created a new context, which has not yet settled down, and the 
implications of the end of the Ben Ali and Gaddafi regimes is far from clear.  
 
Future Research 
In-depth Examination of Relations between Bourguiba and Gaddafi  
In this thesis, I conducted research into inter-state relations between Tunisia and Libya in the 
period iof independence from 1969 to 2010. I will now propose future areas of research 
which can elaborate further on my analysis and the reflections contained here. Although I 
examined Bourguiba and Gaddafi as part of the first part of my hypothesis: that the impact of 
ideology on their bilateral ties was largely negative, there is plenty of ground to cover 
concerning the personal relations of these two individuals. The psychology, background, 
education and beliefs of both Bourguiba and Gaddafi can be analysed in order to better 
understand what drove their hostile attitude towards each other. Unofficial papers, eyewitness 
accounts and autobiographies can be used to draw a picture of the personal relations between 
Bourguiba and Gaddafi in a deeply ideological context. Bourguiba's years in France and his 
participation in the Tunisian anti-colonial movement, leading to imprisonment, had a strong 
impact on him. The humble tribal background of Gaddafi and his years in the military 
preceded his revolutionary phase of pan-Arabism, which lasted almost 20 years. Personal 
histories of these two leaders, similar to those of other heads of state, can provide clues to 
understanding the bilateral relations of their countries during the Cold War.  
Libyan-Egyptian Bilateral Relations in the Post-colonial Period 
The analysis of Libyan-Tunisian ties deliberately ignored the presence of Egypt in North 
Africa. Although Egypt is not considered to be part of the Maghreb, it has exerted a lot of 
influence on Libya and other countries. Jamal Abdul Nasser was a hero to many Arabs, and 
this level of support threatened 'conservative' regimes in the Arab world. However, the 
geopolitics of the region was transformed after his death. Anwar al-Sadat, who succeeded 
Nasser, moved Egypt from the radical camp when he signed a peace treaty with Israel and his 
country was subsequently excluded from the Arab League. The assassination of al-Sadat was 
a major turning point in the Middle East. The new President, Hosni Mubarak, decisively 
pushed Egypt to the conservative camp. Libya's regime, under Gaddafi, had lost a strategic 
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ally in al-Sadat, and this was even truer in Mubarak's reign. In this context, I would propose 
future study into the Libyan-Egyptian bilateral relations, which could point to the opposite 
findings to those in this thesis. Although a decline in the role of ideology in Libyan-Tunisian 
relations did lead to better relations, Gaddafi's Libya and Nasser's Egypt enjoyed excellent 
relations, thanks to a shared ideology. Crises plagued the relations between Libya and Egypt 
during the reigns of al-Sadat and Mubarak, with their shared border witnessing the 
unpredictable pattern of conflict and co-operation.  
Tunisian Relations with other Arab States 
Foreign policy relations between Tunisia and other Arab states would consist of an 
exploration of the broader context of the Arab world during the 20th century. Although the 
leaderships of Bourguiba and Ben Ali turned to Europe and the USA for military and 
economic partnership, the relations they had with their Arab neighbours were very important. 
The location of Tunisia between oil-rich Libya and FLN-controlled Algeria, showed how 
vulnerable it could be, surrounded as it was by radical regimes. However, the conservative 
regimes in the Arab Gulf provided some support. Bourguiba had backed the formation of the 
Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) as part of his links to Saudi Arabia. The Tunisian 
President's anti-monarchy sentiments did not stop him from having friendly relations with the 
monarchies of the Gulf. Instead, these states provided support against the revolutionary 
ideology dominating Egypt, Libya and Algeria during the Cold War era. I think further 
investigation into Tunisian-Gulf relations would show the existence of cordial ties without 
the negative impact of ideology. 
Gaddafi's Africa Policy: The 'King of Kings' 
In the post-Cold War period, the Libyan regime, led by Gaddafi, shifted its focus or regional 
co-operation from the Arab world to Africa. I have identified the shift to the African 
continent in the context of Libyan-Tunisian relations in this thesis, but I have not explored in 
detail the underlying motivations that drove Gaddafi's increased presence in the continent. 
Interestingly, Gaddafi was apparently awarded the title of 'King of Kings' of Africa, in 
addition to his other domestic titles. Did pan-Africanism replace pan-Arabism as the ideology 
of the Libyan regime? What made Africa a more attractive prospect for integration and co-
operation? Why did the Libyan regime pursue closer relations with states such as Zimbabwe? 
These three questions will need to be answered in any future research on Gaddafi's policies 
on Africa in a changing world. I have only slightly examined the overlapping issues that 
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combine the questions proposed here, due to limited space in my thesis. Future scholarship 
should identify the motivations for the dramatic change in the foreign policy of Libya after 
the end of the Cold War, and the consequences of such a change on African states and 
societies.  
 Study of Tunisia's Foreign Policy in Africa 
Although my research looks into the bilateral ties between Tunisia and Libya, I did not fully 
engage with Tunisian foreign policy in Africa. Similarly to the previous proposed area of 
research, the limited focus of this thesis was only  on relations between two states which were 
African, Arab and Maghrebi. Africa represented a lucrative export market for Tunisia, but the 
country's foreign policy was made up of a complex process. The line between politics and 
economics was not strictly observed. Ben Ali's authoritarian regime, from 1987 to 2011, had 
financial interests in various sectors of the economy. Tunisian exports were considered to be 
a key part of the political interests of the regime, whereby membership in the African Union, 
examined above and in a previous chapter, was underpinned by a neo-liberal agenda. African 
states have become increasingly prominent on the world stage and the Nigerian economy 
overtook South Africa in 2014 to become the largest economy in Africa. A potential area of 
further study is the exploration of how Ben Ali's foreign and economic policies were 
connected in the interaction with the dynamic economies of Africa.  
The Arab Spring and the New Dynamics in Libyan-Tunisian Relations 
This study on Libyan-Tunisian relations began before the outbreak of the Arab Spring in late 
2010 and early 2011, which saw revolutions in these two countries. Mohammad Bouazizi's 
act in setting himself on fire in a desperate act of frustration and protest, culminated in the 
end of Ben Ali's regime following mass protests. The fate of Gaddafi was similar, if not more 
violent, after the protests in Libya were transformed into an armed rebellion seeking to topple 
him. At the present time, both the Ben Ali and Gaddafi regime no longer exist. The findings 
and reflections I have noted in this thesis can lay down the foundations for research into the 
Arab Spring. A post-authoritarian Maghreb can benefit from scholarship on the previous era 
of top-down politics that were restricted to unaccountable political elites. I have shed light on 
the processes of formalisation and how the lack of political will was an obstacle to a 
predictable state of relations between Tunisia and Libya during the period under examination. 
Further research could focus on the future direction of inter-state relations between a 
democratising Tunisia and a Libya that is currently experiencing a civil war. Has the Arab 
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Spring created an opportunity for regimes, struggling to democratise, to work together on the 
project of integration? Will the new governments in Libya and Tunisia take advantage of this 
opportunity? What consequences emerge from the demise of authoritarianism in Tunisia and 
Libya on their bilateral relations? The questions asked in this subsection require exploration 
through the examination of primary sources and interviews with the new political actors, who 
were previously marginalised.  
 
Policy Recommendations of the Study 
I will now make two recommendations for policy-making in the area of Tunisia-Libyan inter-
state relations. The study generated a theory of analysis which identified international and 
regional factors, the strength of authoritarianism, the interaction between informal and formal 
spheres, and economic objectives. The first recommendation proposes that Libyan and 
Tunisian decision-makers in a post-authoritarian environment must recognise the notion of a 
democratic mandate obtained through elections. Popular participation could then be included 
in the decision-making process without excluding key actors, such as businessmen, 
merchants, workers and others. A less ideological atmosphere would be reflected in the 
public policies of the governments in Tunis and Tripoli. I propose that concrete issues, such 
as the provision of healthcare and the quality of education, dominate the demands of people 
in Tunisia and Libya. I thus argue further that the need to include individuals who were 
previously marginalised by the authoritarian systems led by Bourguiba, followed by Ben Ali, 
and Gaddafi, would mark a reversal of relations. This reversal would be more significant than 
the period between 1987 and 2010 in terms of the empowerment of the people who actually 
travel and trade across the Libyan-Tunisian border. Maintaining the direction towards 
freedoms in politics and media will prove to be essential if economic integration is to be 
realised. 
The second recommendation argues that the decline of ideology from 1987 onwards, and the 
more recent disappearance of dictatorships, have created a context suitable for the 
implementation of previously agreed projects of economic integration. A free trade zone, a 
highway connecting Tunisia and Libya, and the creation of a single electricity grid and 
bilateral investment deals involving the private sector, are key areas of potential activity. 
Economic interdependence can be achieved through political will. Building up the capacity of 
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state institutions, a strong challenge in Libya, and using these institutions to formalise 
bilateral ties, can contribute to long-term co-operation. High levels of unemployment and 
social issues can be tackled jointly through investment policies in all three sectors of the 
economy: primary, secondary and tertiary, targeting problem areas. While co-operation in 
tourism presents a short-term solution to the generation of jobs, joint co=ordination in 
education, through teacher and educationalist exchange programmes, can improve the 
competitiveness of the Libyan and Tunisian economies. A dynamic and adaptable labour 
force would then be able to compete with other developing or developed countries in the 
Arab world and in other regions. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
Libyan Parliament 
 
The General People’s Congress 
Libyan Cabinet 
 
The General People's Committee 
Libyan Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
 
The General People's Committee for Foreign  
Relations and international Cooperatio 
Libyan Ministry of Finance  
 
The General People’s Committee of Finance 
Libyan Prime Minister 
 
General Secretary of the General People's Committee 
Libyan Ministry of Tourism   
  
The General Libyan People’s Committee of Tourism 
Libyan Ministry of Economy  
 
The General Libyan People’s Committee of  Economy  
Libyan Ministry Of Health The General Libyan People’s Committee of  Health 
 
It was a watchdog department in the Libyan Parliament established to 
prevent corruption, and to set, monitor, and enforce standards of financial 
transparency in executive branches.    
The General 
People’s 
Committee for 
Control and 
Follow-up 
 
Senoussiyya Sufi brotherhood was present throughout the Sahara desert. It 
was founded by a returning pilgrim, from Mecca and Medina in the Hijaz, 
who preached the return to a simple and uncorrupted form of Islam. Most of 
the members of the Senoussiyya were recruited from the tribesmen of 
Libyan Desert. The Senoussiyya opposed Italian colonialism and were able 
to start a process of state-building in Libya where none had existed. 
 
Senoussiyya 
Youssefism acquired its name from the eponymous Youssef Ben Selah, who 
was a Tunisian Leader, WHICH included the currents of thinking, political 
parties, unionist organisations, patriotic and other revolutionary adherents, 
who believed in armed struggle as the right way to liberate the land from 
Youssefism 
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French Colonialism. 
  
It is one of the Battles between the Libyans and Italians during the colonial 
period in which Italians defeated.     
 
al-Qardabiyah 
It is the East region of the Arab World composes Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, 
Lebanon, and Syria. It refers to the direction of the place of Sunrise. 
 
The Mashreq 
It is the West region of the Arab World composes Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, 
Morocco and Mauritania.  
 
The Maghreb 
It refers to a majority sect of Shi’ite Muslims whose traditionally believe in 
the Twelve Imams who are spiritual and political successor of the Islamic 
prophet Mohammed (Peace upon him).  
 
Shi'ite imam 
It is one of the four Islamic law schools (Madhhab Fiqhi) within Sunni 
Islam.  
 
Maliki school 
A black market that had flourished in the hands of cross-border smugglers 
which emerged in the border cities of Libya. 
 
Tunisian Souk 
It refers to a group of fighters using a special tactic of military offensive 
which had used by Libyan and Tunisian fighters against the colonial 
Authorities.  
 
Fellagha 
It refers to courts that apply the Islamic law in Judiciary.   Shari’ah courts 
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